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Introduction
This thesis consists of four essays that analyze the impact of public policy on issues at the
heart of the current policy debate: Retirement insurance reform, the real estate market, and
income inequality. The first three chapters empirically assess the impact of retirement and
housing market reforms in Germany, using large-scale micro-datasets. These essays do not
only thoroughly analyze behavioral responses and price eects and contribute novel insights
to the literature, they also provide valuable insights for future policy-making in Germany and
beyond. The fourth essay has a more methodological focus, addressing the measurement of
top income shares. Here, calculations are applied to US data.
The first chapter The Eects of Early Retirement Incentives on Retirement Decisions, which is
joint work with Mathias Dolls, analyzes behavioral responses to a major reform in the German
public pension system. This 2014 reform allowed individuals with a long contribution history
to retire without deductions before reaching the regular retirement age. Using administrative
data from public pension insurance accounts, we first conduct an event study, which indicates
that the probability of retiring immediately increases by approximately 10 percentage points
upon becoming eligible. These large eects persist even if we limit the sample to individuals
who do not become eligible at ages that are commonly framed as reference ages. Second,
we employ a coarsened exact matching procedure to compare retirement entry decisions of
eligible and non-eligible individuals. Our results show that individuals who are eligible for the
early retirement scheme retire on average 6.4 months earlier than non-eligible individuals
with identical characteristics. This translates into a decrease in the average retirement age by
0.74months in response to a one percentage point reduction in deductions, a fairly large eect
compared to the literature. With additional pension insurance expenditures of 10.4 billion
euros and aggregate fiscal costs of 19.8 billion euros in the years 2014 to 2017, our subsequent
fiscal cost projections are at the upper end of the range of previous back-of-the-envelope
estimates.
The second chapterWho Bears the Burden of Real Estate Transfer Taxes? Evidence from the
German Housing Market focuses on taxation of the real estate sector. This essay is joint work
with Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest and Florian Neumeier. Using a rich micro dataset on
German property prices covering the period from 2005 to 2018, we examine the eects of real
estate transfer taxes (RETT) on house prices. We exploit a 2006 constitutional reform that
allowed states to set their own RETT rates, leading to frequent increases in states’ tax rates in
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subsequent years. Our monthly event study estimates indicate a price response that strongly
exceeds the change in the tax burden for single transactions. I.e., twelvemonths aer a reform,
a one percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces property prices by on average 3%.
Eects are stronger for apartments and apartment buildings than for single-family houses,
and are robust tomany specifications. We interpret these results in the context of a theoretical
model that accounts for the eects of RETT on a property’s resale value. If a property is
expected to be tradedmore frequently in the future, the decline in its price can exceed the
increase in the tax burden. Moreover, larger price eects can be explained by higher bargaining
power of sellers, and by transaction taxes limiting which houses downpayment-constrained
households are able to aord.
The third chapter The Eect of Real Estate Purchase Subsidies on Property Prices also focuses
on government interventions in the housingmarket, assessing to which degree direct housing
purchase subsidies are capitalized into property prices. Using a large-scale micro dataset on
German property prices, I exploit that in 2018, the state of Bavaria introduced amuchmore
generous subsidy scheme than other German states. My dierence-in-dierence estimations
at the Bavarian interstate border indicate that following the reform, the prices of single-family
homes increased by about 3.4%more in Bavarian border regions than in neighboring states.
This is consistent with a full capitalization of the subsidy. No eect is found for apartments,
whose purchasers seldom qualify for the subsidy. A heterogeneity analysis confirms that
the price eect is larger in segments of the real estate market with a higher exposure to
the subsidy scheme. I also provide suggestive evidence that the subsidy scheme slightly
stimulated construction activity. Overall, my results indicate that instead of making house
purchases more aordable for families, the subsidy scheme led to a rise in house prices and
mainly benefited sellers of properties.
The fourth chapter Richer or More Numerous or Both? The Role of Population and Economic
Growth for Top IncomeShares, which is jointworkwith Andreas Peichl andDanielWaldenström,
makes a more methodological contribution to the inequality literature. The most commonly
usedmeasure for top income inequality is the income share of a fixed percentile of the pop-
ulation. While meeting many of the desired distributional criteria, this measure is sensitive
to developments in the size of the underlying population or in the real economy. However,
when measuring inequality over the long-run, accounting for population and productivity
growth is important. This essay presents three alternative measures of top income shares
that explicitly account for population and income growth. While the standard top share is
a relative inequality measure, our three alternative measures take either an absolute or an
intermediate point of view on inequality. We apply these measures to long-term income data
from the United States and find that the U-shaped inequality trend over the past century holds
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up, but with important qualifications. For instance, we find more accentuated top income
share growth since 1980 when allowing for variation in the population share of high-income
individuals. Altogether, our findings suggest using several complementary top sharemeasures
when assessing long-term income inequality trends.
Appendices can be found at the end of the respective chapter. A consolidated bibliography is
included at the end of this thesis.
3

1 The Effect of Early Retirement Incentives on
Retirement Decisions
1.1 Introduction
Pension systems around the world face aging populations and demographic change, putting
increased pressure on fiscal sustainability. Against this background, many countries have
conducted pension reforms aimed at extending the working lives of the elderly population
(OECD, 2017). These reforms encompass increases in the normal or the early retirement
ages, tightening qualifying conditions and the introduction of actuarial deductions for early
retirement. While Germany also increased the normal retirement age and closed specific
pathways to retirement, a major reform in 2014, quite to the contrary, sharply increased early
retirement incentives for individuals with a long contribution history.
This paper analyzes behavioral responses to this public pension reform that expanded the
so-called old-age pension for the especially long-term insured by allowing individuals with at
least 45 contributory years to retire without deductions as early as age 63. In the years before
the reform, retiring without deductions was only possible at age 65, i.e., the reform implied
a significant shi in the retirement age at which the long-term insured can retire without a
financial penalty. Another element of the reformwas to include additional pension-relevant
periods such as periods of unemployment benefit receipt or of voluntary contributions to
the public pension insurance as contribution years, thereby broadening the pool of eligible
individuals. In the three years following the reform, the old-age pension for the especially
long-term insured – commonly known as the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme – has been the most
important pathway into early retirement in Germany. Overall, it is the secondmost common
pathway towards retirement, with on average 25% of new retirees exiting the labor market
through this scheme, as compared to 33% of retirees retiring at the regular retirement age
(Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2018).
We assess responses to this reform based on high-quality administrative data on pension
claimants from public pension insurance accounts for the years 2013-2017. We first provide
descriptive graphical evidence showing that the likelihood of retiring at the age of 63 in
This chapter is joint work with Mathias Dolls. An older version circulates as Dolls and Krolage (2019).
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post-reform years rises for eligible, but not for non-eligible individuals. We likewise provide
suggestive survey evidence that the reform has changed retirement expectations and has to
some extent re-established age 63 as a retirement reference age for eligible individuals.
In our main analysis, we make use of two identification strategies to estimate the causal
eect of the reform on retirement choices. First, we employ an event study design which
exploits that individuals become eligible for claiming early retirement without deductions at
dierent ages. The event study analysis shows that the probability of retiring immediately
upon becoming eligible for early retirement without deductions increases by approximately
10 percentage points relative to the counterfactual probability of retiring at the same age
with deductions. This is even the case for individuals who do not become eligible at ages
commonly framed as reference ages for retirement. Looking at specific subgroups in our
sample, we find stronger responses for men compared to women and for voluntarily insured
and employed individuals compared to those in marginal employment.
Second, we use matching techniques and compare retirement choices of eligible and non-
eligible individuals. Results from the coarsened exact matching analysis are in line with
those from the event study analysis. In 2015 to 2017, the three years aer the reform had
been introduced, eligible individuals retire on average 6.4 months earlier than non-eligible
individuals with identical characteristics. This indicates that reducing deductions by one
percentage point lowers the average retirement age by 0.74 months. In a robustness check,
propensity score matching estimates confirm that the reform leads to a preponement of
retirement among eligible individuals of on average 6 months.
Finally, our study provides the first fiscal costs projection of the reform taking into account
actual behavioral responsesof eligible individuals. Ourprojections indicateadditional pension
insurance expenditures of 10.4 billion euros and aggregate fiscal costs of 19.8 billion euros
between 2014 and 2017. These projections are at the upper end of the range of previous back-
of-the-envelope estimates. They also exceed projected costs assumed in the dra government
bill by more than 3 billion euros for the period under consideration.
The paper contributes to the literature studying how individuals respond to incentives in the
retirement insurance system. A large empirical literature addresses the eects of pension
reforms which increase the regular retirement age (Atalay and Barrett, 2015; Behaghel and
Blau, 2012; Engels et al., 2017; Hanel and Riphahn, 2012; Mastrobuoni, 2009) or the early
retirement age (Geyer andWelteke, 2020; Manoli and Weber, 2018; Staubli and Zweimüller,
2013). Mainly employing dierence-in-dierence or regression discontinuity designs, these
studies find substantial labor market eects, albeit at varying magnitudes. In addition to
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increasing employment and an upward shi in retirement claiming ages, some of the papers
also find evidence for program substitution towards unemployment insurance.
In contrast to these studies, our paper assesses a very salient reform that increased incentives
to retire early, which is of particular interest as responses to changing incentives may be
asymmetric. Evidence on such reforms is muchmore scarce. Previous research suggests that
reforms granting the possibility to retire early lead to a reduction in the average retirement age
(Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998; Baker and Benjamin, 1999; Vestad, 2013). The reform we
investigate has a substantially dierent approach though, as rather than enabling retirement
at earlier ages than before, it drastically alters financial incentives for early retirement for a
subgroup of the population. Evidence on responses to financial retirement incentives that do
not entail changing retirement ages is mixed. Analyzing the introduction of deductions in a
structural dynamic retirement model, Bönke et al. (2018) find sizable behavioral responses.
In contrast, results by Brown (2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016) point to only a limited
responsiveness of retirement choices to financial incentives.
Responsiveness to financial incentives also relates to the recent literature on reference depen-
dence and social norms in retirement behavior1: Using bunching analysis, Seibold (2019) finds
that retirement patterns cannot be explained by financial incentives alone. Rather, framing
statutory ages as reference ages results in increased retirement probabilities at these thresh-
olds. Likewise, Behaghel and Blau (2012) and Cribb et al. (2016) find behavioral responses to
reforms of the statutory/early retirement ages that entail no or only limited financial incen-
tives.2 We also contribute to this literature on the role of reference ages. In our sample, all
individuals are able to retire at the early retirement reference age 63, with the dierence that
financial incentives dier considerably between those who are eligible for early retirement
without deductions and thosewhoare not. While the early retirement agepotentially serves as
a more salient focal point for those eligible for the reform (and indeed gains in importance as
revealed by our survey analysis), our results nevertheless show that large financial incentives
aect retirement behavior. This is the case even if they do not coincide with ages commonly
perceived as focal points.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the institutional background of the
German pension system and the 2014 early retirement reform. In section 1.3, we provide
information about the data sources used in subsequent analyses. In addition, we present a
1 See e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Rust and Phelan (1997) or Asch et al. (2005) for early contributions
who do not find evidence for ‘excess retirement’ that cannot be explained by financial incentives.
2 Rabaté (2019) shows that labor demand-induced job-exits as a consequence of mandatory retirement can
explain part of the bunching at references ages.
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survey analysis on retirement aspirations and first descriptive evidence of behavioral eects.
Section 1.4 discusses our empirical strategy to identify the causal eects of the reform on
retirement choices. Our main results are presented in section 1.5. Fiscal costs projections are
reported in section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 The German Public Pension System
Covering almost all private and public sector employees3, the German statutory pension
system provides old-age pensions as well as invalidity and survivors’ benefits. Financed as a
pay-as-you-go scheme, the calculation of pension benefits is based on a person’s contribution
history. Entitlements are calculated according to a point system,where the number of pension
points is determined by the ratio of individual annual earnings to average earnings across
contributors in the same year. The system also features certain redistributive properties, such
as pension points for child raising.
In recent years, the system has seen numerous reforms, aecting both the retirement age
and the choice of pathways towards retirement. In light of demographic tensions, most of
these reforms focused on increasing the retirement age or restricting pathways for accessing
retirement. Most notably, recent years have seen a stepwise increase in the regular retirement
age from 65 to 67. Retiring earlier is possible through several early retirement schemes, but
usually requires deductions of 0.3% per month of retiring early. The accessibility of schemes
depends on the insurance record, notably on the number of contributory years. Retiring
as early as age 63 with deductions is possible for those with at least 35 contributory years.
In addition to periods spent in employment, these also include periods spent raising chil-
dren, voluntarily contributing or, under certain conditions, receiving unemployment benefits.
Severely disabled individuals face both a lower regular and a lower early retirement age. For
those born prior to 1952, two additional pathways were possible. Women with at least 15
contributory years, 10 of which have been spent actively contributing aer age 40, may retire
as early as age 60, but face deductions for eachmonth of early retirement. Likewise, retiring
earlier is also possible aer unemployment or partial retirement.
3 Civil servants are exempt from the statutory pension system. While self-employed individuals in certain
vocations, such as craspeople, are covered by compulsory insurance, other self-employed individuals have the
option to opt into public pension insurance.
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Table 1.1 shows the respective retirement ages by cohort. The reference age for deductions,
which varies across cohorts, diers from the regular retirement age for some birth cohorts.
Hence, this reference age is also depicted here. We also list the deductions a person faces
when retiring at 63 through the ‘regular’ early retirement scheme (see fourth row of Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Retirement ages by birth cohort
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Regular retirement 65+1 65+2 65+3 65+4 65+5 65+6 65+7 65+8 65+9 65+10
Early retirement (reference age) 65 65 65+1..3 65+4 65+5 65+6 65+7 65+8 65+9 65+10
Early retirement (with deductions) 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Deductions at 63a 7.2% 7.2% ∼ 8% 8.4% 8.7% 9.0% 9.3% 9.6% 9.9% 10.2%
Retirement at 63 (no deductions) 63 63 63 63 63 63 63+2 63+4 63+6 63+8
Retirement for disabled (ref.) 63 63 63 63 63 63+1..6 63+7 63+8 63+9 63+10
Retirement for disabled 60 60 60 60 60 60+1..6 60+7 60+8 60+9 60+10
Retirement for women 60 60 60 60 60 - - - - -
Retirement aer unemployment 61+1..6262+1..63 63 63 63 - - - - -
Notes: This table shows the earliest possible retirement ages for regular and early retirement schemes in years +
months. For example, ‘65+2’ refers to 65 years and twomonths. Early retirement schemes other than ‘retirement
at 63’ require deductions of 0.3% per month, for which reference ages are shown. Severely disabled individuals
face a lower reference age. Retirement ages continue to increase up to the 1964 birth cohort. To limit table size,
we restrict this table to a selection of relevant birth cohorts.
a: Deductions when retiring at 63 with less than 45 contributory years, not considering foregone benefits due to
the shorter contribution period.
1.2.2 The 2014 Early Retirement Reform
The 2014 reform of the ‘old-age pension for the especially long-term insured’ contained two
main elements. First, it abolished deductions at the early retirement age for individuals with
long contribution histories. From July 2014 onwards, the so-called ‘retirement at 63’ scheme
permitted individualswith at least 45 contributory years to drawapensionwithout deductions
as early as at age 63. Between 2012 and 2014, the same was possible only at age 65. Prior
to the reform, individuals who would now be eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme and
who retired at 63 would have faced deductions for a period of 24 months, amounting to 7.2%.
Second, the reformbroadened eligibility criteria. Since 2014, further pension-relevant periods,
in particular periods of unemployment benefit receipt and periods of voluntary contributions
to public pension insurance, count towards the 45 contributory years. This enlarges the pool
of potential recipients of the old-age pension for the especially long-term insured.
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As a person retiring through the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme faces no deductions, the change in
incentives upon becoming eligible for the scheme is very large. For example, a person born in
1950 with 44 years and 11 contributory months at age 63 could either retire at age 63 and face
deductions of 8.4%, or keep on working for one more month and not face deductions at all. If
the person earned an average income, delaying retirement by onemonth would thus increase
retirement benefits by roughly 9.4% relative to pre-eligibility benefits.4 This is much larger
than the aforementioned deductions of 8.4% since deductions are generally framed relative
to benefits without deductions. In turn, the 9.4% are set in relation to the comparatively lower
pre-eligibility benefits with deductions. If retirement was delayed one further month, benefits
would only increase by a further 0.19% due to accumulating more pension points during this
month.5
Similar to the regular retirement age, the minimum retirement age for the ‘retirement at
63’ scheme increases across cohorts (see fih row of Table 1.1). From the birth cohort 1953
onwards, it increases stepwise until reaching the age of 65 for the 1964 birth cohort.
The reformof the old-agepension for the especially long-term insuredwaspart of a substantial
and very salient retirement reform, which also increased pensions for mothers of children
born before 1992 and increased invalidity benefits.6 Being the first large project by the new
grand coalition government that had formed at the end of 2013, it was widely discussed in
the media. The reform was first announced in the new government’s coalition agreement
in mid-December 2013, a first legislative dra was passed in January 2014 and the final law
was passed in May. The Ministry of Labor dedicated a publicity campaign to the retirement
reform in January 2014 (‘not a gi, but well-deserved’), claiming that hard-working individuals
4 This calculation assumes the person has contributed for 45 years at an average income, and has thus earned
45 pension points. In this setting, working one further month at an average income increases pension benefits
by 0.19%. Actual incentives dier across individuals due to heterogeneous earnings histories.
5 Two further factors reduce incentives fordelaying retirementonceapersonbecomeseligible for the ‘retirement
at 63’ scheme. First, while individuals who continue working beyond the regular retirement age receive an
extra surcharge amounting to 6% in addition to the pension points earned aer the regular retirement age, this
extra surcharge is not granted to those who continue working aer reaching eligibility for the ‘retirement at 63’
scheme. Second, the gradual introduction of deferred taxation of public pensions since 2005 implies that the
taxable share of public pensions has been increasing by 2 percentage points per year recently. While the taxable
share amounted to 68% in 2014, it has risen to 74% in 2017, the most recent year of our sample period.
6 These other aspects of the reformshould not confoundour analysis. For once, invalidity benefits are commonly
drawn at a much earlier age and with much fewer contributory years than required by the ‘retirement at 63’
scheme. While invalidity benefits play a very small role in our sample, we nevertheless exclude all individuals
drawing invalidity benefits. Also, our analysis accounts for group demographics. Any potential income eect of
mothers’ increased pensions should thus not exert a dierential eect on control and treatment groups.
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benefited from the reform as a reward for having contributed to society throughout their
lives. Hence, the reform could hardly be anticipated in 2013, but was very salient from the
beginning of 2014 onwards. The reform was also subject to much public discussion, with
critics stating that the reform would increase benefits for those who already receive large
retirement benefits at the expense of younger generations, whose contributions fund the
reform. In this spirit, a pre-reform analysis indicated that eligible individuals are entitled to
above-average retirement benefits and do not haveworse health than non-eligible individuals
(Börsch-Supan et al., 2015).
1.3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
1.3.1 Public Pension Insurance Accounts
For ourmain analysis identifying the causal eect of the early retirement reform on retirement
choices, we employ high-quality administrative data on pension claimants from public pen-
sion insurance accounts (Versichertenrentenzugang 2013-2017). The scientific use file contains
a 10% random sample of all individuals entering retirement between 2013 and 2017. As the
dataset is process-produced, it mainly contains variables needed for calculating pension enti-
tlements. Amongst others, we observe personal characteristics such as gender, marital status,
education level and region of residence, as well as variables on the contribution history and
retirement. These include the exact retirement age in months, the chosen retirement scheme,
pension points, i.e., accumulated pension contributions, and pension-relevant periods, which
enable us to determine eligibility for the early retirement scheme. The dataset provides further
details on the three years preceding retirement, such as the respective socio-economic status
and the annual salary.
We supplement our analysis with results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE-RV), a cross-national panel survey with a focus on themiddle and old-age
population, and focus on survey questions on early retirement aspirations, private retirement
savings and physical health conditions. The German survey can be linked to administrative
records from public pension insurance accounts (Versichertenkontenstichprobe). We exploit
this feature in order to compare survey responses with actual retirement behavior observable
in the public pension insurance accounts.
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1.3.2 Sample for Estimating Behavioral Responses
Our analysis focuses on individuals with a long contribution history of 40 to 47 contribution
years at age 63. While all individuals in this group are able to retire with deductions at age 63,
their eligibility for early retirement without deductions diers. This allows us to identify a
treatment (control) group of individuals who are aected (unaected) by the reform. We
exclude individuals who retired in prior years and are included in the dataset for administra-
tive reasons, individuals with previous retirement spells, and individuals entering invalidity
benefits (Erwerbsminderungsrente). Individuals who spent part of their career abroad, receive
pensions according to the Foreign Pension Law or are subject to transitory regulations are
likewise dropped from the sample. The overall sample contains roughly 110,000 individu-
als from birth cohorts 1947-1956 retiring between 2013 and 2017, of which we use dierent
subsets for our two estimation approaches.
The calculation of relevant pension periods slightly diers from the calculation of contributory
periods in other retirement schemes. In particular, the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme does not
consider periods spent in education or periods of long-term unemployment. Periods of short-
term unemployment with unemployment benefit receipt count towards the relevant pension
period as long as they do not occur in the two years leading up to retirement. We thus subtract
periods of education, unemployment extending 12 months, and unemployment occurring in
the two years prior to retirement from the overall contributory period.7
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics across (i) the sample used in the event study and (ii) the
weighted sample used in the coarsened exact matching procedure (cf. section 1.4). Both
samples dier: Sample (i) corresponds to those who become eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’
scheme at some point prior to reaching the regular retirement age or who potentially could
have become eligible had they not retired before. Pooling the data years 2015 to 2017, the
event study encompasses the cohorts 1950 to 1954.8
7 We do not observe unemployment benefit receipt in the data, but only the total number of months in unem-
ployment. By counting only amaximum period of unemployment of 12months towards the contributory period,
we have chosen a conservative approach of identifying individuals eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme.
Importantly, our sample includes individuals with long and stable employment biographies who typically only
have short periods of unemployment, if at all.
8 As the estimation strategy requires individuals in the sample to become eligible over time, the sample focuses
on individuals born between 1950 and 1954. We do not include the data year 2014 as our data does neither
contain the retirement month nor the birth month, but only the birth year and the retirement entry age in
months. Due to this limitation, we do not observe for 2014 whether a person has become eligible before or aer
the introduction of the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme in July 2014.
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Table 1.2: Public pension data: Summary statistics
Event study Matched sample
Female 46.9% 48.7%
Married 75.1% 75.7%
East German 31.7% 38.7%
Education
None 6.7% 4.2%
Vocational degree 63.1% 59.6%
Advanced occupational degree 5.0% 3.8%
University degree 2.3% 2.0%
Unknown 22.9% 30.5%
Labor market status before turning 63
Employed 75.7% 75.6%
Marginally employed 3.6% 3.3%
Voluntarily insured 3.3% 4.2%
Short-term unemployed 7.3% 4.9%
Receiving other social benefits 4.6% 2.9%
Credit period (sickness leave etc.) 1.6% 4.4%
Employer-sponsored early retirementa 0.6% 0.2%
None/ unknown 3.3% 4.5%
Pension points at 63 43.8 41.9
Number of observationsb 61,318 62,375
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the public pension insurance accounts sample, based on own
calculations. Event study: 2015-2017. Matched sample: summary statistics aer weighting, 2013-2017. a: Does
not include partial retirement (Altersteilzeit). b: Unweighted sample size.
Sample (ii) encompasses individuals with 45-47 contribution years at age 63 and individuals
whocould atmost attain 43-45 contribution years at the regular retirement age, i.e., individuals
who are immediately eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme as well as a control group of
individualswho are ineligible for the scheme. Individualswhobecome eligible between age 63
and the regular retirement age are included in sample (i) but not in sample (ii).
Thematched sample encompasses the cohorts 1947 to 1956. Amajority of those in the sample
are employed prior to retirement and have earned a vocational degree. Compared to the uni-
verse of retirees, East German retirees, in particular East Germanwomen, are overrepresented
due to their on average longer andmore continuous labor market biographies.
13
1 The Eect of Early Retirement Incentives on Retirement Decisions
1.3.3 Retirement Expectations and Descriptive Evidence
Prior to our estimations, we present descriptive evidence showcasing retirement expectations
and retirement behavior. In a first step, we explore the eect of the reform on early retirement
aspirations using survey responses from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(Börsch-Supan et al., 2013; Forschungsdatenzentrumder Rentenversicherung andMax-Planck-
Institut für Sozialrecht und Sozialpolitik, 2019). This provides first suggestive evidence on
changing reference ages in the wake of the reform. Exploiting that the German version of
the panel survey (SHARE-RV) can be linked to administrative records from public pension
insurance accounts, we identify eligible and non-eligible survey respondents and compare
pre- and post-reform survey responses as well as post-reform retirement choices. We focus on
survey waves conducted in the year prior to the introduction of the reform (wave 5, 2013) and
one year aer the reformbecameeective (wave 6, 2015). As in ourmatching analysis studying
behavioral responses, we define a treatment and a control group. The treatment group
consists of individuals in the survey who are immediately eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’
schemewhen reaching the early retirement ageorwhobecomeeligible at somepoint between
the early and the regular retirement age. The control group includes survey participants who
have accumulated 35-42.5 contribution years between the early and the regular retirement
age and who hence will not become eligible before reaching the regular retirement age.9
We first assess whether retirement expectations changed for those aected by the reform, and
whether expectations dier between treatment and control groups. The first row of Table 1.3
shows the age at which individuals expect to receive a public pension for the first time. The
share of respondents in the treatment group who expect to retire at the age of 63 increases
from 27% before the reform to 39% aer the reform, which is a first indication that eligible
individuals adjusted their retirement aspirations already shortly aer the reform became
eective. In contrast to the large increase in the treatment group, the share of respondents in
the control group who expect to retire at the age of 63 does not change much (22% in 2013 vs.
24% in 2015). This indicates that the reform has to some extent re-established the age of 63
as a focal point for (early) retirement for those who are eligible, whereas little change can be
seen for those who do not benefit from the reform.
9 Note that the definition of treatment and control group diers from thematching analysis due to themuch
smaller sample size of the SHARE-RV survey. Information on the contribution history of survey participants is
retrieved from linked public pension insurance accounts. Survey participants have to consent to the data linkage.
In waves 5 (6), roughly 72% (79%) of respondents have agreed to link information from their public pension
insurance accounts to their survey responses. This leaves us with N=181 in the treatment group and N = 121 in
the control group.
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Second, we compare survey responses from 2013, i.e., the year before the ‘retirement at 63’
reform was announced, with actual retirement choices aer the reform became eective.
Among those in the treatment group who retire through the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme, 41%
had stated in 2013 not to look for early retirement. With roughly 17%, the corresponding share
of early retirees with no aspirations for early retirement in the pre-reform year is much lower
in the control group. A comparison of these shares suggests that the reform has induced a
significant number of eligible individuals to change their retirement plans, speaking against
the reform resulting in pure windfall gains.
Table 1.3: Survey evidence from SHARE-RV: Retirement expectations
Share of respondents Treatment group Control group
Expecting to retire at age 63
...Wave 5, 2013 27.3% 21.8%
...Wave 6, 2015 39.3% 23.5%
Retiring before reaching the regular retirement age
... and stating in wave 5 (2013) not to look for early retirement 41.0% 17.1%
Notes: Own calculations based on SHARE-RV, waves 5 and 6. Treatment group: Individuals eligible for the
‘retirement at 63’ scheme before reaching the regular retirement age (N=181). Control group: Individuals with
35-42.5 contribution years between early and regular retirement age (N=121). Treatment and control group only
include individuals who retire aer the ‘retirement at 63’ reform became eective (07/2014). Survey respondents
in treatment and control group have consented to the linkage of their survey responses with administrative
records of the German pension insurance.
We subsequently provide first descriptive evidence on retirement behavior in ourmain sample.
Table 1.4 shows the fraction of retirees retiring through each retirement scheme in the full
sample, regardless of contribution years.10
In the years following the reform, about 40% of all retirees in our sample retire at the reg-
ular retirement age, while about 30% exit the labor market through the ‘retirement at 63’
scheme. The remainder retires early through another retirement scheme, inmost cases facing
deductions. The share choosing to retire through one of the alternative retirement schemes
declines over time as two of these schemes were only accessible to pre-1952 birth cohorts,
and possibly due to substitution towards the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme.
10 As our sample focuses on old-age retirement and excludes invalidity benefits, which may be drawn at any age
by individuals who are physically unable to work, these fractions deviate from oicial statistics.
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Table 1.4: Retirement choices by year in the full sample
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Regular retirement 41.79% 44.78% 39.33% 39.44% 42.15%
Early retirement with deductions 17.82% 10.38% 16.03% 19.51% 18.60%
Retirement at 63a 2.60% 18.40% 30.88% 28.89% 31.15%
Retirement for severely disabled 12.30% 9.71% 6.39% 7.15% 7.11%
Retirement for women 15.11% 9.59% 4.84% 3.72% 0.74%
Retirement aer unemployment 10.37% 7.14% 2.52% 1.30% 0.24%
Notes: This table shows retirement choices in the public pension insurance account data. The sample includes
retirees regardless of their contributory periods, excluding invalidity benefit recipients.
a: Prior to July 2014, a precursor of the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme allowed for early retirement without deduc-
tions for individuals with 45 contributory years at age 65. The data assigns individuals claiming an old-age
pension for the especially long term insured aer age 65 to the same retirement pathway as those entering early
retirement without deductions at age 63 following the reform. For this reason, a small percentage of retirees
enters retirement through this scheme prior to the reform.
To showcase the distribution of retirement ages, Figure 1.1 depicts the frequency of retirement
decisions by retirement scheme and age in the pre-reform benchmark 2013 as well as in the
post-reform years 2015 to 2017. While we observe the month of retirement in the most recent
years, the retirement age is only available on a quarterly basis prior to 2014. For this reason,
the 2013 retirement ages can only be depicted in 3-month age intervals, while more precise
monthly retirement ages are available in the years that follow. Retirees retiring between age 60
and age 66 are included in the graphs regardless of their accumulated pension points.11 The
high frequency of early retirement via the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme in panel 1.1 (b) indicates
that the shi towards early retirement in 2015 to 2017 is substantially driven by the retirement
reform. A large fraction of those who retire early enter retirement at age 63, at 63 + 2, or at
63 + 4 months.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 plot the Kaplan-Meier failure function, i.e., the empirical cumulative distri-
bution function of retirement ages of those who are eligible for early retirement immediately
once they reach the early retirement age (45-47 contributory years at age 63), those that will
not reach 45 contributory years, and hence will not become eligible prior to age 65 (41-43
contributory years at age 63), and those in between that could potentially become eligible
between ages 63 and 65 (between 43-45 contributory years at age 63).
11 All other sample restrictions, such as the exclusion of individuals with previous retirement spells, do apply.
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Figure 1.1: Frequency of retirement decisions by age and retirement type
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Notes: This figure shows the frequency of retirement decisions by retirement scheme and retirement age in the
overall sample, irrespective of contribution years. For 2013, only a quarterly retirement age variable is available.
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As opposed to section 1.5.2, where we use coarsened exact matching to ensure comparable
characteristics of those who are eligible and ineligible for the reform, no weighting procedure
is used here.12 Hence, some of the dierences may be due to diering characteristics across
groups.
Figure 1.2: Kaplan-Meier failure estimates: ECDF of retirement ages by year
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Notes: This figure shows the empirical cumulative distribution functions of retirement ages by contribution
years at age 63 and by retirement year. Individuals with 45-47 contribution years are immediately eligible for the
‘retirement at 63’ scheme, while individuals with 43-45 contribution years attain eligibility over time. Individuals
with 41-43 contribution years do not become eligible before reaching age 65.
In all years, the Kaplan-Meier function displays a jump at age 63. While the size of the jump is
roughly equal across dierent contributory year brackets in 2013, the jump is much larger for
those with 45-47 than for those with fewer contributory years in 2015 to 2017. That is, retiring
early occurs muchmore frequently for those eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme than for
those who are not eligible. In 2016 and 2017, the jump of those with 45-47 contributory years
takes place at a slightly later age than the jump in the cumulative distribution functions of
those with fewer contributory years. This indicates that individuals in younger birth cohorts
12 Note also that the definition of treatment and control groups is slightly simplified for expository purposes. We
use a precise definition of treatment and control groups in our estimations.
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postpone early retirement until reaching the age required to retire early without deductions
(see Table 1.1). Note also that the Kaplan-Meier function of those with 43-45 contributory
years is initially close to the distribution function of those who are ineligible at age 63, but
then risesmore steeply than the comparison groups’ cumulative distribution function asmore
andmore individuals with 43-45 contribution years at age 63 become eligible over time.
In a similar spirit, Figure 1.3 shows theKaplan-Meier functions bybirth cohort and contribution
years at 63. For cohorts 1950, 1951 and 1952, a larger fraction of eligible than of ineligible
individuals retires early. As opposed to Figure 1.2, the jump does not immediately occur at
63 for the 1950 cohort, and is smaller for the 1951 cohort, while the distribution function
increases faster at later ages. This is due to the reform being passed in mid-2014, when those
born in 1950 andmany of those born in 1951 were already older than 63.
Figure 1.3: Kaplan-Meier failure estimates: ECDF of retirement ages by birth cohort
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
60 61 62 63 64 65 66
Age
1950
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
60 61 62 63 64 65 66
Age
1951
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
60 61 62 63 64 65 66
Age
1952
41-43 43-45 45-47
Notes: This figure shows the empirical cumulative distribution functions of retirement ages by contribution
years at age 63 and by birth cohort. Individuals with 45-47 contribution years are immediately eligible for the
‘retirement at 63’ scheme, while individuals with 43-45 contribution years attain eligibility over time. Individuals
with 41-43 contribution years do not become eligible before reaching age 65.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
We employ two dierent approaches to quantify responses to the pension reform. First, we
conduct an event study to exploit that individuals become eligible at dierent ages. In this
setting, the variation stems from individuals who reach 45 contributory years in diering
months of their lives.
Second, we contrast the retirement behavior of individuals who are immediately eligible with
the behavior of comparable individuals who are not eligible for this preferential retirement
scheme. To ensure the similarity of the control vis-a-vis the treatment group, we employ a
coarsened exact matching procedure.
1.4.1 Event Study
Using an event study design, we analyze the pathway towards retirement upon becoming
eligible for the early retirement scheme. The sample includes individuals becoming eligible for
the early retirement scheme prior to reaching the regular retirement age. In addition to those
who reach at least 45 contributory years, we also consider those who would have reached
45 contributory years if they had not retired earlier through a dierent retirement scheme.
This ensures that we do not only consider those who postpone their retirement in order to
be eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme, but also include individuals with a comparable
contribution history that choose to retire early regardless of the reform.
We estimate the following equation, where t corresponds to the age inmonths between age 62
and age 66:
Reti,t =
24∑
j=−12
βjδEligi,t−j + µi + ςi,t + εi,t (1.1)
Our dependent variable Reti,t is a dummy whether person i is retiring at time t. δEligi,t−j
indicates a change in eligibility at time t− j, i.e., it is a dummy for the double condition of
reaching 45 contributory years while also having reached age 63 (or age 63 + 2 (63 + 4) months
for birth cohort 1953 (1954)). The coeicients βj , which encompass the event window running
from 12months prior to 24 months aer reaching eligibility, indicate dierences in the proba-
bility of retirement entry at dierent points in the event window. We include individual fixed
eectsµi aswell asmonthly age x birth year fixed eects ςi,t. The year of birth interaction term
is included in the time fixed eects to control for diering retirement conditions across birth
cohorts (see Table 1.1). Notably, those born in 1953 (1954) can only claim early retirement
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benefits without deductions at age 63 + 2 (63 + 4) months, and should thus have dierent
time fixed eects than individuals born in earlier cohorts. The error term εi,t is clustered at the
individual level.
We estimate the equation across the event window and use β−12 as a benchmark set to
zero in order to identify the other coeicients. This is a matter of scaling. For the ease of
interpretation and as opposed tomany other event studies, we do not use β−1, i.e., the period
prior tobecomingeligible, as abenchmarkas this periodmay reflect anticipationeects. In the
months preceding eligibility, individuals might be less likely to retire as they are able to avoid
deductions when they become eligible. Setting β−1 to zero would thus depict all coeicients
in relation to a period in which soon-to-be eligible individuals have a lower propensity to
retire than others.13 Overall, the event study contrasts an individual’s propensity to retire at a
certain point in time prior to or aer becoming eligible with a counterfactual probability of
retiring with deductions at the same age. A positive coeicient βj indicates that j periods aer
becoming eligible, a person is βj percentage points more likely to retire than if they still had
to wait 12 months until becoming eligible. As long as anticipation eects 12 months prior to
becoming eligible are low, this approximates the increase in the propensity to retire j periods
aer becoming eligible due to the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme. Another way of interpreting the
coeicient is that j periods aer becoming eligible, individuals are more likely to retire than
other, non-eligible individuals at the same age.
In order to set themagnitude of eects in relation to financial incentives, we subsequently
calculate an elasticity of the retirement entry probability at j = 0. This measure sets the
change in the retirement probability upon becoming eligible – the event study coeicient
β0 – in relation to the underlying change in financial incentives. The latter is defined as the
percentage change between retirement benefits when retiring at j = 0, the month a person
becomes eligible, and retirement benefits when retiring onemonth earlier.
ε0 =
β0
ben0/ben−1 − 1
(1.2)
1.4.2 Matching
Subsequently, we contrast the behavior of those who are immediately eligible for the ‘re-
tirement at 63’ scheme to those who are not eligible: The treatment group is composed of
individuals with 45 to 47 contributory years at age 63, whereas individuals in the control
group are not able to meet eligibility conditions for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme by a short
13 An event study in which β−1 is set to zero results in an upwards shi of all coeicients.
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margin. The control group includes individuals who can at most achieve 43 to 45 contribu-
tory years at the regular retirement age if they continue working until then. Given that the
regular retirement age is increasing across birth cohorts 1947-1956, the two-year window of
contributory years at age 63 also diers across cohorts. It ranges from 40 years + 11months to
42 years + 11 months for the 1947 cohort to 40 years + 2 months to 42 years + 2 months for the
1956 cohort.14
Other than that, the definition of the treatment and control group is analogous to the event
study. As characteristics, preferences and expected retirement benefits might dier between
groups, we employ a coarsened exact matching procedure (Iacus et al., 2012) to ensure
the comparability of control and treatment groups. The following variables are used in the
matching procedure: retirement year, gender, marital status, education level, a dummy for
East Germany, socio-economic status at age 6315, and the pension points an individual has
earned at age 63 as a proxy for the earnings history and for expected retirement benefits.
While all other variables require exact matching16, the latter variable matches on coarsened
intervals, where cutpoints are defined according to Sturges’ rule (Scott, 2015).
In a second step, the retirement age in years is regressed on the eligibility dummy, with
matching weights accounting for group dierences. Any other variable aecting retirement
preferences across groups should be controlled for by thematching procedure. The analysis is
conducted separately for each year between 2013 and 2017, where the year 2013 constitutes a
placebo test. The treatment and control groupsonly dier by their eligibility for the ‘retirement
at 63’ scheme. As the reform was neither passed nor announced at this point, the behavior of
individuals in the treatment and control group in 2013 should not be aected by the reform.
14 For example, the regular retirement age for the 1950 birth cohort corresponds to 65 + 4months. Individuals
from this birth cohort who have accumulated at most 42 contributory years and 8 months at age 63 will not
become eligible for the early retirement scheme before reaching the regular retirement age and hence enter the
control group. In order to ensure comparability between the treatment and the control group, we also choose
a 2-year window of contributory years at age 63 for the control group. For the 1950 birth cohort, this window
ranges from 40 years + 8 months to 42 years + 8 months.
15 This variable dierentiates socially insured employees, marginally employed employees, voluntarily insured
individuals including self-employed individuals who have opted into public retirement insurance, unemploy-
ment benefit recipients (Arbeitslosengeld I), recipients of other benefits, individuals with credit periods (Anrech-
nungszeitversicherte), e.g. due to sickness, and individuals who are neither working nor otherwise contributing
towards retirement insurance, such as housewives.
16 Treated individuals are dropped from the estimation if no individual in the control group shares their charac-
teristics.
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We subsequently calculate an elasticity of the retirement agewith respect to the change in
financial incentives. For this purpose, we set the treatment eect in relation to the percentage
change in benefits due to deductions when retiring with deductions at the early retirement
age.
η =
∆ retirement age
% deductions
(1.3)
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Event Study
Figure 1.4 displays the results of the baseline event study. The large spike at j = 0 shows that
a substantial fraction of prospective retirees exits the labor force immediately once they are
able to retire without deductions. The probability of retiring immediately upon becoming
eligible exceeds the counterfactual probability of retiring at the same age with deductions by
about 10 percentage points.
Figure 1.4: Event study: Baseline
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
-10 0 10 20 30
Months before/after eligibility
Rel. probability of retiring 95% confidence interval
Notes: This figure shows the event study coeicients βj . The event window j ranges from -12 to +24 months and
β−12 is set to zero. The specification includes age x birth year fixed eects. N=61,318.
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With our sample averaging a 9.17%change in benefits uponbecoming eligible, this amounts to
an elasticity of the retirement entry probability of 1.09, i.e., a one percent increase in benefits
increases the probability of retirement by 1.09 percentage points. We also find positive, albeit
smaller coeicients in the months that directly follow eligibility, which is driven by employed
individuals not immediately exiting the labor force, but remaining in their job for a fewmore
months. Coeicients become slightly larger again towards the end of the event window,
suggesting that eligible individuals have a slightly higher likelihood of retiring before reaching
the regular retirement age than ineligible individuals.17
In the months preceding the eligibility date, a slightly negative eect arises, which indicates
that some individuals postpone their retirement by a few months in order to benefit from
the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme. There are small spikes in j = −2 and j = −4 which are
mainly attributable to the 1953 and 1954 cohorts, for whom the early retirement age without
deductions does not coincide with the early retirement age with deductions. While retiring
with deductions is feasible at age 63, retiring through the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme is only
possible two or four months aer turning 63 for these cohorts (see Table 1.1). As individuals
in these cohorts would face deductions of 9.3% (9.6%) when retiring at 63, but no deductions
when retiring two (four) months later, there are strong incentives to retire at 63 + 2 (63 + 4)
months. Hence, comparatively less of those eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme at
age 63 + 2 or age 63 + 4 opt into early retirement with deductions at 63, leading to the larger
negative eect at j = −2 and j = −4.
Analysis for Restricted Sample
An interesting question is to what extent our results are driven by the fact that the early
retirement age for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme is a focal point for early retirement (Seibold,
2019). In order to shed light on this question, we focus on the subset of individuals who reach
45 contributory years at some point between the early retirement age for the ‘retirement at
63’ scheme and the regular retirement age. In a first robustness check, we restrict the sample
to individuals who reach eligibility only one month aer turning 63 (or 63 + 2/ 63 + 4 months
for the 1953/1954 birth cohort) or later. For this group, retiring early through the ‘retirement
at 63’ scheme is not directly connected to the reference age of the 63rd birthday. In a second
robustness check, we restrict the sample even further and focus on the subset of individuals
who reach 45 contribution years at least one month aer turning 64. For this group, eligibility
neither coincides with age 63 nor with the 64th birthday, whichmay also serve as a focal point.
17 Many of the individuals in the sample become eligible immediately at the early retirement age for the ‘retire-
ment at 63’ scheme. For those individuals, the regular retirement age is beyond the event window. Note however
that all coeicients are relative to j = −12, a period in which small anticipation eects might still be present.
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Figure 1.5: Event study: Not immediately eligible individuals
(a) Individuals reaching eligibility later than age 63
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(b) Individuals reaching eligibility later than age 64
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Notes: This figure shows the event study coeicients βj for individuals who do not become eligible immediately.
The event window j ranges from -12 to +24months and β−12 is set to zero. Specifications include age x birth year
fixed eects. (a) Only individuals becoming eligible aer age 63 or, for birth cohort 1953 (1954), aer age 63 + 2
(63 + 4) months. N=6,775. (b) Only individuals becoming eligible aer age 64. N=4,393.
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As shown in Figure 1.5, the overall trajectories of the event studies closely resemble those
presented in Figure 1.4. In particular, the spikes at j = 0 are of a similar size as in our baseline
event study, which implies that individuals exhibit strong responses to large and salient
financial incentives, even if they do not coincide with reference ages.
Analysis Across Subgroups
We subsequently assess whether responses dier by gender. As shown by Figure 1.6, immedi-
ate eects are much stronger for men than for women. While the elasticity of the retirement
entry probability amounts to 1.46 for men, it is only 0.80 for women.
Figure 1.6: Event study: Results by gender
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Notes: This figure shows the event study coeicients βj by gender. The event window j ranges from -12 to +24
months and β−12 is set to zero. The specification includes age x birth year fixed eects. N=32,572 (Men) and
N=28,746 (Women).
One possible explanation for these gender dierences are cross-eects between spouses.
Using Swiss data, Lalive and Parrotta (2017) show that women reduce their labor force par-
ticipation once their partner reaches pension eligibility, whereas spousal retirement does
not significantly aect male retirement behavior. A similar eect might play a role here. As
on average, men tend to be older than their spouses, many 63 year old women will have
spouses that become eligible for retirement schemes prior to them. Some of these women
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may choose to retire at the early retirement age regardless of incentives, resulting in a lower
average responsiveness to becoming eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme.18
We also conduct the analysis by pre-retirement employment status. As the event study design
requires variation in the age at which individuals become eligible, this subgroup analysis is
only possible for employed, marginally employed19 or voluntarily contributing individuals.
Unemployment benefit receipt in the years prior to retirement, for example, does not increase
contributory years. Hence, unemployed people are either eligible for the early retirement
scheme right away, or will not become eligible at all. Figure 1.7 depicts the event study for
socially insured employees, marginally employed employees and voluntary contributors.
Figure 1.7: Event study: Results by socio-economic status
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Notes: This figure shows the event study coeicients βj by employment status. The event window j ranges from
-12 to +24 months and β−12 is set to zero. The specification includes age x birth year fixed eects. N=45,817
(Employed), N=2,268 (Marginally employed) and N=1,933 (Voluntarily insured).
18 While the data contains marital status, we cannot match spouses and are hence unable to adequately assess
the cross-eect of spousal retirement behavior.
19 Marginally employed individuals only earn monthly wages of up to 450 euros and are exempt from social
insurance contributions, but can opt into retirement insurance. This analysis is limited to marginally employed
individuals who choose to contribute to retirement insurance and hence acquire further contributory periods.
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The trajectory for socially insured employees looks rather similar to the baseline in Figure 1.4.
There is a substantial spike of roughly 10 percentage points at j = 0, equivalent to an elasticity
of the retirement entry probability of 1.08, followed by smaller positive eects in subsequent
periods. In contrast, voluntarily insured individuals exhibit a much larger propensity to retire
immediately, attaining an elasticity of the retirement entry probability of 1.83. Coeicients in
follow-upperiods are insignificant, whichmight bedue to the fact that voluntary contributions
increase retirement benefits only by very little once eligibility is reached.20 Finally, we find only
small and insignificant positive eects at j = 0 for those in marginal employment, suggesting
that this group retires as early as possible, regardless of deductions.
1.5.2 Matching
Coarsened Exact Matching
Table 1.5 highlights the results of the baseline specification. The first specification (upper
panel) shows OLS results without any matching. Specification 2 (lower panel) employs coars-
ened exact matching and matches on demographics and on characteristics related to the
earnings history. The retirement age in years is used as dependent variable. Aer matching,
eligibility for the scheme does not exert an eect on the retirement age in the placebo test
(2013, first column, lower panel), adding credibility to the matching procedure.21
In 2015 to 2017, coeicients are large and significant, indicating a substantial behavioral
response to the reform. Individuals in the treatment group retire on average 6.4 months
(0.53*12) earlier than those in the control group. As average hypothetical deductions in our
sample amount to 8.6%, our estimates translate into an elasticity of the retirement age with
respect to deductions of 0.74. Otherwise put, reducing deductions by one percentage point
decreases the average retirement age by 0.74 months.
In 2014, eligible individuals retire on average 2.3 months earlier, yielding an elasticity of 0.27.
Amounting to roughly one third of the size of the 2015 to 2017 eects, the size of the coeicient
for 2014 is in line with the other results as the scheme only became eective in the second
half of the year. It is likely that two further factors lowered the 2014 coeicient. First, the
reform’s announcement at the beginning of 2014 might have led to anticipation eects as
20 As opposed to socially insured employees who typically have a certain period of notice or whomay take the
requirements of their employer into account when deciding upon retirement, voluntarily insured individuals,
many of them self-employed, may face fewer frictions.
21 In the year 2013, retiring without deductions was possible from age 65 onwards (instead of e.g. at age
65 + 2months for the birth cohort 1948) provided that a person had accumulated 45 contributory years. This
might explain the small negative coeicient for 2013.
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Table 1.5: Coarsened exact matching: Baseline specification
Retirement age
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Treat (no matching) -0.074∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
se (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023)
t -2.09 -2.71 -12.14 -13.11 -11.90
N 8484 11240 14532 14012 14107
Treat (CEM, all observations) -0.015 -0.192∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗
se (0.064) (0.063) (0.051) (0.043) (0.044)
t -0.23 -3.03 -10.53 -11.99 -12.24
N 7122 9418 12372 12001 12009
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Treatment group: 45-47 contribution years at age 63. Control group:
Individuals whowould reach 43 to 45 contribution years at the regular retirement agewhen contributing until the
regular retirement age. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Specification 1: no matching. Specification 2:
matching via demographics and total pension points at 63.
some individuals may have postponed their retirement to the second half of the year in order
to benefit from the reform. Second, many of those becoming eligible once the scheme was
passed were already older than 63, leaving less room for antedating retirement.
Table 1.6 depicts the results by gender, showing much larger coeicients for men than for
women. While men retire on average 8.2 months earlier aer the reform, women only retire
4.7 months earlier. This corresponds to a one percentage point reduction in deductions,
lowering the average retirement age by 0.95 months for men and by 0.55 months for women.
These results are in line with the lower responsiveness of women to the reform in the event
study setting, shown in Figure 1.6.
Several reasonsmay play a role here: First, due to the ‘retirement for women’ scheme, women
born before 1952 may already retire as early as age 60, albeit with deductions. Hence, some
women in the treatment groupmaypostpone retirement to age63 inorder to avoiddeductions.
This may compensate part of the counteracting eect of those antedating their retirement.
Second, labor market ainity and selection eects due to gender roles could contribute to
the smaller eects found for women. In the cohorts born in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
female labor market participation was much lower thanmale participation. For this reason,
those who accumulated 45 contribution years may constitute a selection of particularly labor
market aine women, who on average derive a lower utility from retiring early. On the other
hand, as discussed in section 1.5.1, some women may adjust their retirement behavior to
their spouse’s retirement choices, reducing the responsiveness to own financial incentives
(Lalive and Parrotta, 2017).
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Table 1.6: Coarsened exact matching: By gender
Retirement age
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Treat (CEM, all men) -0.096 -0.353∗∗∗ -0.673∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗∗
se (0.083) (0.086) (0.076) (0.061) (0.064)
t -1.16 -4.10 -8.89 -11.18 -10.92
N 3929 5608 6187 5478 5307
Treat (CEM, all women) 0.090 -0.060 -0.402∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗
se (0.096) (0.079) (0.068) (0.061) (0.057)
t 0.35 -0.45 -5.94 -6.18 -6.95
N 3193 3810 6185 6523 6702
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Treatment group: 45-47 contribution years at 63. Control group: Indi-
viduals who would reach 43 to 45 contribution years at the regular retirement age when contributing until the
regular retirement age. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Next, we present matching results by socio-economic status. Table 1.7 focuses on those
socio-economic statuses with a suiciently large number of observations and comparability
across years. Results are in line with the event study in Figure 1.7. Socially insured employees
in control and treatment group do not exhibit a significantly dierent retirement behavior in
2013. In 2015 to 2017, those who are eligible retire on average 7.7 months earlier than those
who are ineligible. Slightly lower eects are observed for voluntarily insured individuals, who
retire on average 5.4 months earlier. These eects translate into the average retirement age
decreasing by respectively 0.90 and 0.63 months if deductions are lowered by one percentage
point. Fluctuations in coeicients across yearsmay be attributable to the comparatively lower
size of the subsample. In contrast, eects for marginally employed individuals are slightly
positive, and, notably, significant in 2014, where those who become eligible retire 4.4 months
later on average (elasticity of -0.51). This could be due to anticipation eects. As previously
discussed, marginally employed individuals predominately retire immediately at age 63, even
if this leads to deductions. In 2014, the reform only became eective in the second half of the
year. This resulted in strong incentives to postpone early retirement to aer July 2014. For the
other socio-economic statuses, a similar eect is oset by comparatively earlier retirement
in the second half of the year. In turn, individuals receiving unemployment benefits display
a rather low level of responsiveness to the reform. Coeicients are negative and significant
only in the year 2016, where unemployed individuals in the treatment group retire on average
3.3 months earlier (elasticity of 0.38).
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Table 1.7: Coarsened exact matching: By socio-economic status at age 63
Retirement age
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Treat (CEM, employed) -0.097 -0.360∗∗∗ -0.684∗∗∗ -0.634∗∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗
se (0.093) (0.075) (0.063) (0.053) (0.051)
t -1.05 -4.77 -10.83 -12.01 -12.13
N 4192 6359 8660 8538 9169
Treat (CEM, marginally employed) 0.038 0.365∗∗ 0.043 0.143∗ -0.042
se (0.165) (0.181) (0.084) (0.082) (0.090)
t 0.23 2.01 0.52 1.75 -0.47
N 327 381 577 587 460
Treat (CEM, unemployed (ALGI)) -0.100 -0.141 -0.180 -0.278∗∗ -0.148
se (0.131) (0.166) (0.135) (0.121) (0.119)
t -0.76 -0.85 -1.33 -2.30 -1.25
N 715 411 572 543 349
Treat (CEM, voluntarily insured) -0.127 -0.264 -0.563∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗
se (0.148) (0.185) (0.131) (0.131) (0.128)
t -0.86 -1.43 -4.29 -2.91 -3.19
N 344 447 526 472 437
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Treatment group: 45-47 contribution years at 63. Control group: Indi-
viduals who would reach 43 to 45 contribution years at the regular retirement age when contributing until the
regular retirement age. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Finally, we address possible cohort eects in previous estimations in order to check whether
our results are aected by the changing availability of alternative retirement schemes across
cohorts. Older cohorts in our sample hadmore retirement options. Women born prior to 1952
could enter the ‘retirement for women’ scheme, while men and women born prior to 1952
could choose ‘retirement aer unemployment and partial retirement’. Therefore, a further
analysis matches on the birth cohort instead of on the retirement year.22 Table 1.8 shows the
results for birth cohorts 1950, 1951 and 1952, respectively, based on pooled data years 2013
to 2017.23 Results are again in line with previous findings: those in the 1950 cohort retire on
22 We cannot match on both the retirement year and the birth cohort at the same time as this would restrict the
possible dierence in the retirement age between the control and the treatment group and bias the coeicient
towards zero. In other words, the maximum treatment eect would be restricted to 11 months occurring if
a person in the treatment group retiring in January was matched to a person in the control group retiring in
December of the same year.
23 Note that including the year 2013 in our estimations might result in a slight downward bias, given that
individuals choosing to retire in 2013 do not yet adjust their behavior to the reform. However, only restricting the
sample to the reform years 2014-2017 might, on the contrary, induce an upward bias. This would drop some of
the least responsive individuals, in particular individuals born in 1950 who chose to retire early in the pre-reform
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average 4.3 months earlier, while those born in 1951 and 1952 retire 6.5 months earlier. With
elasticities of 0.51, 0.75 and 0.74, the responsiveness by cohort is very close to the baseline.
The similar findings for birth cohorts 1951 and 1952 indicate that our results are not strongly
aected by the availability of alternative pathways to early retirement for the 1951 birth cohort.
The smaller coeicient for the birth cohort 1950 is due to the cohort’s rather advanced age
when the reform was passed, which implies that individuals in the treatment group could not
antedate retirement as much as those in younger cohorts.
Table 1.8: Coarsened exact matching: By birth cohorts
Retirement age
1950 1951 1952
Treat (CEM, 2013-2017) -0.355∗∗∗ -0.545∗∗∗ -0.554∗∗∗
se (0.048) (0.062) (0.052)
t -7.38 -8.79 -10.65
N 7554 9188 11185
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Treatment group: 45-47 contribution years at 63. Control group: Indi-
viduals who would reach 43 to 45 contribution years at the regular retirement age when contributing until the
regular retirement age. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Robustness Check: Propensity Score Matching
As a further robustness check, we employ propensity score matching (Dehejia and Wahba,
2002). Instead of directly matching on observables, this methodology first predicts the prob-
ability of belonging to the treatment group using a logistic regression, and then matches
observations in control and treatment group with a similar propensity score. We use Maha-
lanobis matching, matching on the same variables as with CEM.24 As opposed to the CEM
methodology, individuals with dierent characteristics, but a similar propensity score can be
matched here. This results in an overall larger sample size than in the CEM procedure.
The results shown in Table 1.9 are in line with our previous findings using coarsened exact
matching. While no significant eect can be found for the 2013 placebo test, coeicients for
the years 2015 to 2017 are close to those presented in Table 1.5. According to the estimates
year 2013 regardless of incentives. Note also that the analysis by cohort is not conducted for birth cohorts 1953
and 1954 as our most recent data is from 2017, i.e., we do not observe individuals from these cohorts who retire
at their regular retirement age.
24 We use dummies for gender, marital status, being East German, education level, and labor market status
before turning 63 to determine a person’s propensity score. Pension points at age 63 enter the estimation as a
third degree polynomial.
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based on propensity score matching, individuals aected by the reform retire on average
about 6 months earlier than those unaected by the reform.
Table 1.9: Propensity score matching
Retirement age
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
ATT (propensity score matching) -0.095 -0.103 -0.490∗∗∗ -0.526∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗
se (0.075) (0.078) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048)
t -1.27 -1.32 -9.64 -11.30 -10.24
N 8476 11230 14520 13999 14091
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Treatment group: 45-47 contribution years at 63. Control group:
Individuals who would reach 43 to 45 contribution years at the regular retirement age when contributing until
the regular retirement age. Propensity score matching via demographics and a polynomial of total pension
points at age 63.
Further Factors Possibly Aecting Retirement Behavior
In the public debate, advocates of the reform frequently stated that the reform enabled
individualswithbadhealthoutcomesdue to their longworking lives to retire early. As ourmain
sample does not indicate the health status of retirees, we again draw on survey results from
SHARE-RV to assess whether early retirement decisions are related to poor health conditions.
For this purpose, we exploit survey questions on the self-assessed health status and on the
presence of a long-term illness. As shown in Table 1.10, the share of respondents who perceive
their health status to be ‘excellent’, ‘very good’ or ‘good’ is very similar in the treatment and
the control group (66% vs. 67%). The same is true for the share of respondents with a long-
term illness (51% vs. 48%). In both groups, respondents who feel to be in good health are
slightly more likely to retire at the regular retirement age as compared to retiring before
reaching the regular retirement age. However, retiring early with a self-assessed health status
being ‘excellent’, ‘very good’ or ‘good’ occurs slightly more frequently in the treatment group
compared to the control group (66% vs. 63%). While results should be interpreted with some
caution due to the low sample size, they, in line with Börsch-Supan et al. (2015), do not lend
support to the claim that individuals eligible for the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme have poorer
health as a consequence of a long working life.
Second,weuse theSHARE-RVdata to shed some light onpossible interactionsbetweenprivate
retirement savings and early retirement. This could be of interest as financial constraints
might aect retirement choices. For example, individuals with private retirement savings on
33
1 The Eect of Early Retirement Incentives on Retirement Decisions
top of their public pensionmight be less constrained by deductions that lower public pensions.
It would also be conceivable that a lower discount factor induces people to work longer and to
engage in private retirement savings. Both in the treatment and the control group, the share
of respondents who declare to own a private retirement account is roughly 35% on average.
In the treatment group, the share of individuals with a private retirement account is equal
amongst those who choose to retire early and those who do not. In contrast, in the control
group, the share of respondents with a private retirement account is higher among those
retiring at the regular retirement age than among those retiring early with deductions. These
results provide suggestive evidence that behavioral responses to the reformmight be slightly
stronger for individuals with private retirement savings.25
Table 1.10: Survey evidence from SHARE-RV: Further factors aecting retirement behavior
Share of respondents Treatment group Control group
Self-assessed health status excellent/very good/good (wave 5, 2013) 66.3% 67.2%
... among those retiring before reaching regular retirement age 65.8% 62.8%
... among those retiring at regular retirement age 70.7% 72.9%
With long-term illness (wave 5, 2013) 50.6% 48.3%
... among those retiring before reaching regular retirement age 50.4% 49.0%
... among those retiring at regular retirement age 53.7% 45.8%
With private retirement account (wave 5, 2013) 35.7% 34.6%
... among those retiring before reaching regular retirement age 35.7% 27.0%
... among those retiring at regular retirement age 35.7% 39.0%
Notes: Own calculations based on SHARE-RV, waves 5 and 6. Treatment group: Individuals eligible for the
‘retirement at 63’ scheme before reaching regular retirement age (N=181). Control group: Individuals with
35-42.5 contribution years between early and regular retirement age (N=121). Treatment and control group only
include individuals who retire aer the ‘retirement at 63’ reform became eective (07/2014). Survey respondents
in treatment and control group have consented to the linkage of their survey responses with administrative
records of the German pension insurance.
25 SHARE-RV also contains a question on the monetary amount invested in the private retirement account. The
mean value is 30,000 euros (25,600 euros) in the treatment (control) group, but the response rate is relatively low
so that the number of observations becomes very small when we further dierentiate between respondents
retiring early and at the regular retirement age.
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How Do Eects Compare?
On average, the abolition of deductions within the scope of the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme
raises the probability of retiring immediately upon becoming eligible by 10 percentage points
and lowers the average retirement age by 6.4 months. The magnitude of this eect is roughly
equivalent to a one year increase in the early retirement age in Austria as found by Manoli and
Weber (2018) and slightly exceeds the projected eect of increasing the regular retirement
age in Germany from 65 to 66, which Seibold (2019) quantifies at 4 months. The eects in
those papers are, however, not primarily driven by financial incentives, but rather by social
norms or the role of references ages for retirement choices, while our event study eects hold
when we focus on individuals reaching eligibility at non-reference ages.
As estimated by Bönke et al. (2018), the introduction of deductions in the German public
pension system increased the average retirement age by 4.1months, which would correspond
to an elasticity of the retirement age of 0.57 with respect to deductions. With an estimated
elasticity of 0.74, the magnitude of responses to the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme is moderately
larger. Similarly and also in the German context, Engels et al. (2017) find that increasing deduc-
tions for early retirement for women by one percentage point reduces the average retirement
rate by 1.9 percentage points. The latter eect is larger than our estimated elasticity of the
retirement entry probability of 1.09, or 0.80 for women. However, Engels et al.’s estimated
coeicients encompass both the eect of raising the regular retirement age and the increase
in deductions, and are therefore not only driven by financial incentives.
One possible explanation for our comparatively large eect is that the scheme targets a set of
particularly responsive individuals. As evidenced by our estimations, responses are especially
strong amongst employed men – a group that forms a rather large share of those eligible
for the reform. Moreover, the reformwas very salient as a consequence of the government’s
publicity campaign and a broad media coverage. Our finding that the largest response occurs
in the month of becoming eligible suggests that frictions do not play an important role in
the context of the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme. Another presumably important factor is the
large size of the financial incentive. In our sample, the average change in pension benefits
upon becoming eligible exceeds 9%. This contrasts with only minor increases in pension
entitlements – 0.19% per month for an average income earner – if a person stays in the labor
force aer eligibility is reached. Finally, the rather large eects may possibly indicate a high
responsiveness to a reform that facilitates retiring early, as opposed to reforms that tighten
retirement conditions. Put dierently, financial incentives may play a more (less) important
role in settings opening (closing) pathways into early retirement.
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1.6 Fiscal Costs
In the German public debate, the fiscal costs of the reform are controversially discussed.
Current fiscal cost estimates vary substantially. At the lower end, the dra bill of the retire-
ment reform estimated additional public retirement insurance expenditures amounting to
0.9 billion euros in 2014, 1.9 billion in 2015, 2.2 billion in 2016 and 2.0 billion in 2017, with
costs slightly declining in subsequent years and then again increasing to 3.1 billion in 2030
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). Pimpertz (2017) provides a lower bound estimate of the re-
form’s cost, assuming unchanged retirement behavior and focusing on foregone deductions
only. This approach yields cost estimates ranging between 0.14 billion in 2014 and 1.2 billion
euros in 2017. Using a simulation model, Werding (2014) projects somewhat higher costs of
0.5 billion euros in 2014, rising to 2.6 billion in 2015 and 3.2 billion in 2016 and 2017. Schnabel
(2015) estimates that annual fiscal costs might rise to 6 billion euros if 125,000 individuals
retire via the scheme per year – a figure which the number of actual claimants exceeds by
far.26 At the upper end, monthly costs of 1.3 to 2 billion euros were frequently circulated in
the media27 – an overestimation based on the total sum of pension benefits paid under the
‘retirement at 63’ scheme, neglecting that many of those claiming early retirement benefits
would have otherwise retired early through another scheme.
Against this background of widely varying cost estimates, we strive to provide a more precise
estimate of fiscal costs. Using our detailed microdata and the coarsened exact matching
methodology described above, we are able to account for behavioral responses as well as
for foregone deductions and contributions. To obtain counterfactual retirement choices,
we match those retiring via the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme to the same control group as in
section 1.5.2. Within each strata, we then compute the counterfactual retirement age, also
accounting for specific retirement rules for women and individuals with disabilities. Overall,
the reform’s costs entail changing pension insurance expenditures as well as foregone social
insurance contributions and tax revenues. For each of these dimensions, we calculate actual
and counterfactual expenditures and revenues for each individual retiring via the ‘retirement
at 63’ scheme and for each year under consideration. Individual fiscal costs, i.e., the dierence
between actual and counterfactual costs, are then aggregated and upweighted to match
the total number of those retiring through the retirement scheme, taken from oicial statis-
tics (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2018). Our calculations encompass the following
aspects:
26 In 2016, 225,290 individuals retired via the ‘retirement at 63’ scheme (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund,
2018).
27 See e.g. https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rente-253.html.
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Pension insurance expenditures. The retirement reform aects pension insurance expen-
ditures along three dimensions: deductions, retirement timing, and accumulated pension
points. Costs are assigned to the relevant fiscal year, assuming that retirement under the
reform takes place in the middle of the year.
While retirement benefits under the reform are provided in the data, we impute counterfactual
retirement benefits, accounting for changes in retirement timing, the ensuing change in
pension points, as well as deductions. The abolition of deductions under the ‘retirement at
63’ scheme increases benefits of those retiring early, even absent any behavioral response to
the reform. In addition, retiring earlier due to the reform results in less accumulated pension
points, which reduces retirement benefits. At the same time, claiming benefits early raises
fiscal costs in the year of retirement. Naturally, these eects reverse for individuals postponing
their retirement in order to become eligible under the reform.
Income tax revenues. The timing of entering retirement and the amount of benefits aect
taxable income and thus have direct implications for tax revenues. Furthermore, retirement
benefits are only partially taxable. For example, for individuals retiring in 2017, only 74% of
pension benefits are included in taxable income. Similar to the changes in pension insurance
expenditures, we calculate each individual’s actual and counterfactual tax base, which is
composed of wages and retirement benefits. Individuals postponing their retirement in the
counterfactual scenario are assumed to extend their pre-retirement employment status at
their previous wage. Taxes are simulated by applying the German individual income tax
schedule to taxable income. As we lack comprehensive data on partners’ taxable income as
well as on other income sources such as investment or rental income, we are nevertheless
only able to provide a rough approximation of the reform’s impact on tax revenues.
Social security contributions. Entering retirement likewise aects social security contribu-
tions. While employed individuals’ employer and employee social security contributions
amount to about 40%28, contributions of retirees only correspond to roughly 18% of their re-
tirement benefits. Considering that the public pension insurance covers about half of retirees’
health insurance fees, retirees are only liable to contribute the remainder of about 10.5%.
These low rates are due to retirees not contributing to public pension and unemployment
insurance. At the same time, if retirement benefits increase due to foregone deductions, a
small percentage of these costs is compensated by rising health insurance and nursing care in-
surance contributions. As before, calculations assess actual and counterfactual social security
contributions in each year.
28 Contribution rates slightly dier across years, between those with and those without children, for those with
lower wages and by health insurance provider.
37
1 The Eect of Early Retirement Incentives on Retirement Decisions
Our calculations do not account for second round eects, such as possible increases in so-
cial insurance contribution rates to compensate for foregone revenues following the reform.
Table 1.11 presents the ensuing fiscal cost estimates. While our calculations suggest that
aggregate pension insurance expenditures amounted to 10.4 billion euros between 2014
and 2017 - thus exceeding the fiscal costs projection of the government bymore than 3 bil-
lion euros - total fiscal costs correspond to 19.8 billion. With estimated pension insurance
expenditures of 3.74 billion euros and total fiscal costs of 7.26 billion euros in 2017, our fiscal
cost projections are at the upper end of the range of cost estimates. This is also due to the high
number of claimants, which had been underestimated when the reform was announced. Yet,
costs per claimant lie between projections that assumed unchanged retirement behavior and
projections assuming that all claimantswould otherwise have retired at the regular retirement
age.
Table 1.11: Fiscal costs of the early retirement reform
Costs in billion euros
2014 2015 2016 2017
Pension insurance expenditures 0.82 2.31 3.51 3.74
Total costs 1.51 4.42 6.64 7.26
Notes: This table shows annual fiscal cost estimates in billion euros. Estimations are based on counterfactual
retirement choices based on coarsened exact matching of eligible and ineligible individuals. Total costs
encompass pension insurance expenditures, income taxes and social security contributions.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper assesses the responses to a recent German pension reform that introduced in-
centives for retiring early. While the retirement age has been gradually increasing over time
for most prospective retirees, the reform enabled individuals with 45 or more contribution
years to retire early at age 63 instead of 65 without incurring a financial penalty. Exploiting
high-quality administrative data from the German public pension insurance, we both employ
an event study design and estimate the eect of becoming eligible for the early retirement
scheme in a coarsened exact matching approach. In supplementary analyses, wemake use
of the SHARE-RV survey and study the eect of the reform on the reference age for early
retirement as well as the role of potential determinants for claiming early retirement such as
health conditions and private retirement savings.
Our results indicate that the probability of retiring early increases by roughly 10 percentage
points in themonth of becoming eligible relative to the counterfactual probability of retiring at
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the sameagewithdeductions. This translates intoaonepercent increase inbenefits increasing
the probability of retirement entry by 1.09 percentage points. Responses are equally large if
we restrict the sample to individuals who do not become eligible at age 63 or up to age 64.
Even though in particular age 63 may serve as focal point for early retirement due to the
scheme being commonly known as ‘retirement at 63’ – our survey analysis lends support to
this hypothesis – becoming eligible at non-focal ages elicits similar responses.
Individuals eligible for the reform retire on average 6.4 months earlier than non-eligible indi-
viduals with identical characteristics. This means that reducing deductions by one percentage
point decreases the average retirement age by 0.74 months. The eect is larger for men
than for women and particularly large for individuals who have been working or voluntarily
contributing to public pension insurance prior to becoming eligible. Our results based on
the SHARE-RV survey do not suggest that responses are driven by poor health conditions or
liquidity constraints.
We subsequently use our matching methodology to quantify fiscal costs. With additional pen-
sion insurance expenditures of 10.4 billion euros and aggregate fiscal costs of 19.8 billion euros
between 2014 and 2017, our cost estimates exceedmost previous back-of-the-envelope cost
estimates including those presented in the dra government bill. The latter assumed addi-
tional pension insurance expenditure of just 7 billion euros over the period 2014–2017, which
highlights the policy-relevance of precisely estimated behavioral parameters for ex-ante fiscal
cost projections.
Our estimated elasticities are fairly large compared to the literature. In our view, there are
several potential factors that may play a role. First, the reform analyzed in this paper was
very salient. The large spike in the event study analysis in the month of becoming eligible is
indicative that information or other frictions are negligible in the context of the ‘retirement
at 63’ scheme. Second, the size of the financial incentive is very large as eligible individuals
can retire early without any deductions. Third, financial incentives may be a more important
driver of retirement choices when pathways into early retirement are opened rather than
closed. While previous papers have shown that social norms and reference ages can be crucial
for retirement choices in many settings, we find that responses to the reform are equally
large even if they do not coincide with retirement ages framed as reference points. This
suggests that, in our context, retirement choicesmay indeed bemainly influenced by financial
incentives.
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2 Who Bears the Burden of Real Estate Transfer Taxes?
Evidence from the German Housing Market
2.1 Introduction
In many countries, taxes on real estate transfers are an important source of public sector
revenue. However, they are oen criticized for creating large distortions, reducing the number
of transactions in the housing market. At the same time, transfer tax holidays are widely
seen as an eective measure to stimulate the economy because there are strong behavioral
reactions to these tax cuts, mostly regarding the timing of house purchases.1
This paper focuses on the eects of permanent changes in real estate transfer taxes, which
are understudied in the literature. Most existing contributions focus on transitory tax changes
or discontinuities in the tax schedule. Eects of permanent increases in transfer taxes are
important because growing international mobility of both capital and people may increase
pressure to raise more revenue from land and real estate. If that happens, a key question is
who bears the tax burden. Is the tax capitalized into house prices so that those who own the
house when the reform happens eectively pay the tax? Or do the buyers, who actually remit
the tax, bear the burden? To provide answers to these questions, we combine theoretical
modeling with empirical analyses. In the first part of the paper, we develop a simple and very
stylized overlapping generations model where the price eects of transfer taxes depend (i) on
the distribution of bargaining power between sellers and buyers aswell as (ii) on the likelihood
that the buyers will resell the house later. We use this model to derive hypotheses, which
we then put to an empirical test. In the second part of the paper, we exploit a reform of the
German federal fiscal system in 2006 that gave the German states the right to set the rate of the
real estate transfer tax (RETT) to study the price eect of RETT rate changes. Before the reform,
there was a nationwide uniform tax rate of 3.5%. Aer the reform, most states increased their
tax rates, albeit at dierent points in time. Today, the highest tax rates are equal to 6.5%.
Revenue from the RETT is significant. In 2005, just before the reform, revenue from this tax
This chapter is joint work with Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest and Florian Neumeier and circulates as Dolls et al.
(2019).
1 For instance, in the crisis of 2008-09, the UK government reduced the stamp duty tax on land to stimulate
spending on house renovation. Best and Kleven (2018) find that the boost in spending caused by the temporary
tax reduction was as large as the tax cut itself.
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was just 2.7% of overall state tax revenue in Germany. In 2018, this number was equal to 4.5%.
This increase partly reflects rising real estate prices in Germany since the financial crisis. In
our empirical analysis, we utilize the variation in RETT rates across German states and over
time to investigate the impact of RETT on house prices for dierent types of properties. To
this end, we use a unique dataset covering roughly 18 million properties oered for sale over
the period from 2005 to 2018. The data was collected by analyzing real estate advertisements
from 140 dierent sources, including property portals such as ImmobilienScout24.de, as well
as regional and trans-regional newspapers. Our dataset includes a large number of property
characteristics, such as the asking price, the first and the last day the property was listed, floor
size, the construction year, as well as several amenity features.
Our paper contributes to the literature studying the eect of property transfer taxes on house
prices (Dachis et al., 2012; Besley et al., 2014; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015; Slemrod et al., 2017;
Best and Kleven, 2018). In contrast to the present paper, a large part of the existing literature
focuses on temporary tax changes and tax holidays. The estimated price eects of property
transfer taxes reported in this literature vary notably, suggesting that the price eects may
depend on the institutional setting. Besley et al. (2014), for instance, exploit the UK stamp
duty tax holiday 2008-2009 and find that roughly sixty percent of the tax relief accrued to
buyers. Similarly, bunching results in Slemrod et al. (2017) for a transfer tax in Washington
D.C. suggest that the burden of the transfer tax is equally split between buyers and sellers.
In contrast, Dachis et al. (2012) estimate that the introduction of a (permanent) transfer tax
in Toronto in 2008 led to a price reduction equal to the tax, suggesting that sellers bear the
burden of the tax.2 Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) and Best and Kleven (2018) study transfer
taxes in New York/New Jersey and in the UK, respectively, and provide similar evidence. The
authors find that price responses to tax thresholds exceed the size of the tax change. What is
more, Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) show that a transfer tax notch even leads to an unraveling
of the market in a certain price range.
Recent studies have also assessed the incidence of real estate transfer taxes in the German
real estate market. However, these studies are mainly based on aggregate data. Using annual
data at the state level, Petkova and Weichenrieder (2017) assess the eect of RETT increases
on transaction prices and transaction volumes for single-family houses and apartments. For
houses and vacant lots, the authors find that the number of transactions declines, while prices
are not significantly aected. For apartments, however, the authors observe negative price
2 This finding refers to the tax on one transaction. Since the tax increase will also apply to future transactions,
the true burden implied by the tax increase is likely to be larger, as we will discuss further below, a point also
made by Petkova and Weichenrieder (2017).
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eects, but no eect on the number of transactions. In a similar vein, Fritzsche and Vandrei
(2019) find negative eects of RETT increases onmonthly state-level family home transaction
volumes. Their results also indicate substantial anticipation eects of RETT reforms. Focusing
on commercial property, Baudisch and Dresselhaus (2018) find both a decline in transactions
and a decline in prices following a tax increase. In contrast to previous studies relying on
state-level data, we exploit amicro-level data set on real estate prices, which allows for amore
credible identification of price eects.
The literature also discusses the importance of dierent channels through which transfer
taxes may aect house prices and transactions. Best and Kleven (2018) consider a model with
downpayment constraints and leverage to rationalize large prices responses. Slemrod et al.
(2017) study optimization frictions in a bargaining model. Their model allows both buyers
and sellers to bear remittance responsibilities and accounts for the possibility that the seller
maymake quality adjustments to her house prior to the sale. Other bargaining models can
be found in Besley et al. (2014) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2015). In the model proposed in
the present paper, the price eects of transfer taxes depend on the bargaining power of the
sellers vis-à-vis the buyers as well as the likelihood that the buyers will resell the house. In this
framework, given that a tax increase is perceived as permanent, price eects are predicted to
be larger for properties which are tradedmore oen. In general, the model predicts that the
price eects are likely to be larger than the tax change for a single transaction. Our empirical
results are in line with the predictions of our model. The price eects we find are larger than
those reported in earlier studies. On average, a one percentage point increase in the tax
rate reduces property prices by 3% within a year aer the tax reform. One interpretation
of this result is that the growing tax burden on future transactions is capitalized into house
prices. An alternative explanation for the large price eect is that buyers are crowded out
of the market through downpayment constraints as emphasized by Best and Kleven (2018).
As taxes are usually not mortgageable, an increase in the tax burden limits which houses
downpayment-constrained households are able to aord.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the insti-
tutional background of the RETT in Germany. In section 2.3, we present a simple housing
market model which motivates our empirical analysis and facilitates the interpretation of our
results. Section 2.4 presents the data. In section 2.5, we describe our empirical approach and
section 2.6 shows the results. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Background
TheRETT is an important sourceof revenue for theGermanstates. Witha revenueof 14.1billion
euros in 2018, which corresponds to 4.5% of state level tax revenues, its weight as a source
of revenue is limited, but its importance is due to fact that it is the only significant tax where
the states can set the tax rate.3 The RETT is charged on the purchase price on all kinds of real
estate, including residential and commercial properties as well as vacant lots.
Table 2.1: Real estate transfer tax rate changes
State Initial Tax Rate Date of Increase New Tax Rate First Legal Dra
Baden-Württemberg 3.5% 05.11.2011 5.0% 13.09.2011
Bavaria 3.5% - - -
Berlin 3.5% 01.01.2007 4.5% 07.11.2006
01.04.2012 5.0% 18.01.2012
01.01.2014 6.0% 10.10.2013
Brandenburg 3.5% 01.01.2011 5.0% 13.09.2010
01.07.2015 6.5% 04.03.2015
Bremen 3.5% 01.01.2011 4.5% 22.06.2010
01.01.2014 5.0% 09.07.2013
Hamburg 3.5% 01.01.2009 4.5% 14.10.2008
Hesse 3.5% 01.01.2013 5.0% 25.09.2012
01.08.2014 6.0% 13.05.2014
Lower Saxony 3.5% 01.01.2011 4.5% 31.08.2010
01.01.2014 5.0% 17.09.2013
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 3.5% 01.07.2012 5.0% 14.02.2012
North Rhine-Westphalia 3.5% 01.10.2011 5.0% 10.05.2011
01.01.2015 6.5% 28.10.2014
Rhineland-Palatinate 3.5% 01.03.2012 5.0% 23.11.2011
Saarland 3.5% 01.01.2011 4.0% 19.10.2010
01.01.2012 4.5% 18.10.2011
01.01.2013 5.5% 08.10.2012
01.01.2015 6.5% 07.10.2014
Saxony 3.5% - - -
Saxony-Anhalt 3.5% 02.03.2010 4.5% 30.09.2009
01.03.2012 5.0% 28.09.2011
Schleswig-Holstein 3.5% 01.01.2012 5.0% 23.08.2010
01.01.2014 6.5% 26.07.2013
Thuringia 3.5% 07.04.2011 5.0% 06.01.2011
01.01.2017 6.5% 23.09.2015
3 There is more tax autonomy at the local level. Local governments can set the property tax rate and the rate of
the local business tax. The rates of the most important revenue sources, the income tax and the value added tax,
are set at the federal level. Through the second chamber, the states participate in decisions regarding income
and value added tax rates, and they receive a share of the revenue.
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Before 2006, the tax rate was uniform across all states and equal to 2% prior to 1997 and to
3.5% until 2006. In 2006, a substantial constitutional reform permitted the states to set their
own RETT rates. With the exception of Bavaria and Saxony, all states have increased their tax
rates since, oenmultiple times (see Table 2.1). So far, no state has ever reduced its tax rate.
As shown by Büttner and Krause (2018), the German fiscal equalization scheme sets strong
financial incentives for states to raise their RETT. Moreover, the German public debt ceiling
(‘debt brake’) requires state governments to achieve structurally balanced budgets from 2020
onwards, which may explain why the need for budget consolidation is the most frequent
oicial justification of RETT increases (Fritzsche and Vandrei, 2019).
2.3 A Simple Model of a Housing Market with Transfer Taxes
We consider a highly stylized model of an economy with overlapping generations. There are
two types of agents, the young (Y ) and the old (O). All agents live for two periods; they are
young in the first period and old in the second. The number of households in each generation
is normalized to unity. There is a stock of two units of housing in the economy. For simplicity
we abstract from depreciation of housing capital and construction.
The utility for the young (old) of owning a house while young (old) is given by UY ( UO).
Ownership of a house may or may not imply that a household actually occupies a house.
There is a perfectly competitive rental market which makes sure that all households live
somewhere. For the purposes of our analysis we do not need to model this market explicitly.
We consider a housing market with frictions. At the beginning of each period, a fraction
0 < q < 1 of the young enters the housing market.4 Only old households consider selling a
house. Each young household in the market is matched with an old household.
If no trade takes place, the old agent keeps the house while old and passes it on to the next
generation, which generates a utility for the old household denoted by UO.5 The reservation
4 A standard way of modeling frictions would be to assume that a share of 1− q young households is liquidity
constrained. A limitation of our model is that we do not endogenize q, which implies that changes in transfer
taxes in ourmodel do not influence the number of transactions. Wemake this assumption because our empirical
analysis focuses on eects of tax changes on prices, not on the number of transactions. Themain objective of our
theoretical analysis is to highlight specific factors which are likely to aect the impact of tax changes on prices.
5 This may or may not include the utility of the old of passing on a property to the next generation. Note that
in equilibrium, at the beginning of each period before transactions take place, only the old households own
houses, which is why only they can sell houses. Aer transactions have taken place, the old households still own
2− q units of housing. At the end of period two, the old households die and the houses owned by the old are
inherited by the next generation of old households.
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utility of the young households is equal to zero. If a transaction takes place, the buyer pays a
transfer tax equal to T percent of the house price.
It is straightforward to determine the equilibrium house price. When the young negotiate,
they take into account that they will sell the house with probability q when they are old. With
probability 1− q they will keep and use the house while old, so that the present value of the
surplus from buying the house is given by
UY +
q
(1 + ρ)
pt+1 + (1− q)
UO
(1 + ρ)
− pt(1 + T ) (2.1)
where t is the period index and ρ is the discount rate. The surplus of the old agent from selling
is simply given by pt − UO.
The equilibrium house price in period t is thus given by maximizing the Nashmaximand
β ln
(
UY +
q
(1 + ρ)
pt+1 + (1− q)
UO
(1 + ρ)
− pt(1 + T )
)
+ (1− β) ln(pt − UO) (2.2)
over pt, which yields
p∗t (1 + T ) = βU
O(1 + T ) + (1− β)
(
UY +
q
(1 + ρ)
pt+1 + (1− q)
UO
(1 + ρ)
)
. (2.3)
Our analysis focuses on the house price eects of changes in the transfer tax T which are
perceived as permanent. It is therefore suicient to consider the tax eect on prices in the
steady state, where prices are the same in each period in this stationary model. The steady
state house price is given by
p∗ =
(
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
)−1 [
βUO(1 + T ) + (1− β)
(
UY + (1− q) U
O
(1 + ρ)
)]
. (2.4)
Denote the semi-elasticity of thehousepricewith respect to the tax rate by ε ≡ dp∗
dT
1
p∗
. Consider
first the two polar cases β = 1 (buyer has all the bargaining power) and β = 0 (seller has all
the bargaining power). If the buyer has all the bargaining power it follows directly from (2.4)
that ε = 0. Since the seller is always reduced to her reservation utility and the house price
is the net of tax price, changes in T are always fully borne by the buyer and the house price
does not change. In the opposite polar case, where the seller has all the bargaining power
(β = 0), we get
ε = − 1
1 + T − q
(1+ρ)
. (2.5)
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Equation (2.5) yields various important insights. First, if q converges to zero, which implies
that buyers do not expect further transactions during their lifetime, a one percentage point
increase in the transfer tax (dT = 0.01) reduces the price by approximately one percent. But
if q is positive, the decline in the price will be larger than one percent because the tax increase
is also expected to be a burden on future transactions.
Unsurprisingly, the impact of future transactions is stronger, the lower the discount rate.
Moreover, we should expect the price eects of a permanent increase in transfer taxes to be
higher, the more likely it is that the property will be tradedmore than once over the relevant
time horizon. In particular, wemay then observe that a one percentage point increase in the
real estate transfer tax reduces house prices by more than one percent. Consider finally the
general case 0 < β < 1, where:
ε =
[
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
]−1 [
βUO
p∗
− 1
]
< 0 (2.6)
Aswe show in the appendix, equation (2.6) defines ε as a function ofβ and q, that is ε = ε(β, q),
with δε
δβ
> 0 and δε
δq
< 0. For our empirical analysis, this implies that we would expect to see (i)
a smaller price reduction in response to a tax increase in transactions where buyer bargaining
power is higher and (ii) a larger price reduction in cases where the traded property is expected
to be tradedmore frequently in the future.6
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In our empirical analysis we use a novel and large dataset on the German real estate market
provided by F+B, a commercial real estate consultancy firm. The dataset covers roughly
18million properties that were oered for sale in Germany during the period from January
2005 until December 2018. The dataset was created by analyzing real estate advertisements
from 140 dierent sources, including online property portals, regional and trans-regional
newspapers, as well as real estate agencies, using web-scraping techniques. The raw data
was thoroughly cleaned tomake sure that properties that were listed inmore than one source
at the same time only appear once in the final dataset. For all properties included in the final
dataset, we know the first day the property was listed as well as the last day it was listed.
Moreover, the final dataset includes the complete list of sources in which the property was
advertised.
6 Of course, the expected number of future transactions will itself be a function of the transfer tax. In the simple
model considered here, the number of future transactions is exogenous because our empirical analysis focuses
on price eects, not the quantity of housing transactions.
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The dataset contains three price variables: the oering price of the property on the day it
was first listed, the oering price on the last day the property was listed, and a proxy for the
actual selling price of the property, which is equal to the oering price on the last day of the
listing minus an estimated deduction. F+B estimates this deduction based on matching a
subsample of the advert data to actual transaction data. In our analysis, we primarily focus
on the final oering price. Note that we drop properties from our dataset in case the oering
price (i) increased by more than factor two or (ii) decreased by more than 50% during the
posting period since we are concerned that oering prices of those properties do not reflect
market prices. Moreover, the dataset covers a wide range of property characteristics, such
as floor space, the number of rooms, the construction year, as well as binary indicators for
equipment and locational features, and the postal code of the property. The data is available
for three dierent property types: apartments, single-family houses, and apartment buildings.
In our empirical analysis, we study the price eects of a change in the real estate transfer tax
separately for each property type.
Table 2.2 shows the sample means of important property characteristics separately for (i) the
three dierent property types aswell as (ii) three dierent time periods: 2005-2009, 2010-2014,
and 2015-2018. A glance at the price variables suggest that property prices have increased
notably over the past years. I.e., between 2015 and 2018, the average price per square meter
for an apartment (single-family house) was roughly 650 euros (400 euros) higher than it was
between 2010 and 2014. This corresponds to a price increase of about 34% (24%).
Table 2.2: Real estate data: Summary statistics by time period
Apartments Single-family Houses Apartment Buildings
2005-09 2010-14 2015-18 2005-09 2010-14 2015-18 2005-09 2010-14 2015-18
First asking price 1,785 1,933 2,584 1,600 1,595 1,975 1,005 1,022 1,320
Last asking price 1,767 1,925 2,578 1,584 1,587 1,968 990 1,014 1,314
Floor size 92.6 94.3 102.4 150.0 152.0 153.3 385.5 312.3 325.5
Rooms 3.1 3.1 3.2 4.8 5.1 5.0 7.4 8.4 9.0
Construction year 1979 1979 1982 1981 1978 1980 1954 1952 1954
Kitchen 0.33 0.41 0.31 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.11 0.17 0.21
Parking spot 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.64 0.67
Garden 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.31 0.28 0.41
Balcony 0.47 0.37 0.43 0.31 0.24 0.39 0.33 0.23 0.40
Basement 0.28 0.46 0.46 0.35 0.40 0.42 0.31 0.39 0.45
Notes: The table shows the average realizations of dierent property characteristics for dierent property types
and across dierent time periods. Floor space is measured in square meters. Asking prices refer to the price per
square meter.
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A closer inspection of our data reveals that by far the largest fraction of the properties included
in our dataset (i.e., more than one-third) were advertised on the online property portal Im-
mobilienScout24.de, which is by far the largest online property portal in Germany. To check
whether properties listed on ImmobilienScout24.de dier from those advertised in other
outlets, we compare the characteristics of properties listed on ImmobilienScout24.de to the
characteristics of properties that were solely listed in other outlets. The results are shown in
Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Real estate data: Summary statistics by data source
Apartments Single-family Houses Apartment Buildings
IS24 Other source IS24 Other source IS24 Other source
First asking price 2,173 2,000 1,773 1,639 1,197 1,091
Last asking price 2,160 1,991 1,761 1,630 1,187 1,084
Floor size 94.1 97.5 148.8 153.9 312.3 336.3
Rooms 3.2 3.0 5.2 4.7 10.5 7.3
Construction year 1979 1980 1983 1977 1954 1953
Kitchen 0.39 0.33 0.14 0.26 0.10 0.22
Parking spot 0.68 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.69 0.61
Garden 0.28 0.22 0.31 0.38 0.30 0.35
Balcony 0.48 0.37 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.32
Basement 0.50 0.32 0.45 0.34 0.51 0.33
Notes: The table shows the average realizations of dierent property characteristics for dierent property types
separately for properties listed on immobilienscout24.de vs. properties listed in other sources. Floor space is
measured in square meters. Asking prices refer to the price per square meter.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.3 indicate that properties listed on ImmobilienScout24.de
do not appear to be representative of the German property market. On average, properties
listed on ImmobilienScout24.de are more expensive than properties solely listed in other
outlets. Also, the characteristics of properties advertised on ImmobilienScout24.de dier from
the characteristics of properties listed in other sources. For instance, apartments advertised
on ImmobilienScout24.de appear to be smaller, but are more likely equipped with a kitchen,
a parking spot, a garden, a balcony, and a basement. This accentuates our dataset’s higher
degree of representativity compared to web-scraped Immobilienscout24.de data used by
other studies on the German real estate market.
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
We employ an event study design to assess the impact of changes in real estate transfer tax
rates on residential property prices. For each property type, i.e., apartments, single-family
houses, and apartment buildings, we estimate the following model:
ln(p)i,c,t =
23∑
j=−12
βjDc,t−j + νXi + µc + ςc,t + εi,c,t (2.7)
Index i refers to the property, c to the postal code area the property is located in, and t to the
month itwasoered for sale. Thedependent variable is the logof theproperty priceper square
meter.Dc,t−j are monthly event study indicators for real estate transfer tax rate changes. The
event window runs from 12months prior to the tax change to 24months aer the tax change.7
End points are adjusted in line with Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019). Following Schmidheiny
and Siegloch, wemainly focus on the size of the tax rate change∆τ as event study indicator.
Additionally, a robustness check employs the change in the log net-of-tax rate as in Fuest
et al. (2018). While the first set of indicators assumes a linear relationship between the change
in the tax rate and the percentage change in the property price, the latter set of indicators
captures the elasticity of property prices with respect to the net-of-tax rate η = (∆p
p
)/(∆(1−τ)
1−τ ).
We include postal code area fixed eects µc to account for time-invariant local characteristics
that influence property prices. ςc,t is a time-fixed eect formonths and years whichwe interact
with a set of four dierent dummy variables indicating the degree of urbanization. Indicators
for the degree of urbanization (Siedlungsstrukturelle Kreistypen) are provided by the Federal
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aairs and Spatial Development (BBSR). That way,
we account for the fact that property prices have experienced a stronger increase in urban
areas over the last years (Baldenius et al., 2019). Standard errors are clustered at the postal
code level.
Deviating from a standard event study setting, we choose t−4 as the reference period relative
to which the change in property prices is measured. We do so for two reasons. First, the price
of a property oered for sale shortly before a tax reformmight already reflect the upcoming
tax rate change. As it may take several months to complete a property transaction, setting
an earlier reference period ensures that prices are compared to a time period in which the
preceding tax rate still applies. Second, the median time between the first legal dra and the
reforms’ implementation amounts to 3.2 months. The 4-month window hence ensures that
the pre-trend is not as much driven by announcement eects.
7 The event study window runs until month 23 as the month of the tax change is coded as 0.
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As a robustness check, we additionally control for property characteristics that may influence
prices per square meter. The property characteristics that we consider are the same as in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3, i.e., floor space, the number of rooms, dummy variables for construction
year groups, aswell as dummyvariables indicatingwhether the property comeswith a kitchen,
a parking spot, a garden, a balcony, or a basement. In another robustness check, we also
includecounty-level variables thatmightbe related to regional propertymarketdevelopments.
These variables include population figures, per-capita GDP, and the unemployment rate. Note
that those variables are only available at an annual frequency. Moreover, per-capita GDP as
well as unemployment rates are only available at the county level. The data are provided by
the German Federal and the German States’ Statistical Oices.
In a final robustness check, we address the concern that eects in border regions may be
partially driven by spillover eects. I.e., an increase in a state’s tax rate may shi demand to
border regions in neighboring states, which might result in higher prices in the control group.
This could lead to an overestimation of price eects. We therefore estimate a specification
without observations in the vicinity of a border. More precisely, we exclude postal code areas
that either directly adjoin a state border, or for which the postal code’s centroid is located at a
distance of up to 10 kilometers to the border. Figure 2.1 indicates which postal codes areas
are excluded in this specification.
Our theoretical model highlights the importance of transaction frequencies as well as the
distribution of bargaining power between the seller and the buyer of a property for the price
eect of the RETT. Unfortunately, we neither directly observe the intended holding period
of a specific property nor the distribution of bargaining power between buyers and sellers.
However, we approximate both factors using two dierent municipality-level indicators. As
a proxy for transaction frequencies, we use the fraction of property advertisements relative
to the number of residential properties in a municipality. Data on the number of residential
properties is taken from the 2011 census. We then compute transaction frequency quartiles
within each state and estimate the event study separately for each quartile.
We approximate the bargaining power of sellers using population growth between 2005 and
2017. Arguably, the more people move to a municipality, the higher the demand for houses,
implying more bargaining power for the seller. We again compute quartiles within states and
estimate our model separately for each quartile.
Note that when assessing the importance of transaction frequencies and bargaining power
for the price eects of RETT, we restrict our analysis to single-family houses. The reason is that
apartments and apartment buildings are oen considered an investment and, consequently,
bought by institutional investors, which is why population growth may only represent a
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Figure 2.1: Postal codes in the vicinity of state borders
Notes: This figure shows all German postal code areas, distinguished by their distance to state borders. Red areas
indicate postal codes that either directly adjoin a state border or whose centroid is located at a distance of up to
10 kilometers to a border.
poor proxy for bargaining power. Likewise, if a property is bought as an investment, the link
between the transaction frequency and the fraction of properties oered for sale relative
to the property stock should be less strong. In contrast, the vast majority of single-family
houses is owner-occupied,which iswhyour proxies for transaction frequencies andbargaining
power should be better suited for this analysis. Also note that when constructing the proxy for
transaction frequencies, we omit all municipalities that have less than 1,000 buildings.8
2.6 Results
2.6.1 The Eect of RETT on Property Prices
Figure 2.2 displays the results for the baseline specification in which we employ the change in
the RETT rate∆τ as event study indicator.
8 Without a minimummunicipality size, very small municipalities might be assigned to high transaction fre-
quency categories if just few buildings are on oer.
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Figure 2.2: Baseline: Eects of changes in the RETT rate∆τ
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Notes: The figure plots monthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for the baseline
event study specification. The dependent variable is a property’s log price per square meter, and event study
indicators correspond to the change in the tax rate∆τ . Specifications include postal code andmonth-year x
urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the postal code level.
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For all three property types considered in our analysis, prices start to drop immediately aer
the tax hike becomes eective, whereas the magnitude of the response increases (in absolute
terms) over time.9 Apartment prices gradually decline until the price response reaches a
minimum at around−0.04 aer one year. This indicates that an increase in the tax rate by one
percentage point reduces the price of apartments by up to 4%. For single-family houses and
apartment buildings, theprice response is somewhat smaller –−0.015 and−0.03, respectively
–, and reaches its minimummore quickly. Nevertheless, for all three property types, the price
decrease exceeds the increase in the tax burden. Note that this finding is well in line with our
theoretical model. The larger price eect for apartments compared to single-family houses
and apartment buildings may be due to a shorter average holding period: While houses are
mainly bought by families who plan to live in the property for many years (and may even
have a bequest motive), apartments are more frequently bought by investors whomay intend
to resell the property at some point in time (Petkova and Weichenrieder, 2017; Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2018).
Note that we observe a small pre-trend for single-family houses, although the post-reform
eect rapidly stabilizes at a rather constant level. Also, price eects fluctuate prior to the
reform. This could partly be driven by anticipation eects: Depending on the state and the
reform, a tax increasemay have been announced just twomonths or an entire year prior to the
reform. This could have induced anticipatory responses at dierent points in time preceding
the respective reforms.
Over the last decades, we have seen a very heterogeneous development of property prices in
Germany. Some largeGerman cities, such asMunich or Berlin, aswell as somemore rural areas
in their vicinity, have experienced a rapid increase in property prices over the last decades,
considerably driven by a substantial growth in population size. At the same time, there are
some predominately rural areas in Germany that suer from a population drain, leading to
declining property prices. Although our baseline specification accounts for heterogeneous
time trends across regions characterized by dierent degrees of urbanization, we are still
concerned that our results might be aected by some outliers that have experienced extreme
migration patterns during our sample period. In order to address this concern, we winsorize
our sample according to municipal population growth between 2005 and 2017.10 I.e., we drop
all municipalities with a population growth rate that is smaller than the population-weighted
9 Results are virtually identical when using F+B’s proxy variable for actual transaction prices as a dependent
variable (not depicted here).
10 Administrative data onmunicipal population size was only available until 2017 at the time of writing the paper.
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5% quantile or larger than the population-weighted 95% quantile of the population growth
rate.11
Results are depicted in Figure 2.3. While the coeicients are very similar to those illustrated
in Figure 2.2, no significant pre-trend remains once municipalities are dropped that exhibit
extreme population growth rates. The decline in prices starts in the three months prior to
the reform. This is in line with our expectations and reflects the importance of anticipation
eects. If a property is oered for sale shortly before the RETT rate change becomes eective,
it is unlikely that the transaction will be completed before the implementation date, implying
that the higher RETT rate will apply. Therefore, we already observe a decrease in property
prices before the implementation of the reform.
Figure 2.4 estimates the event study on a combined sample of apartments, houses, and
apartment buildings. As before, the pre-trend disappears oncemunicipalitieswith particularly
strong growth or decline in population size are excluded. With a coeicient of roughly 3%
aer one year, the aggregate eect lies, as expected, in between the eects of the individual
specifications.
Figure 2.4: Joint estimation for apartments, houses and apartment buildings
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Notes: The figure plots monthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for a joint
sample including apartments, houses and apartment buildings. The dependent variable is a property’s log price
per square meter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the tax rate∆τ . Specifications include
postal code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the postal code
level. Panel (a) considers the full sample. Panel (b) excludes the population-weighted top and bottom 5% of
municipalities according to municipal population growth between 2005 and 2017.
11 Dropping properties oered for sale in areas that experienced particularly large increases and declines,
respectively, in population growth, rather than directly winsorizing based on property prices, ensures that the
selection of our sample is not endogenous, that is, related to price changes induced by a decrease in RETT rates.
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Figure 2.3: Winsorizing municipal population growth rates
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Notes: The figure plotsmonthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent
variable is a property’s log price per squaremeter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the tax
rate∆τ . Specifications include postal code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors
are clustered at the postal code level. This specification excludes the population-weighted top and bottom 5%
of municipalities according to municipal population growth between 2005 and 2017.
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To check the robustness of our results, we modify our empirical specification in several addi-
tional ways. Note that all further robustness checks are based on the winsorized sample. As a
first robustness check, we replace the change in the RETT rate by the log net-of-tax rate. A
glance at Figure 2.5 reveals that our results remain qualitatively unchanged. For apartments
and apartment buildings, the estimated price elasticity with respect to the log net-of-tax rate
reaches a maximum of 4, while the estimated elasticity for houses is somewhat smaller.
Second, we add property-specific control variables to equation 2.7. Specifically, we control for
the floor space in square meters, the number of rooms, construction year categories, as well
as various amenities. Controlling for property characteristics ensures that our findings are
indeed due to changes in oering prices and not driven by composition eects. This concern
would be relevant if a change in RETT has an eect on the pool of properties that are oered
for sale. The results are displayed in Figure 2.6.
While the figure closely resembles Figure 2.3, the coeicients’ magnitude slightly decreases.
However, with the confidence bands becomingmore narrow, the significance of the coei-
cients remains unaected.
In a third robustness check, we add several variables to our empirical model that cover
regional housingmarket conditions. We control for county-level GDP, population size, and the
unemployment rate. The results are illustrated in Figure 2.7. Again, we find that our results
remain qualitatively unchanged.
In a final robustness check, we exclude properties located in postal codes in the vicinity of a
state border. The reason is that theremaybe spillover eects of RETT changes into regions that
are located close to the border of a state that has implemented the RETT change. I.e., suppose
there is a region located in state A and bordering state B. If state B increases the RETT, but state
A does not, wemay observe an increase in the demand for properties located in that region
because of its proximity to state B. Figure 2.8 shows the results. While the estimated price
eects for single-family houses and apartment buildings are virtually identical to the ones
obtained in our baseline estimation, the magnitude of coeicient estimates slightly increases
for apartments. This alleviates the concern that the rather large eectmeasured in thebaseline
specification is attributable to spillover eects into border regions of tax-increasing states.
Instead, coeicients are slightly more negative than in the baseline. This could also be due to
the specific municipalities that are excluded here: amongst others, not considering border
regions almost fully excludes the three city states from the sample.
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Figure 2.5: Robustness check: Eects of changes in the log net-of-tax rate
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Notes: The figure plotsmonthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent
variable is a property’s log price per squaremeter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the log
net-of-tax rate. Specifications include postal code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard
errors are clustered at the postal code level.
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Figure 2.6: Robustness check: Property-specific control variables
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Notes: The figure plotsmonthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent
variable is a property’s log price per squaremeter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the tax
rate∆τ . Specifications include postal code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors
are clustered at the postal code level. Specifications control for area in square meter, the number of rooms,
the construction year, as well as whether the property has a basement, a parking spot, a garden, and a kitchen,
and exclude the population-weighted top and bottom 5% of municipalities according to municipal population
growth between 2005 and 2017. 59
2 Who Bears the Burden of Real Estate Transfer Taxes?
Figure 2.7: Robustness check: Regional control variables
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Notes: The figure plotsmonthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent
variable is a property’s log price per squaremeter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the tax
rate∆τ . Specifications include postal code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors
are clustered at the postal code level. Specifications control for annual county-level population, GDP, and the
unemployment rate, and exclude the population-weighted top and bottom 5% of municipalities according to
municipal population growth between 2005 and 2017.
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Figure 2.8: Robustness check: Without postal codes within 10 km of the border
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Notes: The figure plotsmonthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent
variable is a property’s log price per squaremeter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the tax
rate∆τ . Specifications include postal code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors
are clustered at the postal code level. Specifications exclude the population-weighted top and bottom 5% of
municipalities according to municipal population growth between 2005 and 2017, as well as postal codes that
either directly adjoin a border or whose centroid is located at a distance of up to 10 kilometers to the border.
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To sum up, our findings indicate that property prices decline by more than the magnitude of
the tax increase. A one percentage point change in the RETT reduces the prices of apartments
and apartment buildings by roughly 3-4% and house prices by 1.5-2%. While prices start
responding immediately to the reform, the response increases in magnitude over the course
of the first year aer a reform. Responses seem to bemore immediate for house prices than
for apartment prices.
While in contrast to previous findings for Germany, the observed overshiing is consistent
with Best and Kleven (2018), Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) and Davido and Leigh (2013), who
likewise find a reduction in real estate prices which by far exceeds the increase in the tax
rate. Several factors may contribute to this overshiing. First, the capitalization of RETT in a
property’s future resale value might lower property prices, as described in section 2.3. This
might also help explain why eects are substantially larger for apartments than for single-
family houses. While single-family houses are frequently bought by individuals who intend to
live in their house for many decades, and hence do not pay as much attention to the future
resale value, apartments more oen serve as an investment property.
Second, downpayment constraints might play an important role here (Best and Kleven, 2018).
While it is possible to debt-finance a large share of the property price, taxes need to be paid
upfront and are usually not mortgageable. For credit-constrained buyers, an increase in the
tax burden thus has a much larger impact on the aordability of a property than a property
price change of the samemagnitude. For downpayment-constrained households, one can
thus expect a price response that exceeds the change in the tax burden.
2.6.2 Price Eects by Transaction Frequency and by Bargaining Power
Our theoretical model suggests that the price eect of a RETT change is larger when (i) the
bargaining power of buyers is lower and (ii) when a property is expected to be tradedmore
frequently in the future (see section 2.3). We provide evidence for the accuracy of both
predictions by approximating properties’ transaction frequencies and buyers’ and sellers’
bargaining power using two dierent indicators that vary at the municipal level.
Toanalyzewhetherpropertyprices respondmore strongly toaRETT increasewhen transaction
frequencies are higher, we compute a proxy for transaction frequencies at the municipal level.
In a first step, we divide the aggregate number of houses oered for sale in a municipality
by the total number of houses in the municipality. Then, we calculate the state-specific
quartiles of this variable and assign each municipality to one of the four quartiles. Finally,
we re-estimate equation 2.7 separately for each quartile. Figure 2.9 shows the results, with
transaction frequencies increasing fromQ1 to Q4. In line with the theoretical prediction of our
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Figure 2.9: Transaction frequencies: Eects for houses by transaction frequency quartiles
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Notes: The figure plots monthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for each of
four transaction frequency quartiles. Quartiles are formed within states and based on overall postings across all
years relative to the housing stock. Transaction frequencies increase fromQ1 to Q4. The dependent variable
is a property’s log price per square meter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the tax rate
∆τ . Specifications include postal code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors are
clustered at the postal code level. This specification excludes the population-weighted top and bottom 5% of
municipalities according to municipal population growth between 2005 and 2017.
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Figure 2.10: Bargaining power: Eects for houses by population growth quartiles
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Notes: The figure plots monthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for each of
the four population growth quartiles. Quartiles are formed within states and based onmunicipal population
growth between 2005 and 2017, also includingmunicipalities with very high and very low population growth.
Population growth rates increase from Q1 top Q4. The dependent variable is a property’s log price per square
meter, and event study indicators correspond to the change in the tax rate∆τ . Specifications include postal
code andmonth-year x urbanization level fixed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the postal code level.
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model, price responses seem to be slightly stronger in case housing transaction occur more
frequently, even though the dierences between the quartiles are of a rather modest size.
In a similar vein, we proxy bargaining power of sellers and buyers using municipal population
growth rates. The idea is that the larger a municipality’s population growth, the higher is
the demand for properties and, consequently, the better a seller’s bargaining position. As
before, we compute state-specific population growth quartiles, determine the quartile each
municipality belongs to, and re-estimate equation 2.7 separately for each quartile. Figure 2.10
displays results. The price eects in the lowest quartile, that is, Q1, are not significantly
dierent from zero. In those municipalities, sellers have little bargaining power. In line with
the predictions derived from ourmodel, the house price is close to the net-of-tax price, and no
significant price response occurs. In turn, price responses are pronounced when population
growth is (relatively) large and, hence, sellers (buyers) have high (low) bargaining power. Yet
again, the evidence that we find supports the conclusions that can be drawn based on our
theoretical model.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper exploits a constitutional reform that was passed in Germany in 2006 to study the
eect of changes in the real estate transfer tax (RETT) on property prices. The reform granted
the German states the right to set the rate of the RETT. Over the following years, 14 out of the
16 states executed this right and increased the RETT rate, oenmultiple times. Up to date,
there have been 27 tax hikes. Before the reform, there was a uniform RETT rate of 3.5% that
applied to all German states. Today, the highest RETT rate amounts to 6.5%.
We combine the information on RETT rate changes at the state level with a largemicro dataset
covering roughly 18 million properties that were oered for sale during the period from
January 2005 until December 2018. The dataset was created by collecting information from
property advertisements using web-scraping techniques. This information was collected
from 140 dierent sources, including online property portals, regional and trans-regional
newspapers, aswell as property brokers. The list of variables includes the oering price aswell
as a large set of property characteristics. Importantly, our dataset contains the exact day the
propertywas listed aswell as thepostal codeof theproperty. Basedon this dataset, weanalyze
the eect of an increase in the RETT rate on property prices using an event study design.
We conduct our analysis separately for apartments, single-family houses, and apartment
buildings.
65
2 Who Bears the Burden of Real Estate Transfer Taxes?
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we set up a stylized theoretical model of the housing
market to derive empirically testable predictions. One of the main insights is that in the Nash
equilibrium, an increase in the RETT ratemay result in a decline in property prices that exceeds
the tax increase. Our model predicts that the semi-elasticity of the house price with respect to
the RETTmay be larger than one if the bargaining power of the seller is high and if a property
is expected to be tradedmore frequently in the future.
Our empirical findings lend support to our theoretical model. We find that a one percentage
point increase in the RETT reduces prices of apartments and apartment buildings by roughly
3-4% and single-family house prices by 1.5-2% in the twelve months aer the reform. These
results are robust to several modifications to our empirical specifications. What is more, we
indeed find evidence that the magnitude of the price eect in response to a RETT rate change
is positively related to the bargaining power of sellers in the housing market as well as to
properties’ transaction frequencies.
Our findings bear great importance for economic policy-makers. In light of the increasing in-
ternational mobility of capital and labor, taxes on property are oen regarded as a particularly
attractive source of public revenue. However, only little is known so far about the distribution
of the tax burden for a permanent increase in real estate transfer taxes. Our results suggest
that the biggest share of the tax burden is borne by the seller, not the buyer of a property.
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Appendix
In this appendix we show that δε
δβ
> 0 and δε
δq
< 0, as claimed in the main text.
From equation (2.6) we can derive
δε
δβ
= −
[
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
]−2
q
(1 + ρ)
[
βUO
p∗
− 1
]
+
[
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
]−1
UO
p∗2
[
p∗ − β δp
∗
δβ
] (2.A.1)
Note that the first termon the right hand side of equation (2.A.1) is positive because βU
O
p∗
−1 <
0. The second term on the right hand side of equation (2.A.1) is also positive because the price
declines with increasing bargaining power of the buyers, i.e.
δp∗
δβ
= −
[
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
]−1 [
p∗q
(1 + ρ)
− UO(1 + T ) + UY + (1− q) U
O
(1 + ρ)
]
< 0
(2.A.2)
From equation (2.6) we can also derive
δε
δq
=
[
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
]−2
(1− β)
(1 + ρ)
[
βUO
p∗
− 1
]
−
[
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
]−1
βUO
p∗2
δp∗
δq
(2.A.3)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.A.3) is negative because βU
O
p∗
− 1 < 0. The
second term is also negative because
δp∗
δq
=
[
1 + T − (1− β)q
(1 + ρ)
]−1
(1− β)
(1 + ρ)
(p∗ − UO) > 0. (2.A.4)
q.e.d.
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3 The Effect of Real Estate Purchase Subsidies on
Property Prices
3.1 Introduction
Rising rents and property prices have fueled a debate on the aordability of housing in Ger-
many, aswell as in other countries around theworld. This has led to calls for housing subsidies,
and to the introduction of numerous measures aiming to reduce housing costs. Amongst
others, recent years have seen the introduction of rent control, of a temporary accelerated
depreciation schedule for the construction of residential units, and of subsidies for the ac-
quisition of property by owner-occupiers. While many previous initiatives to make housing
more aordable targeted renters and poorer households, increasing attention has lately been
put on the costs of acquiring real estate. Both the German federal and the Bavarian state
government implemented housing purchase subsidies in 2018, aiming to reduce purchase
costs for owner-occupiers.
Although intended to foster homeownership and tomake the acquisition of property more
aordable, in particular for families, housing subsidies may well exert adverse eects by
driving up real estate prices. This would especially be the case if housing demand is driven
up by the subsidy scheme while housing supply is rather inelastic. According to the federal
government, the federal subsidy is unlikely to lead to large windfall gains, and it claims a
lack of evidence on price eects of housing purchase subsidies (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019).
However, several features of the subsidy design speak in favor of potentially large price eects.
First, due to generous income thresholds, roughly three quarters of German families with
minor children – and in the case of Bavaria three quarters of households regardless of family
structure – would be eligible for subsidies when buying a property. Second, federal subsidy
provisions are set to expire in 2020. This could in turn further stimulate housing demand
between 2018 and 2020. With the German construction sector operating at its capacity limits,
housing supply is however rather inelastic (Gornig et al., 2019). As the application window for
the federal scheme is confined to three years, incentives for the construction sector to expand
and develop additional capacity are limited. Contrary to claims by the government, one could
thus expect a considerable pass-through into prices.
Against this background, this paper investigates to which degree direct housing subsidies are
capitalized into home prices. My study is the first to assess the price eects of direct housing
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purchase subsidies that are not intended as a stimulus measure. For this purpose, I exploit
that Bavaria, Germany’s second largest federal state by population, introduced a muchmore
extensive subsidy scheme than the federal scheme available in all states. I use this policy
discontinuity at the Bavarian interstate border to assess the eect of subsidies on home prices,
using a richmicro-dataset onGermanhouse prices. My findings indicate that in the secondhalf
of 2018, single-family home prices increased by roughly 3.4%more in Bavarian border regions
than in neighboring regions of other states. These results are consistent with a full shiing
of subsidies into the prices of single-family homes. In contrast, no eect can be observed
for apartments. This is likely due to apartments seldom being bought by owner-occupiers
who could claim the subsidy. Splitting the sample into houses with a comparatively high or
low subsidization probability also points to heterogeneous eects: price eects tend to be
larger in sectors of the real estate market with a larger exposure to the subsidy scheme. I also
provide suggestive evidence that the subsidy scheme slightly stimulated construction activity
of single-family houses, while possibly leading to a partial crowding-out of the construction of
apartment buildings. Providing a clean identification of subsidy eects, my findings provide
an important contribution to both the literature and the current policy debate at a time at
which the aordability of housing is considered a key policy issue in many countries.
Evidence on housing purchase subsidies in other countries also suggests a significant cap-
italization into real estate prices. While the German and Bavarian schemes grant flat-rate
direct subsidies, other countries tend to subsidize the purchase of real estate through the tax
code by granting mortgage interest deductions. Generally, most empirical evidence indicates
that such tax subsidies do not increase the homeownership rate and are passed-through into
property prices (see Bourassa et al., 2013 for a survey). In a general equilibriummodel of the
US housing market, Sommer and Sullivan (2018) show that eliminating the mortgage interest
deductionwould result in declining property prices, increasing homeownership and improved
welfare. Hilber and Turner (2014) point out that a subsidy’s eects on homeownership de-
cisions and house prices depend on the elasticity of the housing supply: Homeownership
only rises in areas with lax land-use regulations, whereas subsidies are capitalized into home
prices in tightly regulated, rather inelastic housing markets. This house price eect might
even result in an adverse eect on homeownership. Davis (2018) exploits the variation of US
state-level tax legislation to assess capitalization eects of mortgage interest deductions on
houses on both sides of the state border. His results indicate strong capitalization eects,
with a one percentage point increase in the tax rate applied to mortgage interests leading to a
0.8 percent increase in house prices. Similarly, Berger et al. (2000) show a full capitalization of
aer-tax interest rate subsidies in Sweden. Using a Danish tax reform with a dierential eect
on mortgage interest deductions across tax brackets, Gruber et al. (2020) estimate long-term
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eects of housing tax subsidies. Their findings indicate zero eect on homeownership, but
a sizable eect at the intensive margin as well as suggestive evidence that tax subsidies are
capitalized into house prices.
However, the institutional setup of a mortgage interest subsidy considerably diers from the
German subsidy schemes. While the latter grant flat-rate direct subsidies to households below
an income threshold, the size of a mortgage interest subsidy depends on both the price of a
property and individual marginal tax rates. Due to the interaction between tax progressivity
and the mortgage interest subsidy, high-income households with high marginal tax rates
benefit the most from these subsidies.
Evidence on direct subsidies is much more scarce. Also, in contrast to the German setting,
governments tend to resort to direct subsidy programs as a stimulus when the economy
is weak. In the wake of the financial crisis, the United States introduced a homebuyer tax
credit to counter dropping demand in the housing market (Dynan et al., 2013). While first
designed with a repayment requirement, the tax credit was granted as a subsidy in 2009
and 2010. In 2009, first-time homebuyers up to a certain income threshold were eligible
for a refundable tax credit of 10 percent of the purchase price, capped at 8,000 USD. For
most claimants, this is equivalent to a flat-rate subsidy, as in the Bavarian case. In a general
equilibriummodel, Floetotto et al. (2016) show that such homebuyer tax credits temporarily
increase home prices and transaction volumes, but lead to negative welfare eects. Dynan
et al. (2013) exploit regional variation in housing markets, finding only a small and temporary
eect on sales. However, as credits were available throughout the country and the housing
market underwent rapid changes, identifying a control group for an empirical analysis on
prices is diicult. Similarly, the UK subsidizes the acquisition of new built homes below a
certain property value with an equity loan for up to 20% (40% for London) of the property
value. Exploiting spatial discontinuities in the scope of the scheme, Carozzi et al. (2019) find
strong capitalization eects in the supply-constrained London area, the size of which suggests
an overcapitalization, but no eect on construction. In a region with rather elastic supply, the
subsidy is instead shown to stimulate construction.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the subsidy schemes
implemented in 2018. Section3.3describes thedata sourcesused inmyanalysis. In section3.4,
I subsequently present mymethodological approach. This encompasses a description of the
border dierence-in-dierence design and of the analysis of geodata. Results are presented
in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Institutional Background
While real estate prices were stagnating in Germany between 1995 and 2010, nominal prices
have risen by roughly 50% in the last decade (Baldenius et al., 2019; Mense et al., 2019).
Following the debate on increasing home prices, both the German federal government and
the state of Bavaria introduced housing purchase subsidies in 2018. As the Bavarian subsidy
program is supplementary to the nation-wide subsidy program, overall housing purchase
subsides are muchmore extensive in Bavaria.
The Bavarian housing purchase subsidy (Bayerische Eigenheimzulage) constitutes an immedi-
ate subsidy of 10,000 euros and is paid to eligible householdswhopurchase or build a house or
apartment for personal residence aer June 30, 2018. The aim of this subsidy is to encourage
the acquisition of property, increase home ownership rates and create additional housing
(Bayerische Eigenheimzulagen-Richtlinien, 2018). The subsidy is only granted to households
who have resided in or been employed in Bavaria for at least one year. Income thresholds are
rather generous. While singles with taxable incomes below 50,000 euros are eligible for the
subsidy, the threshold increases to 75,000 euros for married couples and to 90,000 euros for
households with one child. Each additional child increases this threshold by a further 15,000
euros. I.e., a family with two children would be eligible if their household income is below
105,000 euros. Overall, about three quarters of households meet these income requirements,
and would potentially be eligible for the subsidy when purchasing or building real estate (see
section 3.3.2).
In the same year, the German federal government implemented a housing subsidy program
for families. In all states, families with at least one child can claim the federal child benefit
for building (Baukindergeld) of 1,200 euros per child and year for a period of ten years. This
subsidy is available nation-wide, independent of the Bavarian housing purchase subsidy.
Income thresholds coincide with the Bavarian scheme. Aer the subsidy was enacted in
May 2018, applications have been possible from September 18, 2018 onwards. While this
time frame roughly corresponds to the Bavarian subsidy scheme, housing purchases and
construction permits are retroactively eligible from January 1 onwards. However, this subsidy
is only available for a limited time: The application window ends on December 31, 2023, while
the building permit or purchase contract needs to be issued by December 2020.
In addition, Bavaria introduced a top-up of the federal child benefit of 300 euros per child and
year (Bayerisches Baukindergeld Plus). This top-up has the same residency and employment
requirements as the Bavarian housing purchase subsidy.
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Table 3.1 indicates the maximum housing subsidy per household type in Bavaria and in other
German states. Overall, eligibility conditions are broader and the average subsidy is much
larger in Bavaria. Note also that the Bavarian housing purchase subsidy is paid up-front upon
approval, whereas child benefits are paid over a period of ten years. This may have dierent
implications for downpayment-constrained households as imminent payments may be more
readily considered by mortgage brokers1: Subsidy payments that banks consider equivalent
to equity may lead to more favorable interest rate conditions.
Table 3.1: Scope of housing subsidies
Bavaria
No children One child Two children Three children
Bavarian purchase subsidy 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Federal child benefit 0 12,000 24,000 36,000
Bavarian child benefit 0 3,000 6,000 9,000
Total subsidy 10,000 25,000 40,000 55,000
Other states
No children One child Two children Three children
Federal child benefit 0 12,000 24,000 36,000
Notes: The table indicates the maximum amount of housing subsidies in euros in Bavaria and in other German
states.
A similar nation-wide scheme was abolished in 2006 due to its limited cost-eectiveness and
its resulting windfall gains (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005). With a volume of 11.4 billion euros in
2004, the subsidy scheme had been one of the largest subsidy schemes at the time.2 While the
policy was widely criticized on the grounds of being costly and inequitable, leading to windfall
gains and potentially driving up prices (see e.g. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschalichen Entwicklung (2003); Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung
(2002); Färber (2003)), studies on this scheme are only descriptive in nature.
1 According to one of Germany’s largest real estate platforms, the child benefit for build-
ing is not considered equivalent to equity by banks, also due to the long payment window:
https://ratgeber.immowelt.de/a/baukindergeld-2018-wer-es-bekommt-wie-viel-es-gibt-und-was-die-
voraussetzungen-sind.html
2 As under current legislation, households with incomes below a certain threshold were eligible for the subsidy
for the purchase or construction of an owner-occupied property. The subsidy was paid as a direct subsidy for a
period of eight years, and consisted of a base subsidy tied to a property’s acquisition costs and an additional
child allowance. Until 2003, the construction of new properties was subsidized at twice the rate of the subsidy
for purchases of existing homes. In 2004 to 2005, lower and uniform base subsidy levels were granted, while
child supplements increased.
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As opposed to other countries such as theUnited States,mortgage interest on owner-occupied
housing cannot be deducted from income taxes. Therefore, interaction eects between hous-
ing purchase subsidies andmortgage interest taxation do not need to be accounted for. How-
ever, the federal government has introduced a temporary accelerated depreciation schedule
for the construction of new residential units. This reform enables an additional 5 percent
depreciation rate, subject to an upper bound, on residential units for rent constructed be-
tween September 2018 and December 2021. While this measure does not directly aect
owner-occupiers, it adds to the strain on the construction sector and might drive property
prices.
These reforms are implemented at a time of historically high capacity utilization in the con-
struction sector (Gornig et al., 2019). As the applicationwindowof the child benefit for building
and the accelerated depreciation schedule is confined to a period of three years, the incentive
for construction companies to expand capacities are limited. Against this background, one
could expect a substantial eect on property prices.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Microdata on Real Estate Prices
My empirical analysis is based on a large and detailed micro dataset on the German real
estate market provided by the real estate consultancy firm F+ B (c.f. chapter 2). The dataset
encompasses property adverts from 140 dierent sources, ranging from online property
portals to newspaper adverts and real estate agents. Data collection was conducted via web-
scraping. The raw dataset was subject to data cleansing and consistency checks to ensure
that properties listed concurrently in multiple sources are only included once.
The final dataset contains 307,517 houses and 273,786 apartments that were oered for sale
within 50 km of the Bavarian interstate border in 2016 to 2018. While F+B provides data from
2005 onwards, I restrict the data to the years around the reform to ensure that the estimation
of pre-reform postal code fixed eects are unbiased by further state-level policies, such as
long-term infrastructure investments or increases in real estate transfer tax rates.
Table 3.2 shows sample means of property characteristics for houses and apartments in the
border regions of Bavaria and of neighboring states, both for the full data set (within 50 km
of the border) and the data used in my main specifications (within 25 km of the border).
The main variable of interest is a property’s final asking price per square meter. While F+B
provides both the first and the final asking price, I focus on the latter as it is likely closer to the
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actual transaction price. As shown in Table 3.2, asking prices of houses in Bavaria amount
to 299,742 euros on average, or 1,952 euros per square meter (281,645 and 1,825 euros,
respectively, for the narrower sample). These are slightly lower than average asking prices
in neighboring states. These price dierences are at least partly driven by the slightly higher
frequencies at which houses in other states are equipped with amenities, such as a garden or
a balcony. My estimations employ postal code fixed eects to account for initial price level
dierentials, and some specifications account for amenities.
Table 3.2: Real estate data: Summary statistics
Houses Apartments
<50km <25km <50km <25km
Bavaria Other Bavaria Other Bavaria Other Bavaria Other
Asking price 299,742 348,419 281,645 324,619 240,083 288,001 234,306 283,982
Price per sqm 1,952 2,215 1,825 2,084 2,434 2,736 2,292 2,679
Area in sqm 157.3 158.7 157.6 158.3 104.2 105.4 108.0 105.9
Number of rooms 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4
Balcony 36.6% 39.9% 36.3% 39.1% 43.3% 43.6% 43.2% 41.8%
Garden 39.1% 43.7% 38.3% 43.1% 27.1% 28.1% 27.8% 28.9%
Basement 49.3% 49.7% 49.5% 49.4% 49.2% 51.7% 48.3% 51.6%
Parking spot 55.4% 57.9% 56.0% 56.9% 72.4% 72.6% 72.7% 71.6%
Number of observations 109,485 198,032 65,653 85,458 84,356 189,430 46,706 80,115
Notes: Overall sample: Houses and apartments within 50 km and 25 km of the Bavarian border, 2016-2018. Other
states encompass Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Thuringia, and Saxony. Source: F+B and own calculations.
3.3.2 Income and Consumption Survey Data
I supplement my analysis with data from the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS,
Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe) 2018. Conducted by the Federal Statistical Oice
every five years, theEVSconstitutes a representative surveyofGermanhouseholds. In the2018
wave, the dataset encompasses 58,278 households. Amongst others, the survey contains data
on incomes, homeownership and living conditions. This enables me to assess the household
and property characteristics of households that meet eligibility requirements for the subsidy
scheme.
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics by property type in the EVS data. The vast majority of
households living in houses are owner-occupiers, whereas only about one fih of households
in apartments own their own property. Also, houses aremore frequently inhabited by families
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withminor children. On average, houses in the EVS sample are a bit smaller than in the advert
data, but more frequently equipped with a parking spot.3
Table 3.3: EVS data: Summary statistics for households by property type
Houses Apartments
Owner-occupiers 83.4% 21.2%
Minor children 27.8% 14.7%
Area in sqm 129.8 73.8
Number of rooms 4.6 2.7
Parking spot 86.5% 49.8%
Number of observations 24,029 34,249
Notes: Overall sample: Households in the EVS data. Source: EVS 2018 and own calculations.
Table 3.4 indicates the fraction of Bavarian households with incomes below the eligibility
threshold. While eligibility is based on gross taxable income, EVS data provides binned net
household incomes. Therefore, I first apply a tax-benefit calculator on household-type specific
gross income eligibility thresholds. Households with incomes below the resulting net income
threshold are then classified as eligible. I use linear extrapolation to determine the fraction of
eligible households whose income lies in the same income bin as the eligibility threshold.4
Table 3.4: EVS data: Share of eligible households in Bavaria
All households Owner-occupiers
All Bavarian households 74.8% 66.3%
Singles 82.6% 74.0%
Childless couples 72.6% 69.1%
Households with one child 76.7% 67.3%
Households with two children 77.2% 73.6%
Households with three or more children 83.4% 81.6%
Number of observations 8,402 4,702
All German households 80.4% 69.3%
Number of observations 58,278 28,808
Notes: Overall sample: Bavarian households in the EVS data, all households in the EVS data. Calculations for
German households according to the Bavarian eligibility criteria. Source: EVS 2018 and own calculations.
3 This may be due to dierent resale frequencies of property types, as well as to diering geographic scopes of
both data sets. While Table 3.3 provides summary statistics on German households, Bavarian border regions are
less urban than the German average. As homes in urban areas tend to be smaller, this might contribute to the
dierence between both data sets.
4 Take an eligibility threshold of 4,600 euros per month, for example, which lies in the net income bin of 4,500 to
5,000 euros. In this case, calculations for Table 3.4 assume that 20% of households in this income bin are eligible.
Results barely change, though, when either classifying all or no households in this income bin as eligible.
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As shown in Table 3.4, about three quarters of households would be eligible for the subsidy
when purchasing or building real estate. Amongst owner-occupiers, roughly two thirds of
households meet the subsidy schemes’ income criteria. This groupmight be more indicative
of households who purchase a house.
3.3.3 Construction Permit Statistics
In addition to estimating the subsidy schemes’ eect on property prices, I assess whether the
availability of subsidies exerts a dierential eect on construction activity. For this endeavor, I
employmunicipality-level administrative data on authorized residential construction projects
(Statistik der Baugenehmigungen). This data set is based on a full census of residential con-
struction projects for which either a construction permit was granted, or which required a
notification of municipal authorities in lieu of an application for a construction permit.5 The
data set thus covers the universe of planned residential construction activity in the year formal
approval was acquired. For ease of reference, I will refer to all cases as construction permits.
As larger cities issue muchmore construction permits than smaller municipalities, the num-
ber of residential construction permits varies between zero and several hundred permits
per municipality and construction year. To account for diering municipality sizes, I scale
construction activity in relation to the building stock. The latter is based on administrative
data on the number of residential buildings in each municipality in 2017. Table 3.5 shows
summary statistics on the number of construction permits for residential buildings, both in
absolute terms and in relation to the overall municipal building stock.
Table 3.5: Construction permit data: Summary statistics
Residential Single-family Multi-family
construction houses houses
Total construction permits 9.8 7.3 2.5
Per 1000 buildings 6.7 5.4 1.3
Source: Statistical Oices of the Federal States and own calculations. Overall sample: Annual municipal residen-
tial construction permits in the vicinity of 25 km of the Bavarian interstate border, 2016-2018.
5 Whether the construction of a property requires a construction permit depends on state laws as well as local
building regulations and development plans.
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3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Estimation Strategy
I employ a border dierence-in-dierence approach to estimate the price eect of the real
estate purchase subsidy. This approach assesses whether property price trends diverge aer
the introduction of the subsidy, while controlling for dierent local price levels and property
characteristics. Allowing for dierential regional time trends, the estimation strategy also
accounts for changing local conditions that may impact real estate prices. I hence estimate
the following equation:
ln(p)i,c,t = β Subsidyc,t +X
′
iθ + δc + γa(c),t + εi,c,t (3.1)
Subscript i indicates the respective property, t the month it was oered for sale, and c the
postal code area the property is located in. As explained more thoroughly in section 3.4.2,
postal codes are allocated to cross-border regions a(c) to capture regional trends. A prop-
erty’s log square meter price ln(p)i,c,t is used as dependent variable. The main variable of
interest, Subsidyc,t, is a dummy for properties posted in Bavaria aer July 2018. A positive
coeicient indicates that prices on the Bavarian side of the border have risenmore than prices
in neighboring regions aer the implementation of the subsidy scheme. The specification
accounts for postal code fixed eects δc, which capture persistent dierences in local property
prices due to possibly unobserved factors, such as natural amenities, traic accessibility,
or school quality. Region-month fixed eects γa(c),t permit dierential time trends across
regions. Several specifications also control for property characteristicsXi, which encompass
the number of rooms, a property’s area in square meters, and the presence of amenities that
may aect property prices. The latter include dummy variables for whether a property comes
with a parking spot, a balcony, a garden or a basement.6 Standard errors εi,c,t are clustered
at the postal code level to account for a possible spatial correlation in local property price
shocks.
My main estimations focus on house prices as houses are predominately acquired by owner-
occupiers, whereas apartments tend to be more frequently bought by investors (Petkova and
6 I do not account for more subjective property characteristics, such as whether a property is described as
modern, well-equipped or luxurious. These assessments might be partially driven by the market environment,
such as sellers’ market power, andmight hence not be orthogonal to the reform. Likewise, I do not account for
the construction year. This is the case as the construction year is missing for 19.8% of houses in the sample.
Whether a seller discloses the construction year is however not random, and might be correlated with other
conditions in the real estate market. Hence, either controlling for construction years, or excluding observations
with missing construction years, might lead to a bias in the estimations.
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Weichenrieder, 2017; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018). This is also in line with EVS data, which
show that a vast majority of residents of houses are owner-occupiers, while most households
living in apartments are renters. As the subsidies are only granted to owner-occupiers, I
expect much stronger price eects for houses. A further specification investigates whether
this prediction holds and provides results on apartment prices.
3.4.2 Geographic Location Data
Each postal code is allocated to a distance band around the Bavarian interstate border ac-
cording to the minimum distance between the postal code’s centroid and the border. While
postal codes in the immediate vicinity of the border are arguably subject to rather comparable
time trends, trends may diverge more strongly the larger the distance to the border. This
implies that there is a trade-o between the number of observations and, thus, estimation
eiciency on the one hand, and unbiasedness on the other hand. For this reason, I estimate
equation 3.1 for dierent distance bands around the interstate border. Figure 3.1 showcases
the assignment of postal codes to distance bands.
Figure 3.1: Postal codes in proximity of the Bavarian border
Notes: This figure shows postal codes in the proximity to the Bavarian interstate border and their allocation to
distance bands around the border.
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As economic conditions may vary along the border over time, I subsequently segment border
regions based on spatial planning regions (Raumordnungsregionen). A spatial planning region
combines severalNUTS-3 regionswithina stateaccording to regional structureandcommuting
patterns. These regions are commonly used for spatial observation andmonitoring byGerman
institutions, such as the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aairs and
Spatial Development (BBSR), but are not endowed with administrative autonomy. As spatial
planning regions are defined within states, I generate cross-border regions bymatching postal
codes in bordering states to the closest Bavarian region. As a first step, I assign Bavarian
postal codes to their respective spatial planning region along the border. Subsequently, postal
codes in neighboring states are matched to the closest Bavarian spatial planning region. This
matching is based on the minimum geographic distance between the postal code’s centroid
and the border of the spatial planning region. Using rather wide distance bands includes some
Bavarian postal codes in the sample that are located in a non-border spatial planning region.
These postal codes are assigned to the closest spatial planning region that adjoins the border.
Figure 3.2 shows which region postal codes are assigned to.
Figure 3.2: Matched regions in proximity of the Bavarian border
Notes: This figure shows the allocation of postal codes to cross-border regions, based on the proximity to spatial
planning regions in Bavaria.
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3.4.3 Accounting for Tax Reforms
Other concurrent reformsmay possibly exert a dierential impact on real estate prices. Most
notably, the neighboring state of Thuringia increased its real estate transfer tax (RETT) rate
from 5.0 to 6.5% at the beginning of 2017 (see Table 2.1 in chapter 2). This presumably
had an impact on real estate prices in Thuringia. As shown in chapter 2, a one percentage
point increase in the real estate transfer tax rate reduces house prices by 1.5-2%, and lowers
apartment prices by 3-4%. While this reform predates the introduction of housing purchase
subsidies by more than a year, it likely resulted in a downward shi in prices in the pre-period,
whichwouldnot be adequately capturedbypostal code fixed eects and cross-border regional
time trends. In consequence, the estimated price eect of the Bavarian real estate purchase
subsidy might be biased. Two dierent strategies are used to address possible confounding
eects of Thuringia’s RETT increase. One set of specifications drops all properties in regions
intersected by the Thuringian border. I.e., estimations exclude the three north-eastern regions
of Figure 3.2. A second set of specifications retains all observations, but introduces dummies
intended to capture dierential price trends in Thuringia. As indicated by the event studies in
chapter 2, house prices begin to decline in the quarter prior to RETT reforms, with most of
the pass-through taking place within half a year of a tax increase. In line with these findings, I
account for RETT eects with dummies in the state of Thuringia for the quarters during which
one could expect a gradual pass-through into house prices – Q4, 2016, Q1 2017, and Q2 2017 –
as well as a dummy variable for the time period in which house prices would be expected to
have adjusted to the new price level, i.e., Q3 2017 to Q4 2018. However, the latter specification
would not account for spillover eects of the Thuringian tax increase into border regions of
Bavaria, Hesse and Saxony. In this setting, spillover eects are more of a concern than in
case of the real estate purchase subsidy: While the subsidy requires prior residence or prior
employment in the state of Bavaria, the RETT increase applies to all households regardless of
their prior residence.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Real Estate Prices
Table 3.6 shows results for houses in postal codes within 25 km of the Bavarian interstate
border. Specification (1)doesnotallow for regionallydierentiated trendsandneither controls
for the real estate transfer tax reform in Thuringia, nor for property characteristics. Regional
time trends are added in specification (2). Coeicients are positive and significant in both
specifications, albeit at a lower level than in subsequent specifications which account for
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a bias due to Thuringia’s RETT reform: Estimated eects are larger when excluding border
regions of Thuringia (specification (3)) or using dummyvariables to control for the RETT reform
(specification (4)). Controlling for property characteristics results in coeicients of respectively
0.0345 and 0.0264 in specifications (5) and (6). This indicates that in the second half of the
year 2018, Bavarian house prices increased by roughly 2.6 to 3.4%more than house prices
in neighboring states. Specifications that use dummy variables to capture dierential price
trends in Thuringia yield lower eects than specifications that exclude Thuringian border
regions. This could either be due to a lower responsiveness of prices in the predominately
rural north-eastern border region7, spillover eects between Thuringia and neighboring states,
or the dummy variables not adequately capturing the timing of the pass-through of RETT
reforms8. Hence, further robustness checks primarily focus on specification (5). With pre-
subsidy house prices averaging 318,700 euros in the Bavarian border region (276,400 euros
when including border regionswith Thuringia), findingswould be consistentwith a full shiing
of the Bavarian real estate purchase subsidy into house prices: 10,000 euros correspond to
3.3% of 300,000 euros.
Table 3.6: Subsidy eects on asking prices of single-family houses
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidy 0.0211∗ 0.0287∗∗ 0.0410∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0120)
PLZ FE X X X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia 7 7 Exclusion Dummies Exclusion Dummies
Property controls 7 7 7 7 X X
Max km to border 25 25 25 25 25 25
N 151,111 151,111 113,917 151,111 113,917 151,111
Notes: This table shows the dierential eect of housing subsidies in Bavaria on house prices. The treatment
dummy indicates properties listed in Bavaria between July and December 2018. Standard errors are clustered at
the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To verify that trends within cross-border regions are indeed comparable, I conduct a placebo
test on a sample limited to the pre-reform years 2016-2017. In analogy to the baseline, this
specification estimates whether price trends of houses available for sale in Bavaria in the
second half of the year 2017 dier from bordering states.
7 A robustness check in Table 3.12 however finds no dierences in the pass-through for urban and rural regions.
8 As opposed to other states’ RETT reforms, Thuringia announced its tax increase more than a year in advance
in mid-2015. This might conceivably lead to anticipation eects and diverging pass-through patterns.
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As indicated by Table 3.7, the placebo test yields no significant dierence in the evolution of
property prices, underlining the validity of my identification strategy.
Table 3.7: Placebo test for asking prices of single-family houses
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidy -0.0027 -0.0064 0.0129 -0.0032 0.0050 -0.0106
(0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0111) (0.0113)
PLZ FE X X X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia 7 7 Exclusion Dummies Exclusion Dummies
Property controls 7 7 7 7 X X
Max km to border 25 25 25 25 25 25
N 96,237 96,237 74,126 96,237 74,126 96,237
Notes: This table shows the results of a placebo test for dierential trends in house prices in Bavaria. The
treatment dummy indicates properties listed in Bavaria between July and December 2017. Standard errors are
clustered at the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
As a robustness check, I conduct the estimation for dierent distance bands around the in-
terstate border. Table 3.8 shows results that correspond to specification (5) in Table 3.6, i.e.,
estimations that exclude border regions with Thuringia and control for property characteris-
tics.
Table 3.8: Subsidy eects on asking prices of single-family houses for dierent distance bands
to the interstate border
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidy 0.0240∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0442∗∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0114) (0.0123) (0.0135) (0.0164)
PLZ FE X X X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion
Property controls X X X X X X
Max km to border 50 40 30 20 15 10
N 227,475 183,380 134,451 92,593 77,410 55,401
Notes: This table shows the dierential eect of housing subsidies in Bavaria on house prices. The treatment
dummy indicates properties listed in Bavaria between July and December 2018. Standard errors are clustered at
the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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For a range between 15 and up to 40 km around the border, results are in line with each
other and the coeicient on the subsidy dummy amounts to on average 0.035. This is again
consistent with a full shiing of subsidies into property prices. However, coeicients gradually
increase when the band around the border becomesmore narrow. In particular, results are
larger for a very narrow distance band of 10 km, although the coeicient of 0.0442 does not
significantly dier from the coeicients for larger distances. Two factors might play a role
here: First, even though restricted by prior residency and employment requirements, spillover
eects across the border might exert eects on real estate prices on both sides of the border.
This would be the case if households who used to live in neighboring states purchased houses
in Bavaria in response to the reform, or if Bavarian households who would have otherwise
consideredmoving to a neighboring state decided to remain in Bavaria. This eect attenuates
with an increasing bandwidth around the border. Second, the common trend assumption
might not hold up as well for the very narrow sample.
Results of the 2017 placebo test for dierent distance bands point in this direction (Table 3.9):
while coeicients are insignificant for all distance bands, they are larger for the 10 kilometer
band around the border.
Table 3.9: Placebo test for asking prices of single-family houses for dierent distance bands to
the interstate border
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidy 0.0051 0.0059 0.0077 0.0006 0.0056 0.0231
(0.0089) (0.0096) (0.0107) (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.0146)
PLZ FE X X X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion
Property controls X X X X X X
Max km to border 50 40 30 20 15 10
N 148,462 119,950 87,957 60,019 50,207 35,935
Notes: This table shows the results of a placebo test for dierential trends in house prices in Bavaria. The
treatment dummy indicates properties listed in Bavaria between July and December 2017. Standard errors are
clustered at the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In contrast to houses, eects for apartments are insignificant and close to zero (see Table 3.10).
This is also the case for various distance bands around the border, as shown in Table 3.11. The
absence of any notable eect is consistent with expectations, given that owner-occupiers only
constitute a small share of apartment residents, and investment decisions on rental properties
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remain unaected by the reform. The subsidy schememight also exert a counterbalancing
eect on apartment prices: Some tenants of apartments may decide to purchase a house and
vacate their rental apartment in response to the subsidy. With rental revenues decreasing,
this could conceivably lead to a small downward shi in the demand for apartments.
Table 3.10: Subsidy eects on asking prices of apartments
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidy 0.0048 0.0067 -0.0025 0.0053 -0.0063 0.0018
(0.0129) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0132)
PLZ FE X X X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia 7 7 Exclusion Dummies Exclusion Dummies
Property controls 7 7 7 7 X X
Max km to border 25 25 25 25 25 25
N 126,821 126,821 106,970 126,821 106,970 126,821
Notes: This table shows the dierential eect of housing subsidies in Bavaria on apartment prices. The treatment
dummy indicates apartments listed in Bavaria between July and December 2018. Standard errors are clustered
at the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.11: Subsidy eects on asking prices of apartments for dierent distance bands to the
interstate border
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidy -0.0008 -0.0082 -0.0100 -0.0053 -0.0093 -0.0139
(0.0107) (0.0112) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0156) (0.0185)
PLZ FE X X X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion
Property controls X X X X X X
Max km to border 50 40 30 20 15 10
N 228,503 177,544 127,145 83,664 68,160 46,871
Notes: This table shows the dierential eect of housing subsidies in Bavaria on apartment prices. The treatment
dummy indicates apartments listed in Bavaria between July and December 2018. Standard errors are clustered
at the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Overall, these findings confirm the validity of the house price estimations: If results for house
prices were driven by a spurious correlation with other policy changes, this would likely show
up in all property prices.
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3.5.2 Heterogeneity Analysis and Quantification of Eects
As shown bymy previous analysis, the subsidy scheme’s aggregate eect on house prices is
consistent with a full capitalization into house prices. At an average pre-reform house price of
318,700 euros in Bavarian border municipalities (276,400 when Thuringian border regions
are included in the sample), my preferred specification’s coeicient of 0.0345 translates into
a price increase of roughly 11,000 euros (see the upper panel of Table 3.12). Yet, one could
conceivably expect dierential eects across segments of the property market.
For once, findings by Hilber and Turner (2014) and Carozzi et al. (2019) suggest dierential
eects by the degree of urbanization. As building plots might bemore readily available for
development in rural areas, housing supply might be more elastic. This could result in a com-
paratively lower capitalization in house prices. I assess whether price responses dier by the
level of urbanization by estimating separate treatment coeicients for rural and urban coun-
ties. Counties are classified in line with a categorization (Siedlungsstrukturelle Kreistypen) by
the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aairs and Spatial Development (BBSR).
However, treatment coeicients hardly dier between urban and rural counties (second panel
of Table 3.12). This might be due to capacity constraints in the construction sector: In the
short-run, housing supply might be fairly inelastic, even if developable land were readily avail-
able. As average house prices are higher in urban regions, a 3.5% price increase nevertheless
translates into a higher price growth in absolute terms in urban compared to rural counties.
Table 3.12: Subsidy eects on asking prices of single-family houses: Heterogeneous eects
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subsidy SE Average area Average price Eect in euros
All 0.0345∗∗∗ (0.0120) 157 318,702 10,995
Rural counties 0.0335∗∗ (0.0155) 158 295,509 9,900
Urban counties 0.0354∗∗ (0.0147) 160 347,101 12,287
Small houses 0.0362∗∗ (0.0156) 112 250,939 9,084
Medium-sized houses 0.0425∗∗∗ (0.0154) 146 298,222 12,674
Large houses 0.0244 (0.0162) 220 414,548 10,115
Notes: This table shows the dierential eect of housing subsidies in Bavaria on house prices. The treatment
dummy indicates properties listed in Bavaria between July and December 2018. Specifications are equivalent
to column (5) of Table 3.6, i.e., encompass postal codes within 25 km of the interstate border, exclude border
regions to Thuringia, and account for postal code fixed eects, control for property characteristics and include
month x region fixed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Second, I assess whether eects dier by house size. All estimations use a property’s price
per square meter as a dependent variable. All else equal, capitalization of flat-rate subsidies
into prices per square meter should be larger for smaller houses. I split the sample into small,
medium-sized and large houses, based on tertiles of the house size distribution. Treatment
coeicients for all tertiles are jointly estimated. Results are depicted in the bottom panel of
Table 3.12. Eects are positive for all house types and significant for small andmedium-sized
houses. Medium-sized houses exhibit the largest price growth, both in percentage and in
absolute terms. However, coeicientsmight also capture a dierent eect: houses of dierent
sizes may have a dierent propensity to be acquired by recipients of the subsidy. Average
subsidies might also dier between house types as families are granted a higher subsidy due
to the child supplement. For example, small houses with few roomsmay not be attractive for
families with children. In consequence, the subsidy schememay have a comparatively lower
impact on the demand curve for small houses.
3.5.3 Extension and Discussion
Analysis by Likelihood of Subsidization
While real estate adverts data is well-suited for an analysis of aggregate price eects of subsidy
schemes, it doesnotprovideany informationonaproperty’s buyer. Therefore, I cannotdirectly
infer whether a property’s purchaser is eligible for the Bavarian housing purchase subsidy
or for additional child benefits for building. This complicates assessing how a dierential
scope of subsidies is capitalized into prices. In order to assess whether eects dier across
subsidy levels, I instead impute subsidization probabilities based on EVS data. This allows for
a dierential analysis of houses whose characteristics make themmore or less likely to be
acquired by beneficiaries of the subsidy scheme.
As a first step, I estimate a probit model for all houses in the EVS data. This estimates the prob-
ability that a house is inhabited by owner-occupiers whose incomes comply with eligibility
requirements, taking account of house characteristics contained in both data sets.9 The esti-
mated coeicients are then used to predict subsidization probabilities in the real estate advert
data. These predicted probabilities are indicative of how likely a house is to be subsidized, but
should not be taken at face value. Not only is explanatory power limited at the first stage, the
categorization of houses might also be prone to omitted variable bias: Both the size of houses
and the share of households above income thresholds may be correlated with the regional
price level. I.e., in areas with a higher initial price level, households with a given incomemay
9 Variables include a polynomial of a house’s area in square meters and dummy variables for the number of
rooms, a parking spot, and broad construction year categories as defined in the EVS data.
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on average acquire smaller houses, and houses with given characteristics may on average
be acquired by households with higher incomes. Lacking detailed geographic information in
the EVS data, I cannot account for this correlation. Furthermore, housing choices might be
endogenous to the subsidy scheme, with subsidies inducing the acquisition of larger homes
(Gruber et al., 2020). Finally, while EVS constitutes a representative household sample, its
results are not necessarily representative for the cross-section of advertised properties. As
average housing tenuremay be related to property characteristics, some property typesmight
comprise a larger share of housing transactions than of the housing stock. The probability that
a specific house is inhabited by an eligible household might thus dier from the probability
that the house is acquired by the very same household.
Therefore, I only conduct a broad-level analysis with heterogeneous eects for houses that are
more or less likely to be subsidized. For this purpose, I define the upper half of the probability
distribution as houses with a high subsidization probability. While individual probability
predictions might be biased, houses in the upper half of the distribution should on average
have a higher likelihood of being subsidized. To assess dierential eects for the subset
of houses with a high subsidization probability, I extend equation 3.1 with an interaction
term between the treatment variable and an indicator for houses with a high subsidization
probability (HPi):
ln(p)i,c,t = β1 Subsidyc,t + β2 (Subsidyc,t ∗HPi) + ν HPi +X ′iθ + δc + γa(c),t + εi,c,t (3.2)
These estimations are then conducted for households that are eligible for dierent subsidy
levels. I.e., I estimate several probit models with dierent dependent variables. I first assess
overall eligibility for the Bavarian purchase subsidy scheme, and subsequently estimate
the probability that a specific house is inhabited by a family that is also eligible for child
supplements for at least one, two or three children. As families receive higher subsidies due
to the Bavarian top-up of the federal child subsidy, this helps assessing capitalization across
subsidy levels.
Table 3.13 presents results for the heterogeneity analysis. The coeicient on the interaction
term shows to what extent the price eect for houses with a comparatively high exposure
to the subsidy scheme diers from the remainder of houses in the sample. As before, the
analysis includes regional time trends, excludes border regions of Thuringia, and controls for
property characteristics. While the coeicient is positive for all subsidy schemes, it is only
significant for the sample of houses that is most likely to be inhabited by eligible families
with at least one, or by eligible families with two or more children. These findings confirm
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heterogeneous eects across property types, contingent on the exposure of properties to the
subsidy scheme.
Table 3.13: Subsidyeectsonaskingpricesof single-familyhouses: Highand lowsubsidization
probability
Dependent variable: log price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
overall 1+ child 2+ children 3+ children
Subsidy 0.0255∗ 0.0217∗ 0.0254∗∗ 0.0294∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Subsidy * high subsidy probability 0.0177 0.0319∗∗ 0.0235∗ 0.0142
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0132)
PLZ FE X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion
Property controls X X X X
Max km to border 25 25 25 25
N 113,917 113,917 113,917 113,917
R-squared, first stage 0.0335 0.0826 0.1029 0.1281
Average price, baseline 333,869 306,118 304,117 287,117
Eect in euros, baseline 8,514 6,643 7,725 8,441
Average price, high probability 290,900 335,945 339,146 368,919
Eect in euros, high probability 12,567 18,007 16,584 16,085
Notes: This table shows the dierential eect of housing subsidies in Bavaria on house prices. The treatment
dummy indicates properties listed in Bavaria between July and December 2018. Average prices refer to prices in
Bavaria prior to July 2018. Standard errors are clustered at the postal code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
I subsequently quantify price eects based on the average pre-subsidy prices of Bavarian
houses in both subsamples. In all low-probability samples, prices increase by less than 10,000
euros on average. The subsidy is only partially capitalized in segments of the real estatemarket
that are in comparatively lower demand by subsidy recipients. In contrast, subsidies are fully
capitalized for homes that are frequently demanded by eligible families. For an average house
in the high probability subsample, the price eect closely resembles the dierence between
subsidies in Bavaria and in neighboring states. For example, a family with two children would
receive up to 40,000 euros in subsidies in Bavaria, and up to 24,000 euros in other states. While
subsidy levels dier by 16,000 euros, house prices increase by a just slightly larger amount
in the corresponding high probability sample. This indicates that on average, families do
not benefit from the subsidy scheme as it is fully capitalized into prices. Rather, the main
beneficiaries are developers and existing homeowners that benefit from the appreciation
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in house prices. Subsidy recipients may however benefit from the reform if they choose to
acquire properties that are less frequently bought by eligible households and, in particular,
by eligible families.
Eects on Construction Activity
Subsequently, I follow the samemethodological approach as in my baseline estimation to
assess the subsidy scheme’s eects on construction activity: I regress the number of annual
construction permits per 1000 existing buildings on a treatment dummy for Bavarian munici-
palities in 2018, while accounting for municipality and time fixed eects. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. As before, I allow for dierential regional time trends and
estimate specifications without border regions to Thuringia.
Several aspects distinguish these specifications from prior estimations. First, local adminis-
trative data on construction permits is only available on an annual basis. Therefore, I am only
able to estimate a treatment eect for the year 2018, pooling construction permits granted
under the subsidy scheme with construction permits granted in prior months of 2018. This
attenuates explanatory power vis-a-vis a setting which distinguishes construction permits
granted early in the year and once the subsidy scheme became eective. Note however that
in the absence of anticipatory eects in the first half of the year, the estimated eect should
capture the change in the number of construction permits following the introduction of the
scheme. Second, while price eects estimations control for a property’s postal code, data
on construction permits is only available at the municipal level, which oen, but not always
coincides with postal code areas. Larger municipalities and cities encompass several postal
codes. To ensure a high degree of similarity between price and construction permit data, I
weigh each municipality with its number of postal codes that are located within the distance
band around the Bavarian interstate border. Results are shown in Table 3.14. Analogous
to Table 3.6, estimations are based on municipalities within 25 kilometers of the Bavarian
interstate border.
Specifications (1)-(3) assess theeectof the subsidy schemeonoverall residential construction
activity. Akin to Table 3.6, specification (1) neither allows for regionally dierentiated trends,
nor controls for the real estate transfer tax reform in Thuringia. Regional time trends are
added in specification (2), while specification (3) additionally excludes border regions of
Thuringia. Treatment eects are then decomposed into single family homes (specifications
(4)-(6)) and houses with two or more apartments (specifications (7)-(9)). No significant eects
can be observed for any specification. Note however that while the coeicients on overall
construction activity and on single-family homes are positive, larger buildings with several
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units display a negative coeicient. While insignificant, these findings would be in line with
the subsidy scheme slightly stimulating the construction of single-family homes, possibly
accompanied by a partial crowding-out of multi-unit construction. As the construction sector
has been operating at its capacity limits over the course of 2018, the latter could conceivably
be related to price eects of the subsidy scheme on the construction sector.
Table 3.14: Subsidy eects on construction activity
Dependent variable: number of residential construction permits per 1000 buildings
All Single-family houses Multi-family houses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Subsidy 0.266 0.184 0.381 0.381 0.326 0.524 -0.116 -0.142 -0.143
(0.346) (0.365) (0.467) (0.312) (0.330) (0.397) (0.106) (0.112) (0.162)
Municipality FE X X X X X X X X X
Time FE Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month
x region x region x region x region x region x region
Controls for Thuringia 7 7 Exclusion 7 7 Exclusion 7 7 Exclusion
Max km to border 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
N 3,264 3,261 2,139 3,264 3,261 2,139 3,264 3,261 2,139
Notes: This table shows the dierential eect of housing subsidies in Bavaria on construction activity. The
treatment dummy indicates Bavarian municipalities in 2018. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper assesses the eects of direct housing subsidies on property prices. Intending to
reduce purchase costs for owner-occupiers, both the German federal and the Bavarian state
government introduced flat-rate direct housing purchase subsidies in 2018. Exploiting that
Bavaria implemented amuchmore extensive subsidy scheme, I quantify capitalization eects
in a dierence-in-dierence setting across the Bavarian interstate border. Based on a rich
micro dataset on properties oered for sale, my results indicate that house prices increased
by roughly 3.4%more in Bavarian border regions than in neighboring states. This is consistent
with a full capitalization of the subsidy into the prices of single-family homes. In contrast, no
significant eect arises for apartment prices, which can be attributed to apartments being
rarely inhabited by owner-occupiers.
These results indicate that subsidy recipients do not necessarily benefit from the subsidy
scheme. Instead, the subsidy scheme leads to an upsurge in housing demand, which is capi-
talized into prices. While subsidy recipients in market segments with lower price appreciation
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might still gain individually, prices of properties that aremost likely to be inhabited by eligible
households rise by the full subsidy amount. Thereby, the subsidy scheme also aects house-
holds who do not receive the subsidy, but nevertheless face higher prices. Homeowners who
acquired their properties in prior years gain the most from the reform due to the apprecia-
tion of house values. On aggregate, the subsidy scheme thus redistributes from prospective
towards preexisting home owners.
My results are consistent with the literature on real estate subsidies: While the German direct
subsidy design substantially diers from other countries’ subsidization through the tax code,
substantial capitalization eects are well in line with the literature.
These findings are of high importance for the policy debate. My results show that due to the
significant capitalization of subsidies into property prices, the recently introduced subsidy
schemes fail to deliver on its promise to make housing more aordable.
While my results capture short-term eects, future research might address long-term eects
on house prices and construction activity. As housing supply might be more elastic in the
medium and long-run, long-term capitalization eects may plausibly dier frommy findings.
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4 Richer or More Numerous or Both? The Role of
Population and Economic Growth for Top Income
Shares
4.1 Introduction
Income inequality is amulti-faceted concept, andno singlemeasure can capture all its relevant
aspects. When studying top incomes and their importance in the income distribution, the
most commonly used measure is the income share of a fixed percentile of the population.
This top income sharemeasuremeets many of the desired distributional criteria that a proper
inequality measure should meet. However, it is sensitive to developments in the size of the
underlying population or in the real economy. A growing population implies that the size of
the top group grows regardless of whether the incomes of its top earners change in real or
even relative terms. Productivity growth that lis amajority of the population towelfare levels
previously only enjoyed by the rich would not result in higher top income shares if this growth
aects everybody equally since the standardmeasure captures the income share of a fixed
fractile of the population. Whether these properties are desirable for a top income inequality
measure in times of population andeconomic growthor not depends on the researchquestion.
Nonetheless, it is important to notice that the standard top income share measure is only
one of several ways of representing the relative status of top earners. The present study is
the first to extend the scope of analyzing top incomes by proposing alternative measures of
top shares that explicitly account for population and income growth. We apply these new
measures to data from the United States for the period between 1917 and 2014 to analyze if
and how long-run inequality trends dier when using dierent measures.
The seminal article by Piketty and Saez (2003) was the first to compute top income shares
for the US for the entire twentieth century.1 In its aermath, many studies have analyzed
dierent aspects of top incomes in the US and largely corroborated the main findings of
Piketty and Saez.2 However, this literature has paid little attention to how secular trends in
This chapter is joint work with Andreas Peichl and Daniel Waldenström and circulates as Krolage et al. (2018).
1 Previous studies of US top income shares by Kuznets (1955) and Feenberg and Poterba (1993, 2000) focused
on shorter time periods.
2 See, e.g., Wol (2002), Kopczuk et al. (2010), Atkinson et al. (2011).
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real incomes, productivity and the population size have influenced top income shares. As over
the past century, the US population has tripled and real per capita GDP has increasedmore
than fivefold (see Figures 4.A.1 and 4.A.2 in the Appendix), it may be of first-order relevance to
analyze how these factors influence inequality trends. To be able to conduct such analyses,
alternative inequality measures are necessary as complements to the standard approach.
We propose three alternative ways to compute top income shares, all aimed at reflecting
dierent aspects of income inequality. The new measures capture the roles of aggregate
income and population growth in a dierent way than the baseline top income sharemeasure
does.3 The first two measures fix an income threshold, which corresponds to a certain top
fractile – say, the top 1 percent – in a given year, and then deflate that threshold over time
using either consumer prices (our first alternative measure) or GDP (our second measure).
The third measure instead defines a fixed top group in terms of number of units, for example
the top 1million earners, and then tracks their income shares over time.
The idea behind using these alternative top income shares is that they capture dierent, and
yet relevant, aspects of top income inequality than the standard top share measure does. By
fixing a real top income threshold above which all individuals are counted as top earners, we
get a measure allowing both a higher average income and a larger group size to contribute to
an increasing top income share. If the economy grows such thatmore people can consume the
same amount of welfare (in constant consumer prices or constant overall output) as previous
top earners, the economy produces more top income earners. Our new top share measures
that use either CPI- orGDP-deflated top income thresholds thus allowus to answer another top
inequality question: “Have the income rich becomemore numerous?”. This question cannot
be answered by the standard top share measure since it fixes the top group size relative to the
size of the whole population.4 By fixing the number of top earners, as in our final alternative
measure,we remove the impact of population growthon the top income share. In the standard
measure, top shares may increase as the population grows simply because the size of the top
group has increased as it is a fixed share of the total. Of course, the population growth eect
on top income shares can be either positive or negative. A positive eect arises if population
growth mainly implies adding low-income earners, perhaps due to immigration of low-skilled
people. This would make the top group expandmechanically as it is a fixed share of the total,
and lead to an inclusion of more andmore relatively well-paid individuals. The standard top
3 We also compare our results with the new series using distributional national accounts (DINA) using the data
from Piketty et al. (2018) that are available since 1960 (c.f. section 4.4.3).
4 These measures are thereby related to the headcount measures commonly used in poverty analysis. See
Peichl et al. (2010) for a comprehensive discussion and analysis of such measures in analyzing aluence.
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share measure would then increase even though the real incomes of the top earners have not
changed at all.
This analysis is closely related to the literature on absolute versus relative inequality mea-
surement. The baseline top income share measure is a purely relative measure, while our
three alternative measures are either hybrids (those fixing a relative income threshold and
then deflating to capture absolute income changes) or a purely absolute measure (fixed top
group). Relative inequality measures have been by far the most widely used, and for good
reason. Relative incomemeasures are scale-invariant, allowing for comparisons over time
despite changes in overall population size or incomes earned. However, the inability of rela-
tive incomemeasures to reflect changes in the structure of incomes or income groups has
spurred discussions among inequality researchers about whether one should always favor
relative over absolute notions of inequality (see, e.g., Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010; Bosmans
et al., 2014, in the context of global inequality measurement). Related to this, survey evidence
suggests that many people perceive absolute (rather than relative) dierences in incomes as
being an important aspect of inequality (see, e.g., Amiel and Cowell, 1992, 1999). Therefore,
in addition to relative measures, other inequality measures that reflect either an absolute or
intermediate notion of inequality have been proposed in the literature. We contribute to this
literature by providing the first alternative top income shares that allow for other notions of
inequality compared to the standard approach which takes a relative point of view.5
Our empirical application to the US income distribution shows that the broad U-shaped top
income share trends documented by Piketty and Saez are also apparent in our newmeasures,
but with some interesting qualifications. Compared to the standard measure, the decrease in
inequality up to the 1980s is largerwhen usingGDP-deflated top incomes and a fixed top group
but smaller when using CPI-deflated top incomes. This variation reflects that the economic
hardship during the wars and the economic crises caused the top groups to shrink in size.
In the post-1980 era, the standard top shares have increased by an order of magnitude, e.g.,
the top percentile share has almost doubled between 1980 and 2010. However, both the CPI-
and GDP-deflated top income shares have increased at an even faster pace. In addition to
experiencing a higher income growth, these measures reflect that the top groups have also
grown in size; more people today qualify as top income earners than they did 30 years ago
when required to earn the same absolute income as in that era. The steeper top income share
trendwhen using GDP-deflated incomes suggests that productivity growth in society has been
5 This exercise is also related to the recent debate about absolute versus relative social mobility in the United
States (see, e.g., Chetty et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2017).
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disproportionately reaped by top earners.6 Looking at the measure using a fixed number
of top earners, the share is actually lower than the standard measure, reflecting a relative
shrinkage of this group.
We also find interesting patterns for the top groups just below the highest percentile, sug-
gesting that influences from population and economic growth are not homogeneous within
the top tail of the income distribution. In contrast to the expanding group size observed in
the top percentile, we observe rather stable population shares in lower top brackets using
the two fixed-income threshold measures (the fixed number of earner-measure is, of course,
unchanged). Their average incomes are also relatively similar to the standard topmeasures,
which jointly results in limited growth, or even slight decrease, in the income share of these
groups. In other words, the proportion of individuals with above-average productivity gains
are found almost exclusively in the highest-earning percentile, not in top groups lower down
the distribution.
We subsequently decompose the dierent top percentile measures’ post-1980 growth into
their underlying factors. This allows us to more precisely identify to which extent the develop-
ment of top income share measures is driven by changes in average top incomes, changes in
the number of taxpayers and changes in the lower part of the earnings distribution. Notably,
the number of taxpayers who increase their real income, as well as the number of taxpayers
who benefitmore than average from economic growth, increase at faster rates than the overall
population.
Finally, when running the analysis across income sources, we investigate the extent to which
the increasing importance of wage income is attributable to increasing numbers of taxpayers
belonging to the top percentile. While the baseline results show an increasing importance of
wage incomes at the top, our results point to a more nuanced development. We find that for
the very top, the relative importance of wages vis-à-vis capital and entrepreneurial income
has been slightly declining over the past three decades.
The contributions of our study are directed primarily at the income inequality literature. While
we are not the first to examine how dierent measurement approaches influence top income
share trends, previous studies have focused on the concept of income, for example the eect
of subtracting taxes and adding unrealized capital gains (Armour et al., 2013), on changing
the computation of business income (Alstadsaeter et al., 2016) or on using national accounts-
equivalent income measures (Piketty et al., 2018). The recent literature on distributional
national accounts (DINA) is of particular relevance for our analysis because it explicitly exam-
6 See Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) for an early discussion of the distribution of US productivity growth.
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ines the distributional eect of including the entire national income instead of only the fiscal
income concepts used so far in the top income literature. For this reason, we conduct a further
analysis of how our measures perform when using DINA-incomes rather than fiscal incomes.7
In addition, Auten and Splinter (2019) re-estimate top shares accounting for tax base changes,
income sources absent from tax records and changingmarriage rates. With theirmethodology,
income shares are shown to increase at a much lower rate. By contrast, our analysis keeps the
income concept unchanged throughout and instead focuses on dierent statistical measures
of top shares and their composition.
Our findings also add to the research literature assessing long-run trends in top income shares
in the Western world, specifically in the US. Most of these studies use the baseline definition
of top income shares (Piketty and Saez (2003), Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010), Leigh (2009),
Atkinson et al. (2011) and Roine and Waldenström (2015)), but in some cases, they use other
data sources to compute the top share (Burkhauser et al. (2012)). Our analysis complements
these studies by asking how the picture would change if one considers further aspects, such
as the variation in the size of top groups as in the fixed threshold measures. Using dierent
top share measures and a richer compositional analysis that comes with it could also provide
insights for cross-country comparisons of the historical evolution of inequality.
4.2 Empirical Approach
4.2.1 Methodology
Following Piketty and Saez (2003), the literature typically uses top income shares, i.e. the
share of total income going to the top x percent of the population, as inequality measures
for the top of the income distribution. This standard top income share measures the amount
of income of a fixed fraction of the population but without accounting for changes in the
composition of the population or in the distribution of income among the rich.8
In order to investigate the impact of population and real income growth on top income
inequality, dierentmeasuresarenecessary to complement the standardapproach. Therefore,
we propose three alternative ways to compute top income shares. Our main analysis then
7 There is a current debate about how to compute DINA incomes, for example, in the US case (Auten and Splinter,
2019). While our analysis is about the relative performance of dierent top share measures rather than which
underlying income one wishes to use, we nevertheless apply our methodology to both standard and DINA top
income shares.
8 See Peichl et al. (2010) for a comprehensive discussion of alternative measures to analyze top income inequal-
ity.
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consists of comparing the trends in top shares for the dierent measures. Comparing the
dierences between the four measures allows us to single out the contributions of population
and economic growth to the observed inequality trends. The purpose is not only to obtain a
picture of the sensitivity of these trends to these variations but also to explicitly account for
the growth of the population and the overall economy. To do so formally, we also propose a
decomposition analysis that separates howmuch of inequality growth is due to rising incomes
at the top versus declining incomes of the remainder of the distribution in addition to changes
in population size.
As discussed in the introduction, relative inequality measures have been by far the most
widely used in empirical analyses. However, other inequality measures have been proposed
in the literature which do not satisfy the relative scale invariance axiom but rather give an
absolute or intermediate notion of inequality. We contribute to this literature by providing
the first alternative top income shares that allow for absolute or intermediate notions of
inequality. The aim of this exercise is not to show that the standard approach (and hence the
scale invariance axiom) is incorrect. Rather, as in the literature on global inequality (see, e.g.,
Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010; Bosmans et al., 2014), the aim is to complement the standard
approach by combining relative, absolute and intermediate measures in the same analysis to
provide a fuller picture of inequality developments.
We compute top income shares for four dierent top groups that dier in whether their
population share and group size are variable or fixed:
1. Standardmeasure: Top income share used in Piketty and Saez (2003): fixed population
share, variable group size (in number of earners).
2. CPI-deflated threshold: Top income or population share of those earning above CPI-
deflated income threshold: variable population share, variable group size.
3. GDP-deflated threshold: Top income or population share of those earning above GDP-
deflated income threshold: variable population share, variable group size.
4. Fixed group size: Constant number of top earners: variable population share, fixed group
size.
MeasureA is thebaselinedefinition that hasbeenused in the top income literature. It is defined
as the share of total incomes earned by a fixed fractile (e.g., top decile or top percentile) of
the population. This standard top income share is a relative inequality measure that, among
others, satisfies the scale invariance axiom, i.e. inequality remains unchanged if all incomes
are multiplied by the same factor.
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Measure B refers to income earners with an income above a level that is linked to an income
threshold of a certain top group (e.g., the 99th percentile threshold for the top percentile
group) in a specific year. We deflate this threshold using the CPI, where the base year is either
the year 1980, which serves as a focal point in the inequality literature due to the substantial
tax reforms implemented in the early 1980s, or the first or the last year in our sample, 1917
and 2014, respectively.9 Since this measure varies in both income and population shares, we
compute both top income shares and top population shares (headcount ratios).
Measure C top shares are computed in the same way as those for measure B, except that
we deflate the income thresholds using per capita GDP instead of CPI to capture the overall
productivity growth in the economy. This step helps investigate the extent to which top
incomes have grownmore quickly than the overall economy.10 If increases in top real incomes
were attributable solely to economic growth and not to changes in the income distribution,
income and population shares above the GDP-deflated thresholds should remain roughly
constant over time. In a robustness check, where we use the DINA data, we apply the same
national income price index as Piketty et al. (2018).
Finally, measure D is the top income share of a constant number of top earners, such as the
top onemillion earners in the distribution. We include thismeasure since rising income shares
of measures B and C may reflect two eects: a rising number of taxpayers above the fixed
income thresholds and rising incomes of these earners. By fixing a number of high-earning
taxpayers, we isolate the latter eect. If population growth was distributionally neutral, the
income share of a given number of top earners should decline proportionally with population
growth. The extent to which the observed pattern deviates from this pattern is informative
about inequality trends within the top group.
To sum up, measure A is a relative top income share measure, measure D is an absolute one,
while measures B and C are hybrid measures providing an intermediate view. Which one
to use in an empirical analysis depends on the context and research question at hand. We
suggest to use all of them to investigate the full picture of inequality trends.
9 To be precise, we use the same inflation measure as Piketty and Saez (2003) which is the so-called CPI-U-RS
series. In a robustness check, where we use the DINA data, we apply the same national income price index as
Piketty et al. (2018).
10 Per capita growth is chosen instead of overall growth to net out the growth eect of the changing population
size.
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Decomposition analysis. We conduct two dierent decomposition analyses of the top
share measures in order to gain further insight into the forces driving them. The first is to
decompose changes in the top percent income share into the contributions of population size,
group size (for measures B and C), overall income and average income growth in the top and
bottom groups. More precisely, the income share Si of top fractile i can be decomposed as
Si =
ȲiNi
Ȳ N
⇔ ∆lnSi = ∆lnȲi + ∆lnNi −∆lnȲ −∆lnN, (4.1)
where Ȳ (Ȳi) indicates average income (in fractile i) andN (Ni) indicates the number of tax
units (in fractile i).
This decomposition allows us to more precisely identify the extent to which changes in top
income sharemeasures are driven by changes in average top incomes, changes in the number
of taxpayers, and changes in the denominator, i.e., in the incomes and size of the remaining
population.
In a second decomposition, we analyze the eect of dierent sources of income on overall
income trends: wages, capital income (excluding realized capital gains) and business income.
As before, we strive to neutralize the eect of population growth by fixing a certain number of
top taxpayers and tracking thedevelopmentof their incomesover time. We take the same fixed
numbers of taxpayers, calculate their average revenue derived from each income category
and derive the share of each group’s respective income categories in aggregate US income.
4.2.2 Data
Our estimates are based on the standard source of international top income data: The World
Inequality Database, and its predecessor, the World Wealth and Income Database. These
estimates encompass income shares and percentile thresholds for the US over the years
1917–2014, using incomes from all sources before tax and deductions and most transfers.
These data come from tax returns statistics compiled by the IRS and have been adjusted to
consider changes in the tax law (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Thresholds and annual incomes are
computed in real terms to ensure their comparability across years. Realized capital gains are
not included in the baseline calculations, but we show in the appendix that our findings are
not sensitive to the treatment of capital gains.
As is common in this literature, the units of analysis are the income tax units (single ormarried
households) and they are related to the total number of potential tax units in the population
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calculated from census data. Income thresholds and shares are calculated assuming a Pareto
distribution to approximate income shares of top fractiles.
Due to the large income growth over the past century and the fact that the World Wealth and
Income Database provides data on only the top income decile, we sometimes need additional
data for those cases when more than 10 percent of tax units surpass a given threshold. If
needed, we supplement the data with IRS SOI11 tax statistics on larger income brackets than
given in the World Wealth and Income Database. The corresponding data sets are available
from 1986 onwards and capture the income shares and thresholds of rather broad income
brackets.12
In addition, we contrast our findings with recent DINAmeasures. These are based on dierent
concepts for calculating top income shares and strive to capture the full scope of national
accounts (Piketty et al., 2018).
4.3 Top Income Share Trends Across Measures
We start our empirical analysis with a broad comparison of the four dierent top share mea-
sures by analyzing both income and population shares of the top group and their long-run
developments. In thenext subsections,weanalyzeour newmeasures inmoredetail by looking
at subgroups of the top 5 and the top 1 percent. In section 4.4, we dig deeper by decomposing
the various measures into their components as well as investigating dierential trends by
income source.
4.3.1 The Top 1 Percent Share
Figure 4.1 presents the evolution of the top 1 percent pre-tax income share in the US between
1917 and 2014 according to the four top income share measures presented above.13 Since it
commonly serves as a focal point in the literature, we use the year 1980 as a reference year
(see Figures 4.A.6 and 4.A.7 in the Appendix for reference years 1917 and 2014). Measure A,
the standard measure as used by Piketty and Saez, exhibits the marked U-shaped pattern
that has been described numerous times in the past literature, showing a share beginning
high at 15-20 percent, decreasing to under ten percent and finally rising to prewar levels in
11 Source: https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-3
12 As Piketty and Saez’s computation procedure results in a slight divergence between World Wealth and Income
data and IRS data, adjustments were made to ensure that the 10-percent threshold of the IRS data matched the
10-percent level of our base dataset.
13 Figure 4.A.4 in the Appendix shows graphs for dierent top income groups.
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Figure 4.1: Dierent measures for the top 1 percent
Notes: This figure plots income shares for the four dierent top inequality measures (as described in section
4.2.1): the standard measure (A), the income shares of those earning above the CPI-deflated (B) or GDP-deflated
(C) 1980 income threshold, as well as the income share of the top 1million taxpayers (D). The measures are
constructed such that they equal each other in 1980 (see Appendix Figure 4.A.5 for 1917 and 2014 as baseline
year). The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data from the World Wealth and Income Database (see
section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
recent years. Measure B, which shows the income share of earners with an income above the
CPI-deflated 1980 income threshold (that is, the 99th percentile) looks dierent. It is much
lower in the prewar era, hovering around ten percent, where it stays until the mid-1980s,
when it rises rapidly, reaching over 30 percent in the 2000s. Measure C, the GDP-deflated
1980 income threshold is also dierent. This share drops drastically from over 30 percent
in the interwar era to ten percent in the 1960s, a fall that is twice as large as in the baseline
series. Moreover, while the share remains rather similar to the baseline until the mid-1980s,
it displays a substantially higher growth rate aerwards and again reaches the level it had
amounted to a century ago. Finally, measure D shows the income share of the top 1million
tax units – the approximate number of tax units in the baseline around 1980. This series is the
most similar to the baseline, with deviations primarily reflecting the eect of dierences in
group size (being relatively larger before 1980 and relatively smaller aerward).14
14 Qualitatively, the results do not change bymuch when we analyze incomes including capital gains (c.f. Fig-
ure 4.A.8 in the Appendix).
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The main message in Figure 4.1 is that developments within shorter periods (though still
several decades) are apparently sensitive to how one defines the top income shares. Our
analysis thus shows that having dierent types of top income share series provides new
insights on the evolution of income inequality. The dierence between the baseline and the
fixed threshold series reflects that not only the relative incomes of top earners but also the
size of their group matter. Deflating the threshold using GDP provides information about
the distribution of the economy’s overall productivity gains: from the 1930s to the 1950s,
they went mostly to the bottom 99 percent, while they subsequently were roughly equally
distributedbetween the top 1980percentile and the rest till the late 1980s. From thenonwards,
they predominately accrued to the upper part of the earnings distribution. However, this
development is partly attributable to a rising fraction of individuals sharing the productivity
gains above the GDP-deflated 1980 threshold.
Next, we examine the evolution of top population shares using the four dierent measures.
This analysis diers from the analysis of top income shares and it addresses related but yet
slightly distinct questions. For example, top population shares are informative regarding the
degree of concentration among the rich (see also Atkinson (2008)) and the absolute number
of high-earning individuals in an economy. Figure 4.2 shows the population shares of the top
percentile income level for each of the four dierent measures.
Measure A, the baseline, is by construction fixed at the one percent level and entirely unin-
formative about inequality trends. Similarly, measure D falls steadily along with population
growth since the share of a fixed group size (the top 1million) falls as the population grows.
By contrast, measures B and C are more informative. Their developments correspond rela-
tively well to what was shown in Figure 4.1. The share of tax units above the CPI-deflated
1980 threshold (measure B) increases throughout the past century. This eect is due to both
productivity growth – increasing real incomes over time – and changes in the income distribu-
tion. Between the 1980s and the 2000s, the top population share increased threefold, which
reflects that top incomes increasedmore than consumer prices.
The share of taxpayers above the GDP-deflated 1980 top percentile threshold (measure C) –
which should follow a flat trajectory if tax units along the entire income distribution benefit
similarly from productivity growth – has been subject to dierent developments during the
past century. The share decreases quite sharply in the first half of the twentieth century, and
increases again from the 1990s onwards, albeit at a much lower level than the CPI-deflated
shares. In other words, when requiring that a top percentile income should match the 1980
level deflated using GDP, less and less top earners have been able to make it to the top in the
previous century. This group has again expanded in recent years.
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Figure 4.2: Population share of top 1 percent earners across measures
Notes: This figure plots population shares for the four dierent top inequality measures (as described in section
4.2.1): the standard measure (A; equal to 1 percent by construction), the population shares of those earning
above the CPI-deflated (B) or GDP-deflated (C) 1980 income threshold, as well as the population share of the
top 1 million taxpayers (D). The measures are constructed such that they equal each other in 1980 (see Appendix
Figure 4.A.5 for 1917 and 2014 as baseline year, respectively). The figure is based on authors’ calculations using
data from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax
fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
Table 4.1 presents an overview of average annual growth rates of the top percentile share
for the dierent measures during subperiods over the past century. The table distinguishes
between the growth in income shares and the growth in population shares, where the latter
corresponds to zero for the baseline shares but is more meaningful for the other measures.
Looking first at the income share growth rates, there is a fairly large correspondence in the
signs of growth rates across measures within subperiods. In one case, the sign diers: the CPI-
deflated top share during the 1950-1980 period shows a positive rate, while rates are negative
for the other measures. However, the magnitudes of growth dier quite notably between
the baseline and the other measures in several cases, especially during the postwar era. The
largest growth rates are observed in the 1980-2000 period. Incomes above the GDP-deflated
threshold have exhibited amuch higher growth rate than the underlying population share,
while this gap is much smaller for the CPI-deflated threshold. This underlines that over this
period, top earners have particularly benefited from economic growth.
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Table 4.1: Average annual growth rates of income and population shares for dierent top 1
percent measures
Annual growth in income and population shares
Period Standard CPI-deflated GDP-deflated Top 1
(Measure A) top thresholds (B) top thresholds (C) million (D)
Income Pop. Income Pop. Income Pop. Income Pop.
1917-1929 2.4 0 3.4 3.1 2.0 0.1 1.4 -1.6
1929-1950 -2.1 0 -1.8 3.0 -2.1 -1.4 -2.3 -1.1
1950-1980 -0.7 0 1.0 2.9 -1.1 -0.8 -1.8 -1.5
1980-2000 4.4 0 7.5 6.2 6.7 2.7 4.0 -1.5
2000-2014 0.4 0 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 -1.5
Notes: This table shows average annual growth rates of the top percentile share in percent for the dierent
measures during subperiods over the period of analysis. The four dierent top inequality measures (as
described in section 4.2.1) are: the standard measure (A), the income shares of those earning above the
CPI-deflated (B) or GDP-deflated (C) 1980 income threshold, as well as the income share of the top 1million
taxpayers (D). The measures are constructed such that they equal each other in 1980. The figure is based on
authors’ calculations using data from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The
income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
4.3.2 Top Groups Above Fixed Thresholds (Measures B and C)
We now zoom in on the dierent alternative top share measures by taking a closer look at the
long-run developments of dierent top fractiles and their income shares in the dierent top
share measures.
Measure B is based on CPI-deflated thresholds. Figure 4.3 shows the income shares and the
corresponding shares of taxpayers for incomebrackets above theCPI-deflated 1980 thresholds.
Comparing real incomes across years instead of comparing relative positions on the income
distribution in a year constitutes one approach to accounting for population growth. We
consider the top 5, 1, 0.5 and 0.1 percent thresholds. In order to highlight dierences along
the top, shares are displayed for the brackets in between the thresholds. This analysis hence
decomposes the top 1 percent shares reported in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 into three groups: top 1–
0.5, 0.5–0.1 and top 0.1 percent and additionally shows the group just below: top 5–1 percent.
Accounting for population growth reveals dierent developments than the well-known top
fractile results (c.f. Figure 4.A.3 in the appendix). The respective trajectories follow dierent
patterns, deviating from the familiar U-shaped one. The developments of income shares do
not closely follow the growth of population shares above thresholds. Instead, the income
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Figure 4.3: Top shares of those above CPI-deflated 1980 top thresholds (Measure B)
(a) Percentage of taxpayers above CPI-deflated
1980 top thresholds
(b) Income shares of taxpayers above CPI-deflated
1980 top thresholds
Notes: This figure plots population and income shares of those earning above the CPI-deflated 1980 income
threshold (Measure B, as described in section 4.2.1). The measure is constructed such that it equals the standard
top 1 percent share in 1980 (see Appendix Figure 4.A.6 for 1917 and 2014 as baseline years). The figure is based
on authors’ calculations using data from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details).
The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
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share between the top 1-0.5 percent thresholds remains rather constant, with some growth in
the 1990s. In contrast, the income share above the uppermost threshold has experienced a
large increase since the 1980s, while declining and then remaining at a roughly constant level
in previous decades. The income share of taxpayers between the 1 percent and 5 percent
thresholds has almost continuously grown since the early 20th century. These developments
cannot be fully explained by economic growth or by a simple fanning out of the income
distribution. A proportional growth of all incomes or an increased dispersion of incomes
would shi the tail of the distribution outward, leading to higher income shares for all – not
just some – upper thresholds. Instead, Figure 4.3 points to a more nuanced development
than onemight infer from the evolution of standard top income shares. Possible drivers are
discussed in detail in section 4.4.2.
Measure C is based on GDP-deflated thresholds. The above results are driven partly by eco-
nomic growth. We use per capita GDP-deflated thresholds (see Figure 4.A.2 in the appendix
for GDP growth) to assess whether top income earners havemore than proportionally ben-
efited from economic growth. If economic growth is equally distributed across the income
distribution, the population and income shares above the GDP-deflated thresholds should
remain roughly constant over time.
As shown in Figure 4.4, such constant population and income shares cannot consistently be
found in the data for GDP-deflated thresholds. As before, the figure depicts developments for
the GDP-deflated top 5-1, 1-0.5, 0.5-0.1 and 0.1 percent 1980 thresholds.15 Diering findings
emerge over time and for rather narrow and larger GDP-deflated thresholds. As shown in
subfigure (a), the percentage of tax units above all GDP-deflated top thresholds declined
aroundWorldWar II. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed diverging developments: more andmore
tax units exceeded the GDP-deflated 5 percent threshold during themid-twentieth century,
whereas the fraction of taxpayers above the GDP-deflated top 0.1 percent threshold shrank.
Hence, more andmore people with high – but not extremely high – incomes have benefited
more than proportionally from economic growth. As, at the same time, the percentage of tax
units above very high income thresholds continued to decline throughout the mid-twentieth
century, incomes at the larger top of the distribution becamemore equal. In the late 1970s,
the result reverses. From then onwards, the share of tax units above the 5 percent threshold
ceased to grow, whereas the number of tax units at the very top grew significantly.
For income shares, thepicture looks a little dierent. In linewith other findings in the literature,
the income share of those above the GDP-deflated 1980 0.1 percent threshold – the highest
in our computations – experienced a stark decline throughout the first half of the twentieth
15 Similar findings emerge for 1917 and 2014 thresholds. See Figure 4.A.7 in the appendix.
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Figure 4.4: Top shares of those above GDP-deflated 1980 top thresholds (Measure C)
(a) Percentage of taxpayers above GDP-deflated
1980 top thresholds
(b) Income shares of taxpayers above GDP-deflated
1980 top thresholds
Notes: This figure plots population and income shares of those earning above the per capita GDP-deflated 1980
income threshold (Measure C, as described in section 4.2.1). The measure is constructed such that it equals the
standard top 1 percent share in 1980 (see Appendix Figure 4.A.7 for 1917 and 2014 as baseline years). The figure
is based on authors’ calculations using data from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for
details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
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century. Remaining rather low until roughly 1980, this group’s income share has seen rapid
increases over the past three decades. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
income share of the top bracket has been subject to even more pronounced fluctuations than
the fraction of tax units above those thresholds. However, whilst decline and growth periods
coincide with the baseline, the share develops at a much larger magnitude.
The income shares between the GDP-deflated top 1-0.5 and 0.5-0.1 percent brackets shrank in
the first half of the twentieth century and began growing again in the 1980s. The time trend is
substantially less pronounced than for the tax units above the top GDP-deflated threshold. In
contrast, the decline of the 5-1 percent share halted aer World War II, with the share then
rising until the early 1980s. From the late 1980s onwards, it experienced a slight decline, only
to remain roughly constant in more recent years. Hence, the dispersion of incomes does not
evenly aect all high incomes.
4.3.3 Constant Number of Top Tax Units (Measure D)
While the comparison of income shares above thresholds indicates a pronounced growth-
exceeding increase only for incomes at the very top, it is driven by two eects: first by changes
in the number of taxpayers above those income thresholds and, second, by changes in the
income allocated to them. Hence, from Figure 4.4 alone, one cannot seamlessly infer which
part is attributable to the presence of more or fewer taxpayers exceeding the threshold, and
which is attributable to individual taxpayers above the threshold increasing their respective
incomes.
To net out the eect of population growth and separate these two eects, we analyze how
the income share of a fixed number of taxpayers evolves over time (see Figure 4.5). For this,
we assess the income shares of the top 500 thousand, 500 thousand - 1 million, 1-2 million,
and 2-5 million taxpayers.16 Recall that distributionally neutral population growth should
lead to a proportional decline in this measure. However, this is not the case and this measure
likewise shows an increase in inequality in recent decades. Splitting top income shares into
sub-brackets yields more thorough insights on the eects at work. Most importantly, the
dierent income brackets at the top do not seem to follow the same general trend. Instead,
while incomes at the very top experience the widely discussed increase since the 1980s, this
increase does not necessarily apply to the slightly lower tier of top income recipients.
16 For the early 1900s, the income share of the top 5 million tax units cannot be calculated because they consti-
tuted more than 10 percent of all taxpayers in these years.
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Figure 4.5: Top shares of fixed numbers of earners (Measure D)
Notes: This figure plots income shares of fixed numbers of top tax units (Measure D, as described in section 4.2.1).
The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section
4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
In line with previous research, the income share of the uppermost income group – here, the
top 500,000 – sharply declined until 1980, when it began to substantially increase. A possible
explanation is that the richest individuals derive a substantial share of their income from
capital and entrepreneurial activities and from performance-tied compensation, e.g., via
bonus payments and stock options. These sources of earnings are more volatile andmore
tied to the business cycle than wages in lower income brackets. In line with this, the spikes
and troughs in recent years may be explained by the Dot-com bubble and the Great Recession.
The picture completely changes for the top 0.5 to 2 million, who did not improve their income
share over time. This starkly contrasts with the top 2 to 5 million, who, similar to the very top,
have seen increasing income shares since the 1980s. General trends in the developments are
fairly robust to excluding or including capital gains.
The above findings accentuate that the top 1 percentile (which would have encompassed
several of the above groups in 2014) is far from being a homogeneous group. Instead, there
seem to be dierential forces at work that distinguish the top segments from one another.
An explanation might well be found by dierentiating why certain taxpayers belong to the
top. In other words, to what extent are rentiers, who derive most of their income from capital,
entrepreneurs, and topmanagers, who all receive rather high incomes, subject to dierent
time trends? The decomposition in section 4.4.2 sheds light on this question.
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4.4 Decomposition Analysis and Robustness
4.4.1 The Role of Income and Population Changes
We now implement the decomposition analysis presented in section 2 (see equation 4.1),
which decomposes changes in the log income share of the top percentile into changes in its
average income, in the average income of the lower 99 percent, and of overall population
growth. As a starting point, Figure 4.6 depicts the average annual changes in log income shares
over the 1980-2014 period for the previously discussed core measures: the Piketty and Saez
baseline top 1 percent income share, the income shares above CPI- and GDP-deflated 1980
top1percent thresholds, and the top1million taxpayers. These changes are thendecomposed
into their contributions. That is, we display average changes in average incomes for the top 1
percent and for the bottom 99 percent measures as well as the changes in the number of
taxpayers in the respective top 1 percent and bottom 99 percent. As indicated by equation
4.1, positive changes in average top incomes increase income shares, while increases in the
bottom 99 percent’s average incomes lower income shares. At the same time, increases in the
number of tax units above (below) the threshold have a positive (negative) eect on the top
income share. Therefore, in order to be consistent with equation 4.1, increases in the bottom
population and income share appear as negative numbers in the figure.
The income share above the CPI-deflated threshold growsmore on average than the unad-
justed top income share. While average incomes above the threshold experience positive
average growth, the eect is driven substantially by an increasing number of taxpayers exceed-
ing the threshold. More precisely, the number of taxpayers above the threshold experiences
much faster growth than the overall number of taxpayers. That is, in both absolute and relative
terms, an increasing number of taxpayers earned at least as much real income as the top 1
percent in 1980.
To a lesser degree, this also holds true for the income share above the GDP-deflated 1980
threshold. The growing income share is substantially driven by the increasing number of
taxpayers at the top, again rising at a much faster pace than the overall number of taxpayers.
Growing average income at the top also plays an important role. This development is however
partly attributable to the threshold increasing with per-capita GDP, which ceteris paribus
results in growing average income above the threshold.
By construction, the number of taxpayers in the top 1 million stays constant. The positive
growth in their income share is thus driven entirely by the top 1 million experiencing substan-
tially higher income growth than the rest of the population. Nevertheless, the remainder of
the population was also able to increase their real incomes, albeit at a much smaller scope.
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Figure 4.6: Decomposing the top percentile growth, 1980-2014
Notes: This figure plots the results from the decomposition analysis presented in section 2 (see equation 4.1),
which decomposes changes in the log income share of the top percentile into changes in its average income, in
the average income of the lower 99 percent, and of overall population growth (number of taxpayers in top vs.
bottom). Results of this decomposition over the 1980-2014 period are presented for standard measure (A), the
income shares above CPI- (B) and GDP-deflated (C) 1980 top 1 percent thresholds, and the top 1million
taxpayers (D). In order to be consistent with equation 4.1, increases in the bottom (top) population and income
share appear as negative (positive) numbers in the figure. The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data
from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal
income, excluding capital gains.
That is, not only do the various measures yield diering developments, but the factors driving
these measures also vary. The number of taxpayers increasing their real income, and the
number of those that benefit more than average from economic growth, grow faster than the
overall population as reflected in the baseline.
4.4.2 Dierential Eects by Income Source
To further assess which factors drive the dierential development of top income shares, we
approximate the contribution to income shares of wages, capital (dividends, interest and
rents) and entrepreneurial income. According to past research (cf. section 4.1), wage income
became increasingly important for top percentiles in the second half of the twentieth century.
At the same time, the relative importance of capital income declined. While these results have
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been widely discussed, our previous question also applies here: To what extent are these
findings driven by changes in the denominator? As above, with the population increasing
threefold over the course of the past century, taxpayers with comparably lower incomes – and
hence a larger share of wage income on average – moved to higher fractiles of the income
distribution. Hence, to what extent is the increasing importance of wage income attributable
to more andmore taxpayers belonging to the top 1 or top 0.1 percentiles?
For this analysis, we track the same top 500 thousand, 1 million, 2 million, and 5 million
taxpayers as above and decompose their incomes according to their sources. When the
number of taxpayers in each income bracket is held constant, a dierent picture emerges than
that for top percentiles, which do not account for population growth. The following describes
the developments by income source.
Wage income. This category encompasses all income derived from dependent labor, i.e.,
wages, salaries and pensions. Figure 4.7 displays wage income’s share in the overall popula-
tion’s aggregate income. The shares of top income groups’ wages in aggregate income have
grown since the 1980s for both the top 500,000, as well as for the top 2 to 5 million.
Figure 4.7: Wage shares of top income brackets (Measure D)
Notes: This figure plots wage income shares of fixed numbers of top tax units in aggregate income (Measure D, as
described in section 4.2.1). The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data from the World Wealth and
Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital
gains.
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In particular, the overall income shares of the uppermost category’s wages have roughly
tripled during the past three decades. In contrast, the top 0.5 to 2 million’s wages have not
increased relative to overall income.
These findings diverge from the results computed with total income. While wages became
increasingly important for earners at the very top and in the middle-upper class, a similar
eect fails to manifest for income earners between these groups. Comparing wage income to
entrepreneurial and capital income shares, though, the relative importance of wage income
has even been slightly declining at the very top of the income distribution. Note, though, that
while we track a constant number of top income earners, we cannot track individuals. Salary
increases for top-earning executives might have lied them into a higher bracket, in turn
shiing taxpayers who are less dependent on wage income – and therefore did not benefit
from a similar increase – to a lower income bracket. Hence, the lack of an increase in the
top 0.5 to 1.5 million’s wage shares might be partly attributable to changing compositions of
taxpayers at the top.
However, the recent growth at the very top is consistent with the ‘superstar’ hypothesis of
Rosen (1981). Globalization and technological change, particularly in the realm of information
and communication technologies, have led to expansions of scale during the past three
decades. Hence, thosewith the very highest abilities havemanaged to obtain larger and larger
rents. The reach of those with ‘second-best’ abilities, however, is limited by these ‘superstars’,
explaining why the importance of wages has not risen for the top 0.5 to 2 million.
Another potential contributing factor to the rising importance of wages is the increased assor-
tativemating that has occurred since the 1970s (Schwartz, 2010). Because income ismeasured
at the tax unit level, the increased propensity to marry a spouse with a similarly high income
should increase both the importance of wages and overall income shares over time.
Another popular explanation for this development are tax reforms, particularly the 1981 and
1986 Tax Reform Acts (Bargain et al., 2015; Feldstein, 1995; Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997;
Hausman and Poterba, 1987). In addition to a broad range of measures, the 1986 TRA reduced
top marginal tax rates from 50 to 28 percent but broadened tax bases. The 1980s constituted
a tipping point in the development of top wage incomes. Aer the tax reforms, the shares of
top wages in overall national incomes increased, but the previously increasing importance of
wages relative to other income sources of top earners came to a halt. That is, while top earners
became relatively richer and their wages grew over time, their earnings increases were driven
by both wages – possibly driven by the developments described above – and other income
sources. Other reforms of income tax rates did not have such pronounced eects. Notably, the
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Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 increased topmarginal tax rates from 31 to 39.6
percent, but this increase can be associated at best with small fluctuations in wage shares.
Capital income. Capital income is composed of rents, dividends and interest. The share of
capital income followed a rather flat trajectory from the 1940s to the 1970s for the top 500,000
to 5 million. This holds for both the share in aggregate income and its importance relative to
top earners’ other income sources.
Figure 4.8: Capital shares of top income brackets (Measure D)
Notes: This figure plots capital income shares of fixed numbers of top tax units in aggregate income (Measure D,
as described in section 4.2.1). The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data from the World Wealth and
Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital
gains.
For the uppermost 500,000, however, capital income has increasingly contributed to their
income in recent years. Nevertheless, the recent increase pales in comparison to the income
shares that top earners obtained from dividends, interest and rents prior to World War II.
The spike in the early 1980s was accompanied by a sharp drop in business income (see Fig-
ure 4.9). Part of this development may therefore be related to reclassification of incomes in
response to changing tax incentives. Some of the development may also be attributable to
changing tax avoidance and evasion opportunities over time.
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Business income. Revenues from entrepreneurial activities have been subject to large
changes. While for all top incomebrackets, the importanceof entrepreneurial incomedeclined
fromWorld War II throughout the 1970s, it has seen a sharp rise since the 1980s. Not only has
the proportion of income generated by entrepreneurs multiplied, but overall entrepreneurial
revenues have also contributed to overall US incomes at increasing rates for the top 500,000
and, to a much lower extent, the top 2–5 million. Strikingly, while entrepreneurial income has
played less of a role for the top 500,000 than for taxpayers with incomes just below theirs, this
relation reversed aer 1980.
Figure 4.9: Entrepreneurial income shares of top income brackets (Measure D)
Notes: This figure plots entrepreneurial income shares of fixed numbers of top tax units in aggregate income
(Measure D, as described in section 4.2.1). The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data from the World
Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income,
excluding capital gains.
Much of the large jump in Figure 4.9 may be attributable to reclassifications and incentives
related to the 1986 Tax Reform Act (Feldstein, 1995; Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997; Hausman
and Poterba, 1987). First, the abolition of the general utilities rule made C-corporations less
attractive. Prior to the reform, such corporations had allowed for lower tax rates than the
personal income tax. As a result of the reform, many C-corporations were converted into
S-corporations. Thereby, previously excluded corporate income was included on personal
tax returns, counting towards entrepreneurial income (Feldstein, 1995). Top earners’ higher
capacity for tax avoidance might also explain why the eect was larger for the top 500,000
than for the subsequent high-income earners.
116
4 Richer or More Numerous or Both?
4.4.3 Using Data from the Distributional National Accounts
Recently, Piketty et al. (2018) analyzed income distribution trends with broader measures
that strive to capture the full scope of national accounts. Based on tax, survey and national
accounts data, DINAmeasures are more comprehensive than standard top share measures.
In particular, the pre-tax national incomemeasure captures all income flows to capital and
labor, accounting for pensions, unemployment and disability insurance. I.e., it corresponds
to income before government intervention.
Our measures can likewise be applied to this income concept. As opposed to the standard
top income share data, suicient DINA data is only available from the 1960s onwards.17 In
addition to being more comprehensive, the DINA calculations dier in further aspects, which
are attributable to dierences in the data sets.18
Despite themethodological dierences, the DINA-basedmeasures for the top percentile in
Figure 4.10 follow a very similar trajectory compared to the dierent top sharemeasures using
the standard data. Interestingly, the biggest dierence between the two data sources can be
found for the standard top income share measure. Both population and income shares above
the CPI-deflated top 1 percent thresholds have risen rapidly in the last three decades. Income
and population shares above the GDP-deflated top 1 percent threshold follow a similar, but
less pronounced trend.
The very high degree of similarity between DINA and standard measures grants further cred-
ibility to our measures and indicates that our measures can be applied to a wide array of
income concepts.
17 Prior years lack information on top thresholds and only contain limited information on top shares. Calculating
our alternative top share measures with a suicient degree of precision is thus not possible.
18 Instead of tax units, DINA considers individuals age 20 or older, between whom incomes are equally split
within households. We correspondingly deflate thresholds by per adult GDP. Instead of the CPI, the data set
also uses the national income price index rather than the CPI for deflating thresholds. Moreover, from the 1960s
onwards, top thresholds and shares are available at a much finer grid than the standard top share data, with
separate measures for every percentile and an even finer grid within the top percentile. We exploit this dierent
data structure and use piecewise linear interpolation to obtain measures above thresholds.
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Figure 4.10: Standard vs. DINA data
(a) Standard (Measure A) (b) CPI-deflated incomes (Measure B)
(c) GDP-deflated incomes (Measure C) (d) Top 1million (Measure D)
Notes: This figure compares top percentile income shares for the four dierent top income inequality measures
using two dierent data concepts: standard data and DINA data. The four dierent top inequality measures
(as described in section 4.2.1) are: the standard measure (A), the income shares of those earning above the
CPI-deflated (B) or GDP-deflated (C) 1980 income threshold, as well as the income share of the top 1 million
taxpayers (D). The measures are constructed such that they equal each other in 1980. The figure is based on
authors’ calculations using data from theWorld Wealth and Income Database and the World Inequality Database
(see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is, respectively, pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains,
and pre-tax national income.
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4.5 Concluding Discussion
Themeasurement of income inequality trends has been discussed extensively in the academic
inequality literature. The recent top income literature has proposed using top income shares
to capture inequality dynamics, and it has received tremendous attention and spurred much
new research. However, little attention has been paid to the fact that the standard top income
share measure is only one of several variants of top income share measures. By focusing on
incomes earned by a fixed share of the population, this measure does not fully reflect changes
in the economy that could make the top group either shrink or grow relative to the rest of the
population.
Our study oers three alternative top share measures that try to address this aspect, focusing
on the influence of real income growth and population growth. The first twomeasures define
an income threshold in a certain year above which income earners are said to belong to the
top (dierent thresholds refer to dierent top fractiles). This threshold is then extended to
later or earlier years, deflating either by CPI or GDP to reflect the relative influence of increased
purchasing power or relative shares in overall productivity growth. The third measure fixes
the top group in terms of number of earners, making it insensitive to population growth.
Our empirical application of these measures to the long-run trends in US top income shares
shows that our measures oer a broadly consistent picture with the one previously provided
by Piketty and Saez. We find a decline in top shares in the first half of the twentieth century
and a rise in the period aer 1980. However, our findings point to several additional patterns,
in particular concerning top sharemeasures that are anchored at the absolute level of income
in one particular year and then deflated over time using either consumer prices or GDP. Most
notable are the dierences between threshold levels in the CPI- and GDP-deflated measures.
While groups at the very top are roughly similar to the baseline measures, trajectories of
groups in the upper middle class vary a great deal.
It should be noted that these alternative measures are complementary to the standard ap-
proach. In fact, we believe that using them in parallel could oer a valuable strategy for the
study of top incomes, and we think that this is underlined by our analysis of US historical
experiences.
The analysis of the role of GDP-deflated real incomes relates to the recent studies on inequality
outcomes using a broader income concept that includes all of national income instead of just
tax return-based fiscal incomes (Piketty et al., 2018; Bozio et al., 2016; Auten and Splinter,
2019). We apply our alternative measures to these distributional national accounts incomes
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and find broadly consistent results. Again, our contribution is to oer alternative top income
share measures, and these can be used on any underlying concept of income.
We hope that future research will continue working on refining the way income inequality
is measured. Our alternative top incomemeasures oer one way of approaching similar re-
assessments of top shares for other countries, and even of conducting cross-country analyses
of the development of top income shares over time. This analysis could shed additional light
on the multitude of factors driving the diering developments across and within countries.
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Appendix
Population growth. As depicted in Figure 4.A.1, the US population has more than tripled
over the course of the past century. The number of tax units has grown by a factor of four
across the same time period. Data are taken from the World Wealth and Income Database.
Figure 4.A.1: US population growth
Notes: This figure plots the US population size and the number of tax units over time. The figure is based on data
from the World Wealth and Income Database.
Economic growth. Figure 4.A.2 displays the development of overall and per tax unit real
GDP in 2014 terms. Data are taken from the World Wealth and Income Database and from
Johnston and Williamson (2018).
Figure 4.A.2: Real GDP growth
Notes: This figure plots real GDP and real per tax unit GDP in 2014 USD over time. The figure is based on data
from the World Wealth and Income Database and from http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/ (Johnston and
Williamson, 2018).
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The key results of Piketty and Saez. As a baseline, Figure 4.A.3 displays the evolution of
top income shares excluding capital gains over time. The upper figure depicts the unadjusted
top income shares as in Piketty and Saez (2003) and Piketty and Saez (2006). As shown in the
graph, top income shares stay roughly constant in the mid-twentieth century, but experience
substantial increases since the 1980s, especially at the very top. The bottom figure shows the
development of income shares in top income share brackets, such as the top 5-1 percent. This
provides a benchmark against which the alternative measures can be compared.
Figure 4.A.3: Development of unadjusted top income shares (Measure A)
(a) Top income shares (b) Income shares of top income brackets
Notes: This figure plots standard top income shares (Measure A, as described in section 4.2.1). The figure is based
on data from theWorldWealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax
fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
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Dierent measures for varying top percentiles. Similar to Figure 4.1, Figure 4.A.4 com-
pares top income shares for dierent parts of the 1980 top earnings distribution.
Figure 4.A.4: Dierent measures for varying top percentiles
(a) Top 5-1 percent (b) Top 1-0.5 percent
(c) Top 0.5-0.1 percent (d) Top 0.1 percent
Notes: This figure plots income shares for the four dierent top inequality measures (as described in section
4.2.1): the standard measure (A), the income shares of those earning above the CPI-deflated (B) or GDP-deflated
(C) 1980 income threshold, as well as the income share of a fixed number of taxpayers (D). The measures are
constructed such that they equal each other in 1980. The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data
from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal
income, excluding capital gains.
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1917 and 2014 thresholds. While our main results focus on 1980 thresholds, similar find-
ings emerge for CPI- or GDP-deflated 1917 and 2014 thresholds (4.A.5). Results for CPI-deflated
thresholds (fig. 4.A.6) and GDP-deflated thresholds (fig. 4.A.7) fit well with the 1980 results.
While the richest group of taxpayers has become significantly richer since the 1980s and has
obtainedmore than an equal share in the benefits of growth, the eect is not that clear-cut
for the middle upper class. Again, the groups that form the lower top (e.g. the 2014 top 5-1
percent) increase in size and gain larger income shares than those above them, but below the
very top.
Figure 4.A.5: Dierent measures for the top 1 percent: 1917 and 2014
(a) Income shares, 1917 (b) Population shares, 1917
(c) Income shares, 2014 (d) Population shares, 2014
Notes: This figure plots population and income shares for the four dierent top inequalitymeasures (as described
in section 4.2.1): the standard measure (A), the income shares of those earning above the CPI-deflated (B) or
GDP-deflated (C) 1917 and 2014 income thresholds, as well as the income share of the top 1million taxpayers
(D). Measures are constructed such that they equal each other in 1917 or 2014. The figure is based on authors’
calculations using data from the World Wealth and Income Database as well as IRS SOI data (see section 4.2.2 for
details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
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Figure 4.A.6: Income shares above CPI-deflated 1917 and 2014 thresholds (Measure B)
(a) Income shares above CPI-deflated
1917 thresholds
(b) Income shares above CPI-deflated
2014 thresholds
Notes: This figure plots population and income shares of those earning above the CPI-deflated 1917 and 2014
income thresholds (Measure B, as described in section 4.2.1). The measure is constructed such that it equals the
standard top 1 percent share in 1917 or 2014. The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data from the
World Wealth and Income Database as well as IRS SOI data (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is
pre-tax fiscal income, excluding capital gains.
Figure 4.A.7: Income shares above GDP-deflated 1917 and 2014 thresholds (Measure C)
(a) Income shares above GDP-deflated
1917 thresholds
(b) Income shares above GDP-deflated
2014 thresholds
Notes: This figure plots population and income shares of those earning above the per capita GDP-deflated 1917
and 2014 income thresholds (Measure C, as described in section 4.2.1). The measure is constructed such that it
equals the standard top 1 percent share in 1917 or 2014. The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data
from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal
income, excluding capital gains.
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Inclusion of capital gains. As a robustness check, Figure 4.A.8 displays 1980 top 1 percent
income shares including capital gains. As can be expected, income shares including capital
gains fluctuatemore than those net of capital gains in Figure 4.1. As for total incomes excluding
capital gains, top income shares start rising rapidly in the 1980s.
Figure 4.A.8: Top 1980 1 percent shares including capital gains
Notes: This figure plots income shares for the four dierent top inequality measures (as described in section
4.2.1): the standard measure (A), the income shares of those earning above the CPI-deflated (B) or GDP-deflated
(C) 1980 income threshold, as well as the income share of the top 1 million taxpayers (D). The measures are
constructed such that they equal each other in 1980. The figure is based on authors’ calculations using data
from the World Wealth and Income Database (see section 4.2.2 for details). The income concept is pre-tax fiscal
income, including capital gains.
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DINA 1980 top shares. As a further robustness check, Figure 4.A.9 shows the DINA equiva-
lent to the top shares presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
Figure 4.A.9: Top 1980 1 percent shares based on DINA
(a) Income shares (b) Population shares
Notes: This figure plots income shares for the four dierent top inequality measures (as described in section
4.2.1) using DINA data: the standard measure (A), the income shares of those earning above the CPI-deflated (B)
or GDP-deflated (C) 1980 income threshold, as well as the income share of the top 1million taxpayers (D). The
measures are constructed such that they equal each other in 1980. The figure is based on authors’ calculations
using data from the World Inequality Database (see sections 4.2.2 and 4.4.3 for details). The income concept is
pre-tax national income.
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